Canberra, 16 September 1970
Confidential
Mr Anthony said he was surprised that GATT had not been discussed at Mr Rippon’s meeting with Mr McEwen yesterday. However, this was not his problem and he would not pursue it now. As Mr Rippon well knew, the main problem for Australia created by British entry into the Community was agriculture. From his own experience he knew that the Community was extremely rigid. He recalled the fruitless attempts to make the Community party to the international Sugar Agreement. Mr Rippon said that the Community was at an early stage in its growth, and would certainly change: he hoped that with Britain in it this change would be in a more liberal direction. But it was only fair to say that the members of the Community were generous with their aid to developing countries and had not been unhelpful over UNCTAD. He thought the right solution for commodities was to remove trade barriers as well as trade preferences.
2. Mr Anthony said that Australians feared the growth of a monster which an enlarged Community could become. In reply to a question, he said he thought Australian agricultural exports to the members of the Community had declined in recent years. A lot of the market for Australian meat had, for example, been lost. Moreover, the preferences the Community had given to Greece and Turkey had diminished the market for Australian dried fruits. Because Australia had relied on the British market, she had not attempted some of the markets in the Community countries until too late. Mr Rippon said that he would be interested to see the figures for Australian exports to the Community; but the Australian Government must realise that the Community would be far more likely to take the attitude the Australian Government wanted if Britain was inside it. As for Greece and Turkey, they were extremely important for Western Europe from the strategic as well as political point of view. Mr Anthony said that Israel hardly fell into that category. Mr Rippon repeated that British influence would be far greater in the Community than outside it. One of the reasons for the failure of the last negotiations was our attempt to lay down too many conditions. This time we intended to pursue different tactics and the Australian Government should allow us to do our best. Indeed it would be gratifying if the Australian Government could make some public recognition of the wider political significance of the British candidature for membership of the Community and the long term advantages for Britain, the Commonwealth and the free world as a whole of a stable and united Europe. Australian difficulties must of course be stated but they should be seen in context. Mr Anthony said that Australia could not decide whether membership of the Community was good or bad for Britain or anyone else but they could assess the disadvantages to Australian agricultural interests. Mr Rippon said that he was as aware as anyone else. But it hurt the case he had to present in Brussels if Australians constantly said that Britain did not care and was ready to sell Australia down the river. This merely meant that the Community would refuse to take Britain’s pleas for Australia very seriously. He wished the Australian Government clearly to understand that HMG did care and were doing their best for Australia. HMG had never told the Community at any point that we were only concerned about British interests alone. Mr Anthony said that he and his colleagues heard on all sides that Britain was really fighting only for New Zealand’s dairy products and Caribbean sugar. He accepted that Australia was strong but repeated that she had certain interests which could be severely damaged. Mr Rippon said that some problems were more serious than others and some countries would be more hard hit than others. But did this not mean that HMG was unaware of Australia’s difficulties and would not do their best for Australia in the negotiations. If the Community refused to give us fair treatment, Britain’s entry into the Community would not be possible.
[UKNA: FCO 30/804]