London, 18 June 1971
Confidential
Mr Rippon began by giving a brief account of progress in the negotiations. The fact that certain major issues had been specified did not mean that we had neglected others or that we had overlooked the interests of the developed countries of the Commonwealth. We had to steer a difficult course between those interests and our critics in Europe who said that we wanted at the same time to have the benefits of the Community and keep our traditional trading links with the developed Commonwealth countries. We had to a certain extent underplayed publicly our attempts to safeguard the position of countries like Australia.
2. Mr Rippon outlined briefly the agreement reached in the negotiations on a number of industrial raw materials that were important to our own interests and three of which were of particular interest to Australia. On alumina, we depended for our supply for one of our three smelters on Australia. Agreement had been reached on a much reduced rate of CET for alumina until the end of 1976.
3. As for agriculture, Mr Rippon drew attention to the statement he had made in the House of Commons on 17 May, when he had reported the Community’s agreement to deal with serious trade disruption with third countries. Mr Rippon said that the French had wanted full Community preference from the outset but we had insisted on transitional arrangements. The agreement reached was an important and comprehensive one which was unlimited and unequivocal. It provided for a good period of time in which difficulties in any particular field could be raised by us, or by the Australians. Any fears about disruption of our trade should be removed by the undertaking to forestall in the case of imminent danger any problems that could arise.
4. Mr Anthony said the Australian Government had expected the British Government to look after Australia’s interests in the negotiations. While they thought the British Government had done well, they were worried about some commodities. Mr. Anthony said that he had visited the European capitals before coming to London. He had been informed there that there was no assured transitional period for Australian items which fell under the CAP. This presented an impossible situation for him to cope with at home, especially on butter and sugar.
5. Mr Anthony said that he hoped that some assurances would be sought in the next round of negotiations. On the practical application of the present situation he was only given vague answers in Europe and no specific idea of how the safeguard would work. He had been given no form of assurance on CAP items and he needed those assurances. He saw the advantages of British membership of the Community, and had gained the impression that Europe desperately wanted Britain to be a member. But he did not want Australian agricultural industries to pay the full price for this. The message from his Prime Minister to Mr. Heath of two days ago reflected the strength of feeling in Australia. 1 But he remained hopeful that a solution to what he conceded was a difficult problem could still be found.
6. Mr. Anthony asked why Australia could not be given firm quantitative assurances during the transitional period. When he was in Europe, both Messrs Mansholt and Deniau had told him that there was no possibility of a transitional arrangement unless the market allowed it; he wanted to know what would happen if the market did not allow it.
7. Mr Rippon said we could not appear to be asking for too much in the negotiations. We were bound to make a contribution ourselves. Our trade patterns were bound to change, as they had already changed over the last year. There was no question of abandoning the Commonwealth and we had secured arrangements for the developing countries and were putting New Zealand’s case. We had gained significant concessions for Australian and Canadian raw materials and a clear and unequivocal undertaking from the Community to protect traditional patterns from severe disruption. But as a whole, Australia’s risk was less than most, at around 3 or 4% of total exports. He appreciated that not only the total effect, but the effect on certain areas and certain commodities needed to be considered. He said that it was for this reason that we had tried to work out in the context of the negotiations solutions to individual problems. Butter was one of the most difficult. Dried fruit did not constitute a significant problem although difficulties did arise for canned fruit. The different growing season for apples and pears lessened the problem here.
8. Mr Rippon said that specific commodity arrangements were hard to achieve. They could, if too specific, lead to serious errors. Flexibility was essential. Britain’s position would be much stronger once we were in the Community and our continuing mutuality of interests with the Australians would be bound to benefit.
9. Mr Rippon said that the CAP was not negotiable. We were bound to accept its terms, even for our own agricultural and horticultural interests. Referring again to the safeguards on trade disruption with third countries given by the Community, Mr Rippon emphasised that it was not possible to deal with this problem commodity by commodity. Broad assurances were the best.
10. Mr Anthony said that his Government wished to avoid a situation where Australia suffered more than any other country [ … ] He felt that Britain’s negotiating position with regard to European enlargement was stronger than was imagined and that there was scope for making arrangements to protect Australia’s interests.
[ matter omitted ]
14. Mr Dixon2 said that from the outset of the negotiations we had underlined that UK accession would mean that third country suppliers would have to make very large adjustments in their pattern of trade with the UK and the importance of ensuring that they had an opportunity to make these changes in an orderly way. We had secured agreement to a programme of gradual adjustments on prices and tariffs. But the same approach could not be applied in the levy sector. It would have been unnegotiable to ask for general derogations from the CAP and Community preference is an integral part of the CAP. But the fact that we had agreed to apply full Community preference from the start did not really make the situation of third countries significantly worse; for leviable products the Community preference would be of importance in affecting access only where the enlarged Community would be in surplus and in such situations any degree of Community preference would tend to exclude third country suppliers. What was important was that we had secured the agreement of the Community to a significant safeguard against the disruption of traditional trading patterns. Although the details of the procedures and criteria to be applied had yet to be negotiated the principle had already been clearly established that action could be taken at all levels in the Community institutions using all the instruments of the Common agricultural policy […] But it was not possible to work out details on all commodities which would have greatly prolonged the negotiations and if we had attempted to negotiate for minimum quantitative assurances then we should have ended up with a very small minima indeed. We had therefore preferred the approach of seeking a comprehensive general undertaking. Mr. Anthony said that the Community’s safeguard assurance applied only to 4 CAP items . . Mr Rippon quoted from our understanding with the Community to show that it covered all levy items and was not limited to 4.3 Mr Dixon said that Mr Anthony might have been thinking of an earlier statement by the Community in which they mentioned four cases of difficulty, including butter and sugar, which could be foreseen. Mr Anthony said that was the position as he understood it from his talks with the Community in the last week or so. He suggested that a joint statement by the Six and the British Government might be appropriate. Mr Rippon assured Mr Anthony that there was no doubt about this agreement and all these provisional agreements would in the long run be turned into a formal legal document which would constitute the final terms agreed. He asked Mr Anthony to have confidence in the validity of this assurance.
[…]
1 Document 283.
2 J.E. Dixon, Under-Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1971–85.
3 See relevant material quoted in Document 287.
[UKNA: PREM 15/367]