Canberra, 26 August 1965
Secret
Decision No. 1173 (FAD) Without Memorandum—Proposed Quadripartite Talks Arising from the Separation of Singapore and Malaysia
The Committee discussed the invitation extended by the Prime Minister of Britain on 18th August to the Governments of New Zealand, United States and Australia to send senior officials to a meeting in London to discuss the implications for future policy in the area of the separation of Singapore from Malaysia.
2. The Committee noted that, as the proposed timetable seemed to preclude any examination of the memorandum mentioned by the British Prime Minister, it might not be possible to give the Australian officials attending the meetings any comprehensive briefing. However, it decided that the Prime Minister should reply in the near future confirming the intention to send two very senior and responsible officials from Australia. The reply should also draw attention to the fact that there would be no opportunity for Australian Ministers to consider the memorandum. The officials would therefore be instructed to receive an exposition from the British, and would then need to return to put Australian Ministers in a position to consider the matter further.
3. Notwithstanding the absence of a paper from the British, the Committee decided to begin to draw out some of the major implications for Australia of the unsettled situation in Malaysia and Singapore. The attached note is an informal record of the Committee’s discussion.
Its contents are not to be regarded as extending the role which the Australian delegation could play at the proposed meetings in London.
(It is mentioned in paragraph 6 of the attached note that the Committee felt that the Australian Government should, in a formal way, reserve its position on defence assistance in the Malaysian area if Sabah and Sarawak should separate from Malaysia, and that attention might, at a suitable time, be drawn to the risks of any indication by the British Government that it could contemplate secession of Sabah and Sarawak. These matters are to be regarded as part of this Decision.)
ATTACHMENT TO CABINET DECISION NO. 1173 (FAD)
Note of discussion
It is impracticable for Australia to contemplate any actions or policies which are not designed in some sense to supplement those being followed by the two major stabilizing forces in the area, Britain and the United States. Keeping those two countries involved in Southeast Asia to the maximum possible extent is a major objective of Australian external affairs and defence policy for the area.
2. In respect of British involvement in the area, economic and other considerations are exercising growing pressure towards a reduction in defence commitments. Accordingly, it may be prudent for Australian representatives who find themselves in discussions with the British at any stage to take care to avoid exercising any pressure or advocacy which might be so turned against us as to indicate further Australian contribution or commitment. It, of course, remains of vital importance to Australia to see that British involvement continues and therefore it may be useful to have a list of the considerations which the British would find persuasive in examining the level of their future commitment of forces in the area, and the duration of that commitment. It was noted that, quite apart from historical considerations, there are elements in the British Cabinet who emphasise the importance of British–American co-operation throughout the world, and that there are continuing defence obligations which keep them in the area.
3. In the case of the United States, the problem is rather different. There appear to be some substantial obstacles to be overcome in obtaining any commitment from them which extend beyond Vietnam. Here again, it is important to assemble the arguments which the United States might find cogent. The growing importance attached by the United States to access to the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Straits is one matter of vital interest which might be advanced. Agreement of the United States to participate in the quadripartite discussions is in itself a useful step. Even a formal confirmation of interest on the part of the United States in the territorial integrity of the area would be a further useful step.
4. Any proposal to move the British defence bases from Singapore and Malaysia to Australia would change materially the purpose they would serve. These bases at present provide an element of stability in Malaysia and Singapore, are a material factor in containing the confrontation policy of Indonesia, and maintain freedom of passage between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans. They also provide a base for SEATO forces. For most of these purposes, an Australian base would not be an alternative, and it is important, bearing in mind the considerations mentioned in paragraph 2 above, that the British retain the use of the bases as long as possible, even if they were to cease to be available for SEATO purposes.
5. Concerning the effect on Australia’s defence commitment to Malaysia if Sabah and Sarawak were to secede from Malaysia, it is impossible to make a firm decision about Australian policy, but it is important to note that Australia’s defence commitment is with Malaysia and not with a series of fragmented States. On balance, Australia should continue to support efforts being made to keep the Federation intact, and lines open with Singapore, although any support from Australia should be so given as in no way to produce a commitment to Sabah and Sarawak as separate States.
6. The Committee expressed concern at the possible implications of the thinking about longer term problems associated with the future ofSabah and Sarawak as revealed in a cable from the British Government to its High Commissioner in Malaysia (No. 2098 of 18th August). This suggested that the British Government may not wish to oppose an eventual decision in favour of the secession of Sabah and Sarawak, if the succession took place as part the processes of bringing Indonesian confrontation of Malaysia to an end, and was agreed to by all concerned in the Federation. It was felt that an early opportunity should be taken to make it clear to the British Government that, while it is difficult in the present confused situation to arrive at any firm conclusions about the best course to follow, the Australian Government is quite clear that it must reserve its position on future defence commitments in the area if Sabah and Sarawak should separate from Malaysia. Additionally, attention might at a suitable time be drawn to the danger that any indication from the British Government, however slight or indirect, that it could contemplate secession of these States, could lead to a defence commitment to them as independent States. In the Australian view, an altogether new situation would have arisen following the emergence of Sabah or Sarawak as independent States, and this would require a thorough re-examination of the commitments stemming from the Defence Agreement with Malaysia. Further problems would arise also if newly independent States of Sabah and Sarawak were to seek membership of the Commonwealth.
7. The Committee considered the possible next steps after the discussions in London. Following the return of the officials from the proposed meetings commencing on or about 3rd September, further official meetings might be necessary. At any rate when meetings at Ministerial level become appropriate—and these should not be too long delayed—it would be likely to be important for the venue to be Asia, and preferably Kuala Lumpur or Singapore. It would also be likely to be important to include in the discussions, then if not before, representatives from the area itself. The realities of the situation, as well as the appearances, suggest this.
[NAA: ‘A1945’, 248/10/17]