401

MEMORANDUM, BAILEY TO BUNTING

Canberra, 24 August 1972

Attached are the notes I promised on Australia House.

2. I have not put them into letter or minute form because I think it is still necessary to consider just what means are used to take the next steps.

3. One possibility would be a reply by the Prime Minister which would take up the particular points of confusion or error in the Foreign Minister’s letter and deal with them. But this would be a fairly harsh operation.

4. On the other hand, a simple reply dealing only with the Crown and its wider implications may be hardly enough.

5. One possibility would be a Cabinet paper—but who would prepare it?

6. I will let this problem tum over in my mind during the weekend.

**Australia House Rough Notes on Mr Bowen’s Letter of 22 August1 **

Page 1 Paragraph 2

One of the problems in the letter of 22 August is that, having usefully analysed the nature of the dual relationship with Britain, the old special relationship is tied down to the continuing link with the Crown, and even more closely tied as paragraph 2 proceeds. The whole purpose of the Prime Minister’s letter2 was to amplify this side of the relationship—to include the broader aspects of social, family and culture, all of which are uniquely close and broad in relation to Britain.

Page 2 Paragraph 1

This is a case of a misrepresentation of what the Prime Minister was saying. No one suggests that the High Commissioner should be the Prime Minister’s representative. He is of course Australia’s representative and therefore comprehends the Foreign Affairs function.

The logical conclusion of the argument in the paragraph is that no head of mission should be anything but a permanent officer of Foreign Affairs. If there is to be any acceptance of appointment of a Foreign Affairs man as head of the London post, we will need to take care that the appointment is not construed as meaning that there will be no more political appointments to positions as head of mission.

Page 2 Paragraph 3

This paragraph, and the first paragraph on the page, amount in effect to a vote of total no confidence in the present High Commissioner. Surely Foreign Affairs cannot be serious in the view that the High Commissioner and the ‘senior’ Deputy are not in any way accountable to Foreign Affairs.

Page 3 Paragraph 1

Page 4 Paragraph 1

The point made in the Prime Minister’s letter about leaving the departmental representatives in London with a substantial measure of autonomy and a right to report direct to their Departments has been misrepresented in these two paragraphs as ‘a deliberate policy of non-co-ordination’. It is nothing of the kind. It is a policy which recognises the different bases which exist in Britain for relationships—a point which seems to have been missed and which calls into question the capacity of Foreign Affairs to appreciate in any sympathetic fashion the whole rationale of Australia House.

Page 3 Paragraph 3

What lies behind this paragraph, and the point about ‘non-co-ordination’ (see above) is an assumption by Foreign Affairs that it will co-ordinate, i.e. control and direct, all the actions of Departments when they have functions or activities overseas. If one assumes that London is one of the more significant posts in which Departments have overseas activities, then the choice is between the kind of loose co-ordination exercised by the Prime Minister and his Department and of tight regulation and control which is the Foreign Affairs tradition. The former is right for a large post such as London—the latter for a small post, where the Government-to-Government relations are primary and the other relations are peripheral.

Given the fairly wide range of activities which fall under the umbrella of the Commonwealth Secretariat, the question is whether the Departments involved should be brought together, and their policies reconciled, by the Prime Minister’s Department or the Department of Foreign Affairs. The view expressed by the Prime Minister was in effect that his Department should have this role.

Page 3 Paragraph 2

The letter misses the point being made by the Prime Minister. Naturally the functions of government are broadly the same all over the world. But what are not the same are the approaches to Government by the Executive, and the relations between the Executive and the Parliament. It is because these central functions—and the position of the Queen—are so similar in Britain and Australia that close, continuing, unfettered and informal contacts between departmental opposite numbers are so valuable in Britain and cannot be paralleled in other countries.

Page 3 Final Paragraph

Here again, the ‘straw man’ technique is used. At this point, Foreign Affairs are giving a very limited definition to ‘normal matters of foreign affairs’. It would be rather comical to invite them to apply this definition at other posts!

The implications of the final sentence of the paragraph is [sic] not warranted by the Prime Minister’s letter. The implication is that the appointment would have nothing to do with Foreign Affairs. What the Prime Minister intended to convey was that, assuming the normal procedures for a First Division appointment are followed, there would be full discussion with Foreign Affairs of the potential appointee.

1 Document 399.

2 Document 395.

[NAA: A1209, 1971/9449 PART 2]