Australia House, London, 22 October 1965
Top Secret
I have this morning received this message from Sir Robert Menzies which he asks me to send you:–
(begins)
’My dear Harold,
We have been much taken up with Rhodesia recently, and, of course, still are.
That problem is difficult and very urgent.
I received your message yesterday about the proposal that you and Arthur Bottomley should visit Salisbury. I am delighted with this new step and profoundly hope for its success.
You know how much I admire your rare combination of vigour and patience. I wish I could have done more to help on the Commonwealth front.
But among our other problems, no less serious and, in truth, no less urgent, is the great question of defence in the south-east Asia region which was the subject of the Quadripartite Talks by officials last month.
We have had the reports of our representatives and your message of 25th September. 1
We are grateful for the message, and heartened by it, and we note its promise of further consultations in the light of your current defence review.
However, before your review goes too far, there are some basic observations which I would like to put. They were mentioned, of course, by our officials, but I now reinforce them.
We would very much hope that your defence review is being made in full world context. Obviously we do not overlook your serious financial and economic problems. In relation to these, our interest runs with yours—that sterling should gain strength and that your general economic condition should progress.
We also have some understanding of your need, in view of these problems, to scrutinise your over-all defence expenditure.
But even so, there are other considerations.
It is not possible, except at peril, for any of us in the Western world to disregard the threat of China which, with its expansionism, will present the main political and military problems in the foreseeable future.
The position in Europe having become, in military terms, relatively stable, it is in Asia that the risk to world peace now arises.
Your 25th September message assures us of your determination to continue a military contribution to defence in the Far East. This is heartening. The threat of China requires the continued physical military presence in Asia of the only two Western powers—the Americans and yourselves—which are capable of exercising, and do exercise, worldwide responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, and between whom continuing close cooperation is of first importance to each of them as well as to the rest of the world.
There is, I think, evidence that the United States Government thinks on these lines, and I am sure that you do.
You have mentioned finding the right solutions of the problems of effective defence in Asia through arrangements on a fully co-operative basis. This we endorse. We have, to the best of our capacity, played our part on a variety of fronts, and in a variety of ways. We will continue to do so in the spirit of the co-operative arrangements you propose.
Singapore and the Malaysian bases come most importantly into these considerations.
We talked about Singapore in London before the Malaysian split. Even then we recognised that we could not count on it remaining indefinitely available. Recent events between Singapore and Malaysia could mean that the elements of weakness in the Singapore tenure have become more pronounced. On this, we feel less pessimistic than some of your people. In particular, we do not reject the probability of being able to remain there effectively even after confrontation has ended. But the Singapore, and also the Malaysian bases are so pertinent to the defence of the area—in other words, to the defence against China—that in our view we should look towards means of staying, even in adversity, so that they may be retained as long as possible.2
This is obviously not a view which relates only to confrontation, since even after the ending of confrontation, we must still look to a situation of continuing instability throughout South-East Asia, with the continuing vulnerability to external and internal pressures of its component States.
We believe that it is a British and an American presence, allied with our own best performance, and the best performance of others, as part of a co-operative arrangement, which alone can produce the vitally necessary stability.
In short, we are convinced that the defence requirements of the South-East Asia area are not merely regional, but are an integral part of total Western defence.
If it were possible, 1 would like to see very soon a ministerial discussion, preferably one which our colleagues from New Zealand and the United States could attend.
Perhaps you could let me have your views.
But whether it turns out to be possible or not, I wanted you to have in your mind as your defence review proceeds our views on what we regard as vital to overall consideration.
I propose to let Keith Holyoake know of this message, and also I will ask our Ambassador in Washington to convey material on these lines to Mr Rusk. I will also be happy to elaborate our views to your High Commissioner and to answer any queries your people may suggest to him.’
1 Published as the attachment to Document 40.
2 Healey minuted Wilson on this sentence in Menzies’ letter: ‘I believe you should take him up on this and force him to think it through. It is one thing for our allies to think that we should not get out of Singapore merely to save money; it is another for them to imply that we ought to stay there (and could stay there) regardless of the practical and political difficulties which will mount up against us if current trends continue’ (UKNA: PREM 13/889, Healey to Wilson, I November 1965).
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6595 PART 2]