Canberra, May 1970
Confidential
United Kingdom Entry into the European Economic Community
The purpose of this Submission is to inform Ministers of the present situation of the negotiations for entry of the United Kingdom and other applicant countries, (Denmark, Norway and Ireland) into the European Economic Community and to consider the possible trade consequences and lines of future action for Australia.
The Present Situation
2. The British Government has stated that it will negotiate to enter the EEC provided that mutually fair terms can be identified and agreed. These negotiations will commence in June or July this year but it seems likely that the negotiations will not be pressed until after the British elections and could therefore run on even throughout 1971.
3. Assuming that the negotiations are successful, there would follow a period for ratification and a transitional period of possibly three to five years to enable the new members to phase in the Community policies as negotiated. Australia may therefore not feel the full implications of UK entry (if it takes place) until 1975–77.
4. It is difficult to make a judgement whether the UK will join the EEC as a result of its current application. While the earlier French attitude appears to have been modified and the leaders of all UK political parties are publicly committed to a real effort to join the EEC, recent statements in the UK including a White Paper have probably for the first time made public the quite significant immediate disadvantages in terms of cost of living, etc. Whether the statements have been made to establish a negotiating position, to condition the British public to acceptance of those disadvantages or to lessen the impact of a further failure to gain entry to the EEC, the effect appears to have been to sway a large section of public opinion in the UK against entry into the EEC. There is now speculation that the Wilson Government might come out against joining the Community on the basis that there is insufficient support from the man in the street.
5. The significant difference between the stated intention of the UK now as against 1961 is the omission of any reference to safeguarding ‘vital Commonwealth interests’. Apart from references to the special problems of New Zealand and sugar, it seems clear that considerations of the effects on the Commonwealth will not inhibit the British in the current bid for entry. Attached are statements made in recent years which indicate that Australia cannot expect the UK to seek any special modifications to lessen the effects upon our trade. (Attachment A).
6. For their own reasons, the UK will be seeking to reduce the impact of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) on those Australian commodities where we could expect the greatest damage to our exports. However, experience of recent negotiations among the Six on the CAP does not give any grounds for optimism that the system will be modified significantly with British entry.
7. Despite the immediate and tangible disadvantages in economic terms for Britain, we must face up to the possibility of the UK entering the EEC with little or no chance in the present CAP to ameliorate the damage to Australia’s exports. The UK would presumably assess the long-term (and less tangible) political and possibly economic benefits as outweighing the short term effects.
8. We could again be faced with the argument used extensively in earlier negotiations that in the longer term Australia would benefit more from an economically strong Britain within the EEC than Britain outside the Community progressively more isolated and growing at a relatively slow rate. All our experience suggests that it would be an optimist indeed who could see prospects for non-primary exports replacing our current agricultural exports even in a strong industrial Britain.
Implications for Australian Trade
9. As indicated above, the effect on Australia’s export trade would be felt more on agricultural exports to Britain. There is a strong tendency to discount the effects because of the decline in the relative importance of agricultural exports in our total exports pattern and the decline in the share of those exports going to the United Kingdom.
10. The decline in the relative importance of our agricultural exports (other than wool) since the last negotiations in 1960/61 from 36% to 31% of total exports has certainly reduced the impact somewhat for Australia as a whole. This has been brought about by an increase in overall exports due to the rapid growth of exports of minerals and manufacturers and also by a general decline in the prices of certain agricultural products. The decline in prices for these agricultural products has worsened the problems of the farmers producing the commodities to be affected.
11. Adoption of the CAP by Britain will, on top of the direct effect of diversion of trade to markets outside the UK, almost certainly mean a considerable reduction in demand for those commodities in the UK because of higher prices and possibly a quite significant increase in UK production because of improved returns to UK farmers. In other words a general worsening of the total world supply/demand situation.
12. The decline in the relative importance of Australia’s exports of agricultural products should not cause us to overlook the very real problems the loss of the UK market will bring the certain individual industries which still depend in large measure upon that market. Attachment B shows the implications for Australian exports of UK entry into the EEC comparing the position in 1959/61 with 1967/69.
