Canberra, 3 September 1965
Top Secret
I have just had a first look at your paper prepared in relation to the quadripartite talks. 1
2. The Indonesian policy of ‘confrontation’, as we understood it, had two major objectives—one to break up the Federation and to restore Sabah and Sarawak to isolation, and the other to remove British bases from the area which involved, of course, putting suitable pressure on Singapore.
3. We have all been committed both publicly and in action to resisting this policy. Your memorandum at first blush appears to involve, either now or within a period, acceptance of the demands inherent in ‘confrontation’.
4. All in all your proposals contained in the memorandum are very far-reaching and in some ways rather surprising. They exhibit a general attitude toward the probable development in that part of Asia which we would require to examine and, if necessary challenge.
5. It remains clear to me that all that the Australian officials now in London can do is to elucidate some aspects of your proposals by appropriate questions and then return to Australia. They will look for precision and offer no opinions. These are matters of high moment requiring Ministerial consideration on the basis of full knowledge. They are not matters which we can discuss on the official level. In the meantime therefore, we must remain uncommitted in respect of the assumptions and aims of your paper.
1 See Document 33.
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6595 PART 1]