Australia House, London, 12 January 1972
No. 32
Anglo-Australian Relations
(Your reference: 625/10/7)
I offer the following comments on the Policy Planning Paper CP 12/71 of 1st December, 1971, on ‘Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives’.1
2. I find the Paper’s chief weakness its failure to assemble and assess in a systematic way the principal facts of the Anglo-Australian relationship. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs is to take over primary responsibility for Anglo-Australian relations, it is important that we know what those relations are and that we identify the principal areas of co-operation and conflict and their inter-relations. Only then are we in a sound position to advise the Minister, to deal authoritatively with other governmental agencies and to manage the relationship efficiently.
The ‘Special Relationship’
3. In a sorting out of the principal categories of the Anglo-Australian relationship, the first could comprise those matters that constitute a ‘special relationship’ between Australia and Britain.
4. Among these, the relationship centring about the Monarchy is for separate study. It could be desirable, however, to consider whether our monarchical status offers any drawbacks in our foreign relations (the projection of image and influence), or is beneficial in preserving support in Britain, to take a couple of obvious queries.
5. Other matters in this first category would include the inheritance—the shared history, similar social and political institutions, common culture, values and traditions; the blood ties; the understanding, unwritten in any treaty, that Britain would help Australia if attacked. Much of this is reinforced by continuing British immigration, and the travel to Britain of thousands of young Australians each year. Another major element is the close relations whereby Australians still draw on the fruits of British experience, research, development and practice in numerous, important fields ranging right across our national life.
6. Should we not try to give some description of all this, sufficient to enable us to assess what it adds up to, what there is that we can exploit in support of interests in other fields, what our benefit and dependence are, whether there are any measures desirable to promote and protect or to reduce or modify the ‘special relationship’ or elements of it, and so on?
7. If we take the view that, despite our geography and important interests and connections in Asia, Australia is essentially, dominantly a West European–North American country, then the maintenance and cultivation of the ‘special relationship’ with Britain would seem to serve a basic national interest, particularly given our geographic and consequential relative political isolation from our partners, increasing in the present international era.
Economic
8. We obviously require a presentation ‘and assessment in the economic field. What is the degree of our dependence on British funds for capital investment and development, loans etc.? What is the position to-day of the British investment, which once occupied ‘the commanding heights’ of our economy? What is the role of British interests in our industrial and technological development, in basic economic decisions about production, marketing, export franchise etc.? What is the bilateral trading position and prospects?
9. There will be other headings in this category and under each it would be desirable to indicate the main dynamics of the relationship: is there co-operation and joint benefit, equitably distributed? Is there a conflict of interest? What are the principal lines of policy and how is it assessed the British are to be influenced? What is the balance of interests as between the economic and other categories in the relationship? This sort of advice seems basic to a co-ordinated and balanced management of our total relationship, and to advice to the Government on such matters.
Defence
10. In this category, it would be desirable to know what goes on between the Australian and British Services; in defence procurement; the nature of our dependence on British R & D in weaponry and equipment, and in respect of military doctrine and practice. There are elements in the military and defence category in which political oversight and co-ordination will be desirable.
11. In addition, there is the strategic relationship, joint membership of Five Power, the Indian Ocean, SEATO etc. And what could and would Britain do should a serious threat develop to the strategic balance in our part of the world?
Immigration
12. This is an important category. We have long been dependent on Britain for the fulfilment of a major national policy of population growth. Two particular aspects that I mentioned in my Post Report last September were the varying quality of the British immigrants (I believe it now accepted that we should be more selective in our recruitment) and the repercussions from our racial restrictions. Both these matters require assessment and policy attention, in themselves and in relation to interests in other categories of our relations with Britain (and other countries).
Miscellaneous Categories
13. As regards such categories as science, technology, communications, health, labour, transport and so on, it is desirable that in Foreign Affairs we have some knowledge of what goes on and of any matters at issue with the British, so that political oversight may be maintained, and a beneficial co-ordination established.