13. For more than a decade the Government, Marketing Boards and producers have actively pursued a policy of diversifying markets for the commodities threatened. Attachment C shows that success in these endeavours varies from spectacular as in the case of meat to poor in the case of fruit. However, here again the statistics can be misleading, because even those markets outside the UK won by these efforts will be affected to some extent by UK entry. Clearly, the virtual closing of the largest open market will, because of increased competition in the residual markets, lead to a further fall in prices.
14. It is important to note that generally speaking because of lack of alternative markets less success has been achieved in diversifying markets for the very products most dependent on the UK market and most threatened by Britain’s possible entry into the EEC. Therefore should Britain enter the EEC on terms approaching the present CAP Australia will face the possibility of serious economic and social difficulties in significant areas of Australia because the producers will be unable to dispose of their goods.
15. To sum up, the effect of the UK entry into the EEC would overall be very much less disruptive to Australian trade now than it would have been in 1960/61. However, the effect on particular industries such as sugar, dairy and fruit would create very serious problems particularly in the light of their current economic position.
Future Policy
16. The attitude we adopted in 1961 and 1962 and have continued to maintain in relation to United Kingdom entry into the Community is that the decision on Britain joining is one for Britain alone but that important Australian trade interests (especially in the agricultural field) stand to be damaged. We tended in 1961 and 1962 to rely upon Britain to seek safeguards for our trade and although Australia made representations direct to the Six, these representations were based on our traditionat relationship with Britain. We also were unwilling at the time to specify which commodities we would regard as vital and for which we would seek some special provisions.
17. With the fairly clear indications now available that Britain will not be seeking any special safeguards in relation to Australia’s trade interests, we need to reconsider whether there is any alternative course of action available to us which could soften the impact of a British decision to enter the Community. Clearly we cannot be seen to be doing nothing to try to safeguard our interests, particularly as New Zealand has been very active in seeking to have accepted that it has a special position. Mr Marshall’s personal visits to Europe have been very sympathetically received although he has not been given any specific promise.
18. In my view, we can accept that no amount of representations, personal or otherwise, are going to achieve a special position for Australia such as New Zealand has. Nonetheless, it is imperative that our public positions, particularly as seen by the producers of those commodities likely to be most affected, be that we are doing what we can. It must be seen that we are doing everything possible to influence the enlargement of the Community in such a way as to cause the least damage to Australia. Whilst accepting that we are unlikely to get any really significant results I consider that I should make our position known in both Brussels and London at about the time of the commencement of the negotiations. Through our representatives in other capitals, including Washington and Tokyo, we should make known what we stand to suffer by way of damage to our trade.
19. In considering the alternative approaches to seeking special arrangements for Australia, one approach, which would involve to a-greater or lesser degree abandoning our reliance on traditional ties with the UK, would be to support a strong multilateral push to reduce the protective effect of the whole agricultural systems of the EEC. To have any real prospect of success such an approach would clearly need to be lead [sic] by the US. However, the US position is ambiguous. The President in his Foreign Policy statement said,
‘Our support for the strengthening and broadening of the European Community has not diminished. We recognise that our interests will necessarily be affected by Europe’s evolution, and we may have to make sacrifices in the common interest. We consider that the possible economic price of a truly unified Europe is outweighed by the gain in the political vitality of the west as a whole.’
On the other hand there are elements within the Administration who are clearly disturbed at the prospective damage to US export trade if the enlarged EEC were not to adopt a more enlightened CAP.
20. A concerted approach by Canada, Australia and other food producers such as the Latin Americans could perhaps stir the Americans into pressing the EEC strongly. I am doubtful whether we should take any overt initiative along these lines as yet. While the UK would welcome any support in its own endeavour to keep down the cost to it of the agricultural policies of the EEC, it could well use any overt Australian initiative along these lines as an excuse to absolve itself of any real responsibility for our interests. This would not preclude us from giving encouragement to moves in the United States and indeed the Community itself in working towards a less protective agricultural policy for the Community.
21. One aspect which we could tackle internationally and seek to convince other interested countries to follow would be to press for the compatibility of the expanded EEC with the GATT. The GATT approves the formation of a Customs union provided that ‘the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed at the institution of any such union’ in respect of trade with third countries ‘shall not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence of the duties and regulations of commerce applicable in the constituent territories prior to the formation of such a union.’
