Canberra, 14 August 1972
The Prime Minister called me into his office about 12.30pm. The Minister for Foreign Affairs was with him and the subject, already under discussion, was Australia House transfer.
2. The Prime Minister said it would be necessary to have a statement ready for a question in the House tomorrow and with that in mind he wanted to get the letter he had approved in draft typed up and put to him for signature.
3. I acknowledged the urgency and said that I would get the letter ready.
4. The Prime Minister then said that Mr Bowen had brought up the question of a First Division officer as Deputy High Commissioner. What he said appeared valid. Why did I want it.
5. I said there were a number of reasons. And as the Prime Minister would remember, we had discussed it previously and he had indicated agreement.
6. He said he knew that but may want to reconsider.
7. I said I believed Australia House should be looked at as a special case. London was different from any other capital so far as we are concerned because of the similarity of system—parliamentary, government and civil service. Forms of thought and methods of approach were the same. At the civil service level, there was close touch—like dealing with Departments here. Experience with this matter lay in the Australian Departments and not in Foreign Affairs exclusively and perhaps, except for one or two cases, not in Foreign Affairs at all. Experience in dealing with Government and Departments in Australia lay first and foremost in the Australian Permanent Heads. They were brought up in the system.
8. Mr Bowen intervened to say that nothing he was saying would prevent such an appointment.
9. I said it might not prevent one such appointment but it would certainly prevent a series.
10. The Prime Minister said there was a lot in what I said. But he asked why it needed to be a Public Service Act appointment.
11. I said that was the normal way for First Division appointments. It involved the Public Service Board in a formal way but would, in reality, involve the Prime Minister and the Minister. It would be an appointment on the same kind of procedure as now applies for Permanent Heads.
12. The Prime Minister said he did not now think this was right. I said I thought it was a good principle. It would, in practice, bring to bear all relevant views including Public Service Board views.
13. Mr Bowen said that he could not accept this. His position would be invidious. He could not be given Australia House to run and then hand over the power of appointment for the top posts.
14. I said this is, in principle, what happens in relation to the appointment of any Permanent Head—it is not the Minister’s appointment however much he may participate in the discussion about it.
15. I said that I would like the Prime Minister to talk to other Permanent heads. This was not a view I held on my own. It was shared by senior colleagues.
16. He asked me whether there was some element of protection of Permanent Heads in it.
17. I said that I did not want to call it protection—but yes, there was a particular consideration.
18. It had to do with pressure on Permanent Heads over a long period. 1t has been thought that a post to which a Permanent head could be appointed—in transfer rather than in relief—was useful and proper to have. The appointment had to be seriously made—on that, I appealed to history—McCarthy, Brown, Knott, Boswell. So it was two-way. Australia House needed a ‘Permanent Head’ and Permanent Heads needed Australia House.
19. The Prime Minister said he did not think he could accept it on this basis.
20. I said I mentioned it because the Prime Minister had asked. I still put the matter on the first point—the wisdom of having a Permanent Head in London as number two.
21. The Prime Minister said that he would not be prepared to sign the letter as I had drafted it but there could be a paragraph which left the matter for further determination.
[NAA: A1209, 1971/9449 PART 2]