Political
14. I am not implying that each of these categories carries a political interest and that what happens in one is likely to have effect, beneficial or damaging, in others. Most can go on independently without perceptible political significance or relevance for other activities. As Mr. Bury said in London last April, discussing the desirability of Foreign Affairs taking over Australia House, ‘Why does Foreign Affairs need to concern itself with the Navy’s purchase of a submarine?’ In many matters, however, and as between those categories in which interests can clash or support each other, there will usually be a lively political element. For example, the manner in which we have handled our trading interest in relation to Britain’s candidature for the EEC has sometimes jeopardised wider political interests (and hence possibly longe-term trading interests). The total relationship must be able to stand the strain of conflicts (normally inseparable, after all, even from co-operation); but now that it has lost so much of its former trading, strategic and political ballast it needs more informed, co-ordinated and careful direction and management. This requires attention to particular relations in the various fields.
Multi-lateral Aspects
15. The foregoing is concerned with the relationship in its bilateral dimension; but the relationship exists in multi-lateral dimensions also. The Planning Paper touches on some of these, but perhaps I may take my points in my own way, asking your indulgence for any duplication.
16. There are some signs that we could be moving into a new phase of our relationship with Britain, beyond that described in the Planning Paper, which has a rather out-of-date quality. There are several factors.
17. I mention first the changing global political and strategic scene. Compared with the period of the containment of China, especially the war in Vietnam, the Americans are moving to a new posture and our relationship with them seems unlikely to continue that of a close, subordinate partner in sustained foreign policy and strategic operations. At the same time the international situation is growing more complex, with more centres of independent power, or at least independent action. The scope and requirement for Australia to take its own decisions and to consult and manoeuvre internationally less as a member of an alliance seem likely to be greater. It would be natural enough for Australia in these circumstances to draw rather closer to Britain in various situations, as a like-minded nation with many interests and objectives in common with us and a major power with which we enjoy a close and long-established friendship.
18. Secondly, there are some signs that Britain is beginning to emerge from its disorientated, post-imperial era, from its prolonged economic and social difficulties and the introspection and relative withdrawal that seemed to characterise the country for much of the ‘sixties. The Heath Government seems to survey the world with a new interest, freshness and confidence. It is responsive to the Australian interest in a number of regions and scope for consultations and co-ordination of policy could grow again, after having been very limited in recent years.
19. These comments are tentative. There are certainly those in politics and the administration who would oppose a wider British involvement, who viewed with dismay, for example, the way Britain became drawn by America’s mistakes into the Bangladesh situation, in which they saw little British strategic interest (and less capability). For these, Europe in the first and overriding priority; and even for those of wider vision, Europe in the years immediately ahead will command much of their effort and imagination. We need a clear statement and assessment, of which this Mission should provide the first draft, of the nature of the British interest beyond Europe. This should be studied to identify matters regarding which it would be in the Australian interest for British interest and perhaps involvement to increase and on which it is assessed it could be rewarding to seek closer policy consultations, and maybe collaboration.
20. Thirdly, Britain’s entry into Europe will provide important challenges and opportunities for Australia. It is true, as the Planning Paper says, that we shall deal with the EEC through Brussels (in so far, anyway, as we are dealing with the Council and the Commission). But we shall also be dealing with the Community through its constituent capitals and in this respect our close relationship with Britain, bilaterally and in regions outside Europe, can benefit us. The British can help us with information, guidance and support. There will be areas of policy in which we have similar or at least compatible interests. Through the British especially we should be able to press many of our interests in Europe (this will require careful handling, but we should not be coy), and try to stimulate and promote the sort of European attention and attitudes we want. It may be premature yet to assess this field too closely, but the Planning Paper could attempt a preliminary sorting of issues as a basis for further inquiry and for consideration of policies.
21. A particular, large field is that of international economic arrangements and policies. A study of relations with Britain in this field should be a matter of some priority: what are the British interests and likely policies; what will be Britain’s international relations in these fields, with the EEC, America, Japan, the under-developed countries; how will things be between Australia and Britain, what we do want of Britain, how do we go about getting it? The Planning Paper fails even to define this field.