22. At the time of formation of the present EEC countries were beguiled by high-sounding phrases such as ‘outward-looking’ and, in the event, the GATT has never taken a decision on the compatibility or otherwise of the EEC. However, events have demonstrated fairly conclusively that the net effect was a raising of trade barriers. This was not particularly significant from Australia’s point of view as trade with the countries of the EEC was never very large. The possible entry of Britain, the world’s largest food importer is quite a different matter. We should now press the EEC and the UK to recognise that the entry of Britain and others with relatively freer import regimes means that to comply with GATT, there needs to be a very significant balancing down of the CAP if the new Customs Union is to comply with GATT.
23. Furthermore, we should press the point that even if the expanded Community does for it own ends pursue policies of support for agriculture which encourage increased production, these should not be such that surpluses are generated and disposed of in a manner which destroys other exporters’ markets outside the Community. At present, because of the operation of the CAP there is no disincentive for producers within the Community arising from the dumped prices at which surpluses are sold outside the Community. The provision of export subsidies in this way contravenes GATT and is one of the most disruptive influences of the Community on world trade in agricultural products. We should call upon the British to help in mitigating this aspect of the present CAP.
24. One of the alternatives frequently advanced at the time of the 1961 negotiations to meet the situation of food producing countries like Australia was the negotiation of international commodity agreements. Experience again does not suggest that this gives any real prospect for resolving our prospective difficulties. Neither the US nor the EEC for reasons of their own, is a member of the International Sugar Agreement. In the International Grains Arrangement where both did participate, there are already signs that attitudes in the US towards international commodity management are hardening. It is difficult to see any prospect of successful commodity agreements for a range of commodities, particularly while the EEC continues to be reluctant to tackle its own internal farm problems.
25. The other possibility which needs to be considered is that of applying to the EEC for some form of associate membership. The EEC is negotiating or has negotiated agreements for some form of association with a whole range of European and African countries, all of differing form which give favoured entry to the EEC but which largely leave the associated territory free to determine its own external tariff. While the EEC has asserted that the current association arrangements are definitely the last, the addition of the UK and other countries could reopen the possibility. There have been some suggestions that New Zealand could be contemplating seeking some form of association with an expanded EEC. Certainly, we should not ignore the possibility of such an application over the coming months.
26. In any case, bearing in mind that the formation of the present European Economic Community has resulted in a clear increase in trade barriers which in our view is contrary to GATT, we should make it known to the United Kingdom and to the other countries that whilst we are not opposed to the enlargement of the Community we consider that this should be done on the basis that trade barriers, non-tariff as well as tariff, are not increased and that further surpluses are not generated and dumped on world markets, without any disincentive on producers within the Community.
27. I have not dealt in this Submission with a number of other important issues which arise out of the negotiations—the possible effect on capital in-flow from the UK, the action that Australia would take on UK preferences in the Australian market, the effect on other Commonwealth preferences, the necessary action to assist industries affected, etc, I think we can defer consideration of these issues until the negotiations have moved forward somewhat.
28. On the occasion of the previous UK bid to join the Common Market, Cabinet appointed a Committee of Ministers with a subsidiary committee of officials, to keep a close watch on developments. I think we should appoint similar Committees now to cope with the issues as they arise in the forthcoming negotiations.
Recommendations
29. I recommend that:–
(a) we confirm our former attitude that it is for Britain to decide whether or not it joins the EEC but that important Australian trade interests stand to be seriously damaged;
(b) we should also make it clear that the enlargement of the Community should be done on the basis consistent with GATT that trade barriers, non-tariff and tariff, are not increased and that export of surpluses generated by the agricultural policies should not be subsidised;
(c) we should make it publicly clear that we are doing what we can to influence the UK and the Community in such a way as to cause the least damage to Australia;
(d) I explain our position clearly in Brussels and London and that our representatives in other countries stress to the EEC and the UK the importance of compliance with the GATT in that formation of the Union should not on the whole lead to an increase in trade barriers.
(e) a Committee to be appointed consisting of the Prime Minister, Treasurer, Minister for External Affairs, Primary Industry and myself to consider matters arising from the negotiations between the EEC and the UK.
ATTACHMENT A
UK ATTITUDE TO COMMONWEALTH INTERESTS
The present attitude of the UK Government towards special arrangements for the Commonwealth was originally set out in the following statement to the Western European Union, on July 4, 1967 by the then Foreign Secretary the Rt Honourable George Brown MP following Britain’s application to join the EEC.
