Bath, 11 October 1967
It is my lot to take the Chair on this 229th birthday of Admiral Phillip, and I do so with a mixture of pleasure and trepidation in this illustrious city of Bath.
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Hitherto, Britain and Australia have trod much the same paths. We are, after all, substantially a British country.
Ninety per cent of my countrymen are either of British origin or British born. Indeed, as I may have said here before, 1¼, million people from the United Kingdom have settled in Australia over the last 20 years. In the same period, you have also invested tremendous sums there, exceeding £1,000 million.
But now, unhappily, there are signs of change. May I give you three examples.
The old traditional trade relationship, dating back to Phillip’s settlement, is declining—not in absolute terms, but in percentages. This, I think, is partly due to the desire of not only the present British Government but its predecessor of which, my Lord Duke, you were such a distinguished member, to revolutionise Britain’s economy by joining the European Economic Community. Australians, amongst other Commonwealth countries, being threatened with the loss of their free entry, or preferences, in the United Kingdom market, have deliberately taken out insurance policies, as it were, by developing alternate markets in Asia, in North America, and elsewhere. In return we must naturally buy from our new customers, and so the British manufacturer suffers. There is still a sizeable proportion of Australian trade with Britain at peril should this country become part of Europe, and it is idle to pretend that we will be other than severely injured by the loss of the present preferential trade arrangements. No Australian Government, of course, would presume to dictate to Great Britain what she ought to do. That would be most impertinent. I hope you will agree, however, that we are entitled to point out the consequences: for our producers at home as well as for British exporters here should they, in turn, lose their own highly valuable preferences in Australia as a result of Britain joining the European community.
Our paths, too, are diverging in other aspects of the overall Commonwealth relationship. On our part, we are acutely aware of the heavy financial burdens of global defence on the British taxpayer; and we are deeply grateful for the splendid part this country has played in world affairs for centuries. But we would not be human if we were not disappointed by the British Government’s decision, last July, to abandon what is colloquially termed the East of Suez defence policy. Whether this was inevitable is something which will be long debated. What it does mean, I am afraid, is that this remarkable land of our ancestors, unique in so many respects, is going to count for less and less in world affairs in proportion to her retreat from global responsibilities. If the ultimate destination of Britain is merely to become one of a group of European states, a member of a European economic and a political confederation, then her diplomatic influence will be confined chiefly to Europe. The other nations of the old Commonwealth, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the smaller partners, will have to re-design their foreign, defence, and commercial policies, and proceed in some directions quite independently of what most Australians regard as the Mother Country. This, I must tell you, is what Australia is now being compelled to do.
The story of disassociation, which has become so marked in the last eighteen months, does not end there. The traditional streams of British investment to Australia and other sterling area countries will be gravely impeded as a result of restrictions imposed by the Treasury in 1966. If these restraints remain for more than a temporary period, Australia will undoubtedly suffer; on the other hand, her prospects are such that she will attract investment from elsewhere. In the long run the sufferer will not be us but you.
Ladies and Gentlemen, none of these things is necessarily irreversible, depressing as they may be to some of you and certainly to me. What I would like to put to you is that, considering the future of Australia, is it really wise policy for Britain to draw apart relentlessly from this dynamic, vibrant, thriving, progressing continent in the South Pacific—a continent peopled, in the main, by your own stock adapting your own institutions, living substantially the same way of life as you do here—a people who, by any standards of private or international conduct, must be regarded as your best friend?
Finally, is it too much to plead, at a gathering of this nature, for a recrudescence of feeling in Westminster and Whitehall towards the Commonwealth ideal? This is a cynical and materialist age. Historic ties, emotion, sentiment, are at a discount: they are said to be old-fashioned and to have no place in contemporary politics. I disagree: but if you look at the future solely from the angle of Britain’s plain material self-interest, surely she would be wise to tighten her bonds with the Old Commonwealth countries, and to make it fundamental to her policies to share with them her large population, her capital, her trade relationships, her foreign and defence policies, and thus participate in the ever-ascending fortunes of nations which our ancestors founded, and for which reason we are assembled here today to honour that adventurous English spirit Arthur Phillip.
I ask you to drink to the Toast—Phillip of Australia.
1 In October 1967, Downer became increasingly vocal in his reservations about British entry into the EEC. During a meeting in London with Westerman earlier in the year, the High Commissioner had stated that ‘unlike some of his Commonwealth colleagues in London, he took advantage of every opportunity to put forward Australia’s point of view’ on trade matters. Westerman replied with ’a note of caution on the best way to serve Australia’s trade policy needs at the present time … The tactics being adopted by Australia would not be helped by adopting a “ whingeing” or crying attitude’. He urged him to avail himself of the advice of his trade adviser in London, Allan Fleming (NAA: A4092, 78, record of conversation, Westerman and Downer, 23 February 1967).
[UKNA: FCO 20/50]