Australian High Commission, London, 3 July 1965
5888. Top Secret
Defence Talks1
At Wilson’s request I met him at the House on Thursday afternoon. He had Stewart, Healey, Bottomley and Trend2 with him. I took Bunting, Hartnell and Eastman (High Commissioner being indisposed).
Wilson said he had originally envisaged including New Zealanders but had later thought it better to speak to me bilaterally and very privately.
2. Wilson referred to current British Defence Review necessitated by manpower strain and financial need to keep expenditure at or below pounds 2000 million by 1969–70, which is the end of the current review period.
Ministers were still considering broad orders of magnitude and had not yet taken firm decision but by about September new defence pattern was likely to emerge.
Some savings were hoped for by scaling down in NATO area and Territorial Army and by revision of equipment plans but a major problem was burden of East of Suez.
Americans were most anxious for maintenance of British commitments and presence there not only because they wanted all to share in moral responsibility but also because at some threatened points British might face less political difficulties than Americans in intervening.
Maintenance and honouring of commitments, however, called not only for heavy expenditure but also for supporting base facilities, and bases could not be held indefinitely against will of host country.
For current British aircraft Aden, for example, was essential as staging post but it might well become untenable in 2 or 3 years when country attained independence.
British Government was therefore considering alternatives—possibilities of some island base (preferably uninhabited) and also of reinforcement of Asia by air across the Atlantic and Pacific (assuming American and Canadian co-operation) when C 130s were available in a couple of years’ time.
Similar problems arose with regard to Singapore Base.
This was presumably secure so long as Confrontation lasted but it had been assumed for planning that Confrontation would end by 1970.
This assumption was related more to convenient span of Defence Review than to any confident assessment; Confrontation might drag on much longer and get worse if China, Indonesia’s new and close ally, saw fit to intervene in force; alternatively it was not impossible that Malaysia would collapse sooner through tensions between Kuala Lumpur and Singapore.
Either way it seemed wise to assume that Singapore Base could not be depended upon for more than a very few years.
3. Wilson said that urgency of defence economies and uncertain life of present bases led British Government to think in terms of commitments East of Suez being shared on quadripartite basis (Britain, United States, Australia and New Zealand).
Basic British aim was to maintain total commitments and effort but to devise ways of doing so more cheaply.
Wilson was therefore interested in possibility of sharing of facilities, services, spares etc with us and also, so far as practicable, with Americans and New Zealanders.
They still had to clear their own minds on several things e.g. to what extent their capability for intervention should be based on long-range aircraft or carriers.
If, however, they ultimately took the TFX, for example, it would seem sense to share a common pool of services, spares etc and also share common-purpose tasks for which these aircraft were suited.
Irrespective of detail, the realities of the situation seemed to call for quadripartite co-operation.
Wilson also hinted with great delicacy at possibility of facilities in Australia against the day when Singapore was no longer available.
4. I told Wilson that I could hardly pretend that his analysis surprised me, but how were Americans likely to react to his quadripartite ideas?
I recalled that in his talks with me McNamara had seen room for cutting down expenditure without reduction of commitments, and had also referred to the difficulty or even the impossibility of the United States filling any new gap arising from an easing out by Britain.
5. Wilson said Americans were very anxious not to be left alone and they had been nervous that British Defence Review would lead to retraction of effort.
He believed they would want to help Britain to stay in area and would therefore be in favour of the ‘Four’ getting together.
At Churchill’s funeral Rusk had expressed keen interest in quadripartite discussions, which were fixed for the time of the SEATO Council.
Unfortunately San Dominica had then kept Rusk at home and it was not possible to carry matter far with Ball3 but Wilson had no doubt as to Rusk’s own interest.
6. Wilson called on Healey who went over the same ground in rather more detail.
He did, however, come out with a clear appeal for service facilities in Australia against the day when Singapore would ‘go bad’.
He argued that British presence thereafter would clearly not be for narrowly British purposes and it should therefore be considered on a co-operative basis.
The requirements would be modest; use of some airfields and staging facilities in the north, the sharing of re-fitting facilities in the east, and the use of some new facilities in the west which he understood may be somewhere in the mind of the Australian Government.
Healey also argued for joint contingency planning so that defence capabilities in the area could be pooled on a rational basis in support of common objectives, for example by pooling of long-range aircraft and carriers; to take one instance Britain had an effective strength of two and a half carriers, which made relatively little sense, but addition of one Australian carrier would make it an effective force.
