386

NOTE FOR FILE BY BUNTING

Canberra, 26 May 1972

Confidential

I spoke to the Prime Minister about control of Australia House. I said that policy having been decided, the next issue was date of transfer to Foreign Affairs.

2. The Prime Minister answered that he was ‘in no hurry’.

3. I said that may be as much as I need to know at the moment. The earliest date for transfer would be 1 July and that might be the most sensible date in any event. But there were a number of considerations which might affect the timetable.

4. One was that I would want there to be full concurrence by the present High Commissioner. This would be an important handling point at the Australia House end.

5. The Prime Minister asked why I raised this. Was there a difficulty? If so, he had not heard of it direct from the High Commissioner.

6. I said I thought the High Commissioner made no bones about his view—for instance, following the discussion in London with Mr Heath. 1 Also in the past few days, one of his cables to me had a definite disowning quality about it.2 I then said I felt sure I had to write to the High Commissioner. I would go off and draft something. The Prime Minister agreed.

7. I then went on to another aspect—the Deputy High Commissioner post.

8. I put a proposal for its continuation. There had been a post on present lines starting with McCarthy and then with Brown, Knott and Boswell.

9. I said reasons for this came out of a need presentationally and in substance for the closest possible relations with Britain across the whole field of Government. The Prime Minister spoke to Mr Heath about increase of relationships in November and they have since exchanged letters on it.3

10. Dealings with the Government, the parliamentary system and the Civil Service in the UK are similar to dealings in Australia. This provides a full background for consultation and co-operation with the UK. The range of Government activity and other links between the two countries remain very wide.

11. Foreign Affairs’ approaches to this situation are an essential part, but Foreign Affairs can do only so much. There is another order of consultation which can be carried out by a Deputy High Commissioner with appropriate background and status.

12. The Prime Minister said I need not pursue the argument. He agreed entirely and wanted the arrangement.

13. Not only that, he thought it ought to be developed at other posts. I said however that may be London presented a special opportunity for it.

14. The Prime Minister then said that the appointment should be by the Prime Minister.

15. I said that would be the intention. Also I did not think that Foreign Affairs would want to question it. The best courses appeared to be to revert to an earlier arrangement whereby the post was a First Division Public Service post.

16. The Prime Minister brought up the need to transfer Australia House at all. But he said immediately that he had spoken to Mr Heath and cleared up that side of it and it should therefore go ahead.

17. I said that I agreed with that. There was now public commitment but in addition it would be a necessary move in the long run—all the more with Britain joining the EEC—and in that event we ought to work towards it soon rather than late.

1 During McMahon’s official visit in November 1971. The discussion with Downer referred to by Bunting is unrecorded.

2 Document 384.

3 UKNA: FCO 24/1342, letters from McMahon to Heath, 6 April 1972, and Heath to McMahon, 8 May 1972.

[NAA: A1209, 1971/9449 PART 2]