‘There are two main questions which arise in relation both to Commonwealth interests and to agriculture: sugar and New Zealand.
For sugar, as you know, we have an agreement with Commonwealth sugar producers which runs until the end of 1974. Your own transitional arrangements are due to expire six months later. The commitment we have under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement is a contract which we must fulfil.
We believe that the sugar exported to Britain under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement can be accommodated within a reasonable production quota under existing Community arrangements, and without departure from the precedents which you have set for yourselves. We have also to look to the longer-term interests of the developing countries and territories many of whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on their exports of sugar and we believe that it is in the Community’s longer-term interest that we should do so. In due course, we shall wish to discuss with you how these interests can be safeguarded in the longer-term.
Turning to New Zealand: in 1962, and again when the Prime Minister and I visited the capitals of the Community countries in the first months of this year, we found general recognition that her case was of an altogether special kind, and should be treated by the Community as such. I do not believe that this should present the Community with problems which we cannot resolve together. New Zealand’s economy largely depends on her trade in butter, cheese and lamb. Because of the size of the British market for dairy produce, we believe that provisions for exports of butter and cheese from New Zealand would in no way be inconsistent with substantial benefits accruing to other members of a wider Community; and we shall need to discuss such provisions with you. In the case of cheese it may be found that in practice there will be little or no problem. But we could turn out to be wrong about this. So we shall ask you to agree to a review procedure to enable action to be taken if it is necessary.
For butter, more precise provision will have to be made. I am confident that in discussions together we can find a constructive and realistic solution. Community farmers have a strong interest with New Zealand in wishing to see the level of butter consumption maintained in Europe.
I now turn to the remaining questions relating to the Commonwealth.
During the 1961–63 negotiations between the Community and Britain it was provisionally agreed that, with one or two exceptions, associations under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome would be appropriate for our dependent territories. We trust that you would still agree that for these territories this is the best arrangement. We should discuss together the position of any dependent territories for which association is not appropriate.
It was also provisionally agreed during the 1961–63 negotiations that association under what was later negotiated as the Yaounde Convention should be open to independent Commonwealth countries in Africa and the Caribbean. The Community subsequently repeated this offer in the Declaration of Intent issued by the Council of Ministers of the Community in July, 1963—a Declaration of Intent which was in no way dependent on Britain’s becoming a member of the Community. I trust that we can quickly confirm that the alternatives contemplated in this declaration will be open to independent Commonwealth countries in Africa and in the Caribbean.
I realise that the Yaounde Convention is due to expire in May, 1969. It would scarcely be practicable for the Commonwealth countries in question to negotiate accession to the present Yaounde Convention.
I therefore suggest that these countries should be allowed to continue their present trading arrangements with Britain until new arrangements come into force after the expiry of the Yaounde Convention in the negotiation of which it should be open to them to take part.
Agreement was also reached in Principle in the 1961–63 negotiations that there should be certain trading arrangements for developing independent Commonwealth countries for whom association was not thought appropriate. We hope it will be possible to revive that agreement.’
This position was recently re-stated by the present Foreign Secretary, The Right Honourable Michael Stewart in a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society on 19 February 1970.
‘The arrangements we would seek for safeguarding essential Commonwealth interests were set down in Mr Brown’s statement to the WEU in 1967. They stand to-day. Briefly, we suggest as appropriate solutions, association under Part IV of the Treaty of Rome for our dependent territories; association as under the Yaounde Convention for the independent countries of Africa and the Caribbean; and trading arrangements as agreed in principle during the 1961–63 negotiations for other developing countries. In addition we have laid emphasis on safeguarding the long-term interest of those developing countries and territories dependent on sugar exports; and also on special safeguards for New Zealand’s daily produce.
The countries concerned are in no doubt of our position on all this.’
The position of the British Government on this question is illustrated by the following exchange in the House of Commons on 22nd October, 1969. On that occasion the Prime Minister was asked:–
‘Whether he will publish in Hansard details of the assurances which he gave to New Zealand’s interests if Britain enters the Common Market and to what extent such safeguards and assurances will apply to Australia as well as New Zealand.’