22. There is, as the Policy Paper says, no question in all this of a return to our former dependent relationship with Britain. That concept is no longer realistic. But we cannot afford to write off the British as ‘fairly ridiculous representatives of an effete power’ or as some sort of tired old Mum, as the Planning Paper has some of us doing. Britain is a substantial power. Its size, history, experience, wealth and capability give it a major and special status in the world, which entry into the EEC will modify but is unlikely to reduce. We need to recognise, as the Planning Paper originally fails to do, that we need Britain much more than Britain needs us.
The Divergence of Interests
23. I comment briefly on some points in the Section on ‘Development of Anglo-Australian relations’.
24. The historical background is not well done and is sometimes inaccurate (e.g. Curtin’s appeal to America was before the fall of Singapore);2 would it not be enough to refer to it in a sentence or two and then move straight in to the post-war situation? If there is to be a historical introduction, why, in a Paper, and a section of the Paper, specifically entitled ‘Anglo-Australian Relations’, is the conduct of Australia’s foreign relations the sole subject?
25. The divergence of interest is inadequately accounted for, only a couple of unimportant symptoms being mentioned. It also receives disproportionate emphasis. Our relationship with Britain throughout the ‘fifties and ‘sixties was much more than a matter of ‘informal intimacy’ (para. 8). We were associated in a major strategic relationship right up until the Labour Government’s announcement of withdrawal from East of Suez in early 1967, and since then we have continued in an important partnership. History has brought great shifts in strategic and economic interest and position, but by and large there has continued a substantial body of common interest, in a sense more fundamental than our new interests because it goes right to the heart of our identity and allegiance as a member of the ‘Western’ community. The paper gives this important topic inadequate weight and attention.
26. The paper also pays far too much attention to some of the relatively superficial aspects of the changing relationship. Abrasiveness is no novelty in Australia’s relations with Britain (and can be a sign of intimacy). If the exchange of information (it was more of a flow in our direction) has become less extensive, so has our co-operation (whereas, engrossed with the Americans, also a larger, more involved power, we have come to get more from them). But the exchange has not dried up and it is simply incorrect to talk of ‘mutual trust giving way to secretiveness’, ‘a sense of competitiveness’ etc. And what about the arrangements in 1969 for an extensive exchange of information and assessment on the intelligence net? I do not recognise the situation described in paragraph 8.3
27. As for paragraph 10, the British have gone out of their way at governmental and senior official level to acknowledge and accommodate what they describe as Australia’s leading role in the Five Power arrangements. Canberra should not be misled by the tiffs arising from rigidities among the British or our own often extreme sensitiveness. These are usually superficial matters in the development and conduct of policy, like builders’ rubbish. The final structure testifies to co-operative effort and compromise.
28. The Planning Paper carelessly misquotes me in support of its argument about the so-called ‘changed atmosphere’.4 I wrote specifically of the Foreign Affairs Branch’s few contacts with British Ministers: the High Commissioner enjoys excellent access. Similarly, the reference to senior FCO officials is mistaken. I was not writing about ‘changed atmosphere’, the Planning Paper’s phrase, but of a more important point, the foreign affairs field. The quotation about non-self sustaining relations also was not a point about atmospherics, but about the preservation of our ‘special relationship’ at a time of major reductions in our strategic and economic dealings. (Roy Jenkins’s attack on ‘kith and kin politics’ illustrates the point)5
29. I myself have not found any sense of significant decline in my contacts, as mentioned in paragraph 9, nor, I believe, have my colleagues in Australia House. These contacts do not include Cabinet Ministers; but they do include some of their senior advisers. I believe the British position is misconceived and consequently misrepresented in the Planning Paper. The references in paragraph 13 do not in fact describe a British sense of decline but report British comments about the desirability of close relations in response to our Prime Minister’s remarks about inadequacies in consultation and co-operation. (Lord Carrington, however, warned that we could no longer take our relationship for granted.) I agree with the Planning Paper that there is plenty of goodwill in Britain to Australia, and I believe that the Paper can take a brighter and more optimistic note than it does. (This is a different question to that of our declining image in the year reviewed in any Post Report.) But, and this point is fundamental, access is like foreign language: just as what really matters is what you say in it, so what matters is not so much ease of access but what your Government can contribute to the consultations.