Healey hoped they could have general discussions with us on this theme fairly soon.
Healey said Britain had learned that it could not produce a major aircraft all on its own; equally it could not hope to produce a major military capacity all on its own; hence the British interest in quadripartite contingency planning and also in the possibility of useful bilateral cooperation with Australia even independently of the United States.
7. I said that we had no doubt which side we were fighting on and that, the sooner we got together on planning, the better.
Let us get down to brass tacks at the earliest.
Were the British ready to tell us in any detail what facilities would be needed?
We had no objection to arrangements for the use of Cocos; there would obviously be great difficulty about setting up expensive new re-fitting facilities in Australia but reasonable facilities already existed.
As to quadripartite planning, the Americans were most anxious for the British to maintain their presence East of Suez and I saw value and promise in contingency planning as to the parts which we all might play.
8. Healey also hoped for closer liaison with us on the intelligence side and in particular for effective British liaison with our JIC; Strong4 would be pursuing this with us on his forthcoming visit.
I said I expected no insuperable difficulty about this provided that the British representative was qualified and briefed to contribute effectively.
9. Stewart then intervened on sensible lines but without adding much that was new.
He saw value in quadripartite discussions at political as well as defence level.
Ultimate withdrawal from Singapore must mean acceptance of belt of neutral countries between Australia and China; central and long team question was therefore handling of China; this was crucial matter demanding serious quadripartite discussion, otherwise we would find ourselves slipping into position of blind underwriting of unilateral American initiatives.
Stewart suggested that four Foreign Ministers should start correspondence now to establish some firm principles, particularly on containment of China.
10. Wilson asked me directly whether I thought it wise to leave all eggs in Singapore basket up to 1969–1970 and beyond.
I agreed that it could be most unwise to depend for long on a base in centre of target area and I was attracted to idea of planning for alternatives.
But I added that we wanted them to stay in Singapore as long as could be managed.
Wilson said this was their intention.
I said I fully understood both the financial difficulties of the British and that I recognised their unwillingness to abandon South East Asia which was the critical point of resistance to China; I would be only too glad to facilitate the proposed discussions to explore how far it might be possible to develop joint contingency planning and the co-operative use of defence facilities.
I said that we viewed our own commitments (Malaysia, Vietnam, New Guinea border and Australian continental defence) not as isolated phenomena but as parts of a total problem.
Wilson agreed that 10 years ago the real threat was on the Rhine; nowadays the Rhine was only one part of a total world war threat of which the centre had moved sharply to China.
11. When I asked about next practical steps it became clear Wilson was not yet ready to put firm proposals to us.
He had wanted to get my reactions in general discussion before developing his ideas further.
It was finally suggested that, after British had finished next phase of defence review in about September, one of their people, perhaps Healey, might come out to see us with firmer proposals as to requirements and to discuss basis on which they might be provided.
Thereafter ideas might be referred for closer study on bilateral basis with view to subsequent discussion quadrilaterally.
The British have already had a certain amount of recent bilateral discussion with America and this would continue pending widening out to the quadrilateral.
I encouraged this.
12. In course of discussion Wilson recognised dangers of tension between Tunku and Lee (which Healey equated to a confrontation between Edward VII and Bobby Kennedy).5
Wilson said he had already warned Tunku and had given him notice of another warning as soon as he would be well enough to receive it.
13. You and all concerned will appreciate that the fact that the future of the Singapore base has been even so much as under preliminary contingency discussion must be held very privately.
I stated and restated my belief that if anything emerged publicly from any talks about the ultimate disposability of the Singapore base, this could be fatal to their morale, which is the true basis of the Malaysian concept, and therefore any talks about the base at any time in the future must be conducted on the highest basis of secrecy.
1 The UK record of this meeting is at UKNA: PREM 13/889.
2 Sir Burke Trend, UK Cabinet Secretary, 1963–73.
3 George Ball, US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
4 Sir Kenneth Strong, first Director-General of Intelligence, Ministry of Defence, 1964–66.
5 King Edward VII, reigned 1901–10, whose private life and extra-marital affairs were the subject of society gossip and press speculation. Robert Kennedy, one of two younger brothers of President John F. Kennedy. Robert Kennedy was US Attorney General, 1961–64, and then US Senator from New York. He was assassinated in 1968.
[NAA: Al209, 1965/6595]