Canberra, 19 October 1965
Top Secret
British Presence in South East Asia
I now attach the retyped version of the Defence Committee report and your covering submission on the ‘British Presence in South East Asia’.1
2. You asked on Saturday morning that I give you a brief note to remind you of the additional points which we then discussed and which were:–
(a) The Defence Committee report refers in various parts to the need for us to be forthcoming to convince the British that we are willing to assist them more and more in South East Asia. It should not be overlooked that having regard to their declining interests in the area what we are really asking is for them to assist us in the maintenance of our forward posture in the defence of Australia.
(b) Not only do we have to be ‘forthcoming’ in our attitude to the problems which the British are currently facing in their Defence Review but we have also to show understanding of their overall economic problems and be willing to direct our national efforts in all spheres of relationships in a more positive manner in an effort to assist. This in tum will help them to view with more favour our representations on the defence problem.
(c) One area in which the British have been unusually sensitive is the indication that British manufactured aircraft may ultimately disappear from Australian skies.2 In this regard there could be merit in exploring:–
(i) deferring the introduction of DC9 aircraft for use on our internal Airlines for an indefinite period.
(ii) ordering 2 BAC 111 aircraft for the VIP flight of the R.A.A.F. and so indicating to the British that we do not discard completely the possibility of using this aircraft in Australia.
(iii) ensuring that the R.A.A.F. when selecting aircraft for navigation training purposes look closely at the British AVRO 748, or preferably direct the R.A.A.F. to purchase this type of aircraft; these aircraft are not due under the present programme for authorisation until 1966—67.
(d) Additional works expenditure will be necessary at R.A.A.F. Butterworth if Mirages are to be permanently deployed there in replacement of the Sabres. The amount involved is of the order of £500,000 if the facilities at present used by the Canberra Squadron are available and of the order of £800,000 if not. As mentioned in paragraph 13 of the Defence Committee report it would be appropriate as an earnest of our intentions to remain in Malaysia to initiate construction of these works forthwith and to inform the U.K. accordingly. We are not, however, aware of the British intentions in regard to both the re-negotiation of the Defence Agreement with Malaysia and the level of their continuing deployment of forces. If it is the decision of Ministers to approach the British on the lines suggested in the Defence Committee report then it would be appropriate at the same time to discuss with them the question of additional financial commitments for the required works at Butterworth and seek information on the re-negotiation of the Agreement. Meanwhile the Department of Air has been asked to advise on:–
(i) The extent of the deployment in place of the present two Sabre Squadrons and one Canberra Squadron which would be practicable if no additional domestic accommodation were constructed at Butterworth and the very minimum requirements of functional accommodation were provided.
(ii) The possible alternatives to the permanent deployment of Mirage Squadrons in place of the Sabre Squadrons but still retaining an effective R.A.A.F. contribution.
(iii) The financial effects of the proposals involved in (a) and (b) and the effects on the general structure of the R.A.A.F.
3. If Ministers view favourably the submissions in the Defence Committee Report then the following questions have to be determined quickly:–
(a) Do we attempt to bring the New Zealanders to our way of thinking so that a joint approach can be made? If so how do we do this—by written communication or verbal representations?
(b) If we are to approach the British, do we consult first with the Americans and explain that our efforts are directed towards ensuring the retention of a British presence in South East Asia and that this is the best way that we can devise to do it?
(c) How do we convey our views to the British—in writing or verbally? If the latter what is the best way in which to go about it?
1 See Document 40.
2 When, in 1963, the Australian Government opted to buy the US TFX or F–111 A in preference to the UK TSR2 as a replacement for Australia’s Canberra bombers, Menzies wrote to Douglas-Home, then Prime Minister in the UK, to explain the decision. Having discussed the merits of the new bomber aircraft, Menzies concluded: ‘One more thing, and for your private information. We can’t ignore the significance of this with the United States. Although I have no doubt that the excellence of the delivery and price terms owe a great deal to the talents of my colleague [Townley, the Defence Secretary], there is more than an element of United States initiative in the transaction. By accepting it we do two things. We strengthen materially our own defensive power and we add a good deal to the total free world capacity in this area. Further, we do it in a way which undoubtedly satisfies the United States and sustains their interest in this corner of the world. This a most important by-product of the decision and one which I hope may contain some merit from your point of view’ (UKNA: DO 164/27, message, Menzies to Douglas-Home, submitted through Australia House in London, 24 October 1963).
[NAA: Al945, 248/10/19]