In reply he said:–
‘The New Zealand Government are aware that Her Majesty’s Government will seek the maximum accommodation for New Zealand’s interests, and that our position with regard to the safeguarding of New Zealand interests was set out in the Statement made by my Right Hon Friend the then Foreign Secretary to the Council of Western European Union on the 4th of July, 1967, and laid before the House on the same day as Command Paper No. 3345.1 repeated these assurances to the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr Marshall, in the course of our conversation on the 17th October. It has always been recognised that New Zealand’s case, in the event of British entry into the European Communities, is of an altogether special kind.’
Subsequently when the omission of any reference to Australia in the Prime Minister’s answer was taken up with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office by the Special Commercial Adviser in London he was told that the answer had been ‘very carefully prepared’.
Presumably this means that safeguards for Australia in the event of entry to the EEC are not being considered in British Government circles.
ATTACHMENT B
IMPLICATIONS OF UK ENTRY INTO THE EEC
POSITION IN 1967/69 COMPARED WITH 1959/61
Australian dependence on UK market almost half what it was in 1959/61
- Averaged over these three years (i.e. 1958/59–1960/61) the UK took 26.3% ($456m) of Australia’s total exports ($1,733m)
- Averaged over the three years 1966/67–1968/69, the proportion had shrunk to 13.5% ($410m) of total exports ($3,037m)
- 1968/69 figures show that the decline in relative importance of our exports to the UK has continued (12.8% or $416m).
Projections suggest that this trend could be expected to continue even if UK did not join the EEC and might come down to about 10% in 1974/75
Despite the reduction in Australia’s dependence on UK market, that market continues to represent a very important one for Australia and in value terms has not changed significantly over the period in question
- Average of $410m in 1966/67–1968/69 compared with $456m in 1958/59–1960/61.
Implications for Australia’s trade
- Studies have been made in relation to the principal items of our export trade to UK the results of which are summarised below
- total losses on these items in the UK market are likely to be of the order of $86m (2.7% of our total 1968/69 world exports)
Agricultural Products and Raw Materials
| Aust. Exports to UK 1968169| Estimated Loss
—|—|—
| Value
$Am| % of
Total
Exports| Value
$Am| % of
Total
Exports
Commodities in which UK the Dominant Australian market| | | |
(45% or more of exports valued at
$A I m or more in 1968/69)| | | |
Beef or Veal, Canned or Bottled| 2.2| 62%| 1.1| 31%
Butter| 27.6| 70%| 27.6| 70%
Apples, Fresh| 9.7| 49%| 3.6| 18%
Canned or Bottled Fruit| | | |
–Apricots| 1.0| 58%| .4| 23%
–Peaches| 7.7| 53%| 3.8| 26%
–Pears| 9.3| 82%| 4.6| 41%
–Fruit Salad| 2.5| 47%| 1.2| 23%
–Other (excl pineapples)| 1.8| 65%| 0.9| 32%
| | Sub-Total| 43.2|
Commodities in which UK still a Major Market| | | |
(5%–45% of exports valued at
$A I m or more in 1968/69)| | | |
Cheese| 2.0| 14%| 2.0| 14%
Eggs in Liquid Form| 1.5| 35%| 1.5| 35%
Wheat, Unmilled| 42.3| 16%| 9.1| 4%
Pears, fresh| 1.2| 29%| .4| 10%
Sultanas| 5.4| 32%| 2.7| 16%
Cane Sugar| 39.2| 34%| 8.0| 7%
Wine| 1.2| 35%| .8| 23%
| | Sub-Total| 24.5|
| Aust. Exports to UK 1968/69| Estimated Loss __
—|—|—
| Value
