Australian Embassy Paris, 8 June 1971
2661. Confidential
I saw Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas on 17 June for forty minutes. He invited me to raise any problems the Australian Government had concerning France.
2. I told him that the matter which was most on my mind at present was the effects which Britain’s entry into the EEC on the terms envisaged at present would have for Australia’s agriculture. These effects would be very serious indeed, in some areas they could only be described as catastrophic. The difficulties were compounded by the fact that they would come at a time when agriculture in Australia was going through a worse period than any since the depression of the 1930’s.
3. I said that in talks I had had with Rippon last year I had been given to believe that Britain would fight hard to get for Australia a transitional period during which Australia’s traditional export of agricultural products to the British market would be gradually scaled down or phased out. I now found that this was, it appeared, not to be the case and instead there could be a sudden cut-off of some exports of agricultural products immediately UK joined the EEC. This would have dire consequences in Australia where beyond the six largest cities most people depended upon agriculture for a living. In this respect, Britain had let Australia down.
4. The situation I had described would be very bad in itself but the consequences were even more far reaching. There was only one alternative market of considerable magnitude, Japan, but even there the market for milk products as well as many others did not hold much promise. Moreover, in this market as in any other alternative market, Australia would have to compete with other exporters to Britain who would likewise be turned away from the British market: these markets would therefore be saturated. Furthermore, the domestic market in Australia would be disrupted by increased supplies to it which could no longer be sold abroad.
5. The main commodities in question, I went on, included dairy products (which posed the greatest problem), sugar, canned fruits, dried fruits and fresh fruits: this was not an exclusive list.
6. As the French and others knew, restructuring of agriculture is a difficult matter. In Australia’s case the whole position was made even more difficult by the fact that whole communities in particular regions depended upon the production of one crop. Australia, like Britain, needed a transitional period in which to re-arrange her agriculture and other markets: unlike Britain, she would not be granted one.
7. At this point, Mr Chaban-Delmas asked his Chef de Cabinet,1 who was also present, to comment, saying that he himself was ignorant of the subject. The Chef de Cabinet replied that he was aware of Australia’s problem: France’s response so far had been that the EEC had generated increased trade within and without the Six. It would continue to generate trade and once enlarged would do so further. I did not have to answer this point as Chaban-Delmas himself was not impressed with the reply which he transmitted to me with an expression of regret for Australia’s plight, a rueful gallic shrug and the remark that he did not see what could be done.
8. I kept up the pressure by saying that Australia had developed close commercial relations with Japan and had now become a major supplier of industrial raw materials for Japanese industry. Australia was trying to develop further her sales of primary products to Japan but she did not relish the prospect of becoming even more dependent in this way upon Japan. It had also to be borne in mind that Australia could be obliged to sell primary products to Japan at virtually whatever price the market there would bring. Japan could by this process achieve the enviable position whereby she would pay less for food than any other industrialized country. Most Europeans did not seem to realize this fact and its implications for Japan’s competitors.
9. I concluded this intervention by adding that what Australia wanted from France was her support for international commodity arrangements which would secure stability in the market for primary products. I also asked that France’s policies should ensure that the most efficient primary-producing countries should have proper access to markets. I was speaking in the same strain in the capital of the other members of the Six and would be doing so also in London when I would have to be even blunter.
10. Chaban-Delmas thanked me. He said that frankly he had not previously been aware that Britain’s entry into the EEC upon the terms now proposed posed for Australia problems of such a magnitude. France had long and close ties with Australia and it was necessary that two countries as like-minded as they were should work together for the common purpose. He would ensure that what I had said was thoroughly examined and a search made to see what could be done, bearing in mind that as regards EEC matters, France was only one of six countries which had to reach common solutions and bearing in mind that France could not go back on what had already been agreed in the Brussels negotiations with Britain.
Comment.
12. I received a very friendly as well as a sympathetic reception from Chaban-Delmas who had apparently not been informed before in person of the problems Britain’s entry into the EEC would pose for Australia. I cannot say what, if anything, will result from my representations but at least the French Prime Minister has now been plainly and forcefully advised of our problems and he gave me a good hearing.
1 Pierre Pascal.
[NAA:A1838, 727/4/2 PART 12]