$Am| % of
Total
Exports| Value
$Am| % of
Total
Exports
Manufactures
(All items where Aust. exports to UK
exceed $20,000)| 103.6| | 18.3|
Of which| | | |
Gluten and gluten flour| 2.4| 70.6%| 2.4| 70.6%
Leather| 3.2| 72.1%| 1.6| 36.0%
Blooms, billets, etc of iron or steel| 1.5| 6.3%| .8| 3.4%
Coils for rerolling iron or steel, not stainless| 6.4| 82.1%| 3.2| 41.0%
Unworked lead and lead alloys nei| 10.2| 40.8%| 1.0| 4.0%
Unworked zinc and zinc alloys| 3.1| 11.4%| 1.5| 5.5%
Image projectors, etc| 1.0| 51.5%| .8| 41.2%
| | Losses/Grand Total| 86.0|
Alternative Markets
- limited availability of alternative markets for the major commodities
Butter/Cheese| very limited scope, some rise in unit returns possibly due to less EEC competition in third markets
—|—
Canned Fruit| limited scope, need to accept lower returns to compete
Fresh Apples and
Pears| active promotion could find alternative markets for probably half displacement
Dried Fruits| very limited scope
Cereals| difficult to find alternative soft wheat markets
Sugar| extremely limited, even assuming major revision of ISA BET’s
Wine| UK exports marginal to Aust. production; growing markets in NZ and Canada
Eggs| Some scope for increased sales in Japan (pulp), Middle East and Hong Kong
Beef and Veal
(Canned or Bottled)| Alternative markets not apparent
Leather| Little prospect for alternative markets
Regional Impact in Australia
- Significant repercussions likely for following major commodities
| Butter/Cheese | Victoria and Tasmania particularly hard hit; major exporters to UK |
|---|---|
| Canned Fruit | Serious for all producers but particularly MIA and South Australia |
| Fresh Fruit | Very serious for Tasmania and WA which are heavily dependent. on exports |
| Dried Fruit | Very serious effect on only significant producing area (Murray Valley) |
ATTACHMENT C
AUSTRALIAN EXPORTS OF SENSITIVE ITEMS
MAJOR MARKETS 1960/61 AND 1968/69
(BY VALUE)| %
1960/61| | %
1968/69
—|—|—|—
Meat| | |
USA| 43.5| US| 66.9
UK| 36.7| UK| 9.0
Malaysia| 2.5| Japan| 7.0
Japan| 1.6| Canada| 7.6
| | Papua/NG| 2.0
Dried fruit| | |
UK| 51.6| Canada| 30.6
Canada| 24.5| UK| 27.6
New Zealand| 10.1| New Zealand| 11.0
| | Germany FR| 10.1
| | USA| 4.0
Canned fruit| | |
UK| 89.7| UK| 60.9
Canada| 4.3| Canada| 14.0
New Zealand| 2.6| Germany FR| 5.6
| | Ireland| 3.3
| | Netherlands| 3.2
Fresh Fruit| | |
UK| 56.0| UK| 38.0
Sweden| 10.5| Germany FR| 14.5
Germany FR| 9.5| Singapore| 12.0
Malaysia| 7.8| Hong Kong| 5.0
New Zealand| 4.2| New Zealand| 5.0
Butter| | |
UK| 79.4| UK| 68.1
Singapore| 2.7| Singapore| 4.7
Ceylon| 2.4| Thailand| 3.4
Malaysia| 2.2| Malaysia| 3.2
Hong Kong| 2.0| Saudi Arabia| 2.8
Cheese| | |
UK| 56.5| Japan| 23.9
Arabian States| 12.9| Saudi Arabia| 15.6
Philippines| 6.7| UK| 14.0
Iraq| 4.6| Philippines| 9.3
| | Iraq| 7.2
| | USA| 6.2
Eggs and egg products| | |
UK| 76.9| UK| 32.5
Italy| 8.9| Japan| 45.5
Sugar| | |
UK| 50.4| UK| 32.1
Canada| 23.0| Japan| 19.9
Japan| 10.8| USA| 19.0
New Zealand| 6.2| Malaysia| 7.3
Hong Kong| 4.7| Canada| 7.0
Wheat & flour| | |
China (Mainland)| 20.9| Japan| 22.3
UK| 16.4| China (Mainland)| 20.8
Italy| 9.3| UK| 15.2
Japan| 7.2| Malaysia| 4.8
Iraq| 5.9| Ceylon| 2.9
Other cereals| | |
China (Mainland)| 22.0| Japan| 21.5
UK| 19.0| UK| 18.7
Italy| 17.6| Papua/NG| 9.7
Germany FR| 11.0| Netherlands| 8.4
Wine| | |
UK| 58.7| UK| 34.3
Canada| 7.9| Canada| 31.7
New Zealand| 6.2| Papua/NG| 9.6
| | New Zealand| 8.2
[NAA: A5619, C743 PART 2]