Transfer of Australia House
30. There is no reason nowadays, if there ever was one, why relations with Britain should be excluded from the Foreign Minister’s responsibility: indeed no other Minister is in the position to conduct relations in a fully informed and co-ordinated way. Moreover, the political management of our relationship with Britain increasingly involves considerations arising in our multi-lateral international dealings. The assumption implicit in the present arrangements, of a predominantly bilateral relationship, has been false for many years now. But I do not share the Planning Paper’s view that a transfer of responsibility will afford ‘diplomatic opportunities and scope for initiatives’. It will be an administrative matter, bearing on the conduct of relations and of our representation.
31. The discussion about the Head of Mission raises difficult questions. Our experience in Washington and Tokyo no doubt provides some guidance, but it may be felt that there are considerations in Britain, arising in the ‘special relationship’ earlier discussed and in the large representational role here, that could affect the Department’s advice to the Minister. There is a major requirement here for the sustained cultivation of friendly contact on an exceptionally broad front, well beyond operational contacts, for image projection, speech making, and visiting all over Britain. There is a very heavy formal round. There are numerous important visitors. The Head of Mission, career or political, will find an unusually large proportion of his time taken up by this work—and it cannot be skimped: indeed, it may now be desirable to work harder at it.
32. If the appointment is to be political it will be made for political reasons and there seems little point in trying to prescribe criteria (as in para. 23A(ii)). It may be important, however, to have it established that there is no requirement for a political appointment in terms of the effective representation here of the Government and nation and the conduct of business.
33. Whatever the appointment, as in Washington, it will always be necessary to have a senior professional as Deputy. Many of the problems of a political appointment mentioned in the Planning Paper could be taken care of by adequate instruction. This should deal also with the question of the Deputy’s access to Ministers, but I consider that the desiderata stated in paragraph 23A(ii) go too far: there cannot be two Heads of Mission. Given adequate guidelines, a good deal of the practical relationship between Head and Deputy would have to be left to be worked out between them.
Staffing
34. I strongly disagree with the proposal for two Deputies. Perusal of the London Diplomatic List shows only three missions with two deputies undifferentiated by confusion (e.g. economic or consular affairs): Australia, Jamaica and Korea. It is an arrangement that causes confusion and a reduction in the status and impact of each Deputy. The Planning Paper establishes no requirement for two Deputies. If there is a need to give rank to the officer running administration (he hardly needs public status), Minister could be used. The proposal for one Deputy to do ‘political’ work and the other to ‘co-ordinate the work’ of the mission indicates a fundamental misconception. A very important aspect of the ‘political’ (i.e. policy) work should be concerned precisely with co-ordination of work in the Mission. That is the heart of the management of our relations—and it also is very relevant to operational aspects of policy consultations and of intelligence reporting (news and views), particularly with Britain.
Departmental Changes
35. I would hope that we would be able to work up an effective departmental arrangement for the general oversight and co-ordination of relations with Britain, as I understand we are seeking to establish in respect of Japan. An effective Departmental Section would be basic to this, but I would envisage its duties as of a different order to those outlined in the Planning Paper. In so far as those in the Planning Paper concern ‘reporting’ (and there is little else), the primary responsibility would rest not with the Britain Section, but with the responsible functional section (Branch, Division). The Britain Section would deal with Britain’s domestic affairs (including, should they ever become politically important, those Welsh and Scottish nationalists), with bilateral matters, interdepartmental consultation, and the miscellanea of the relationship when all these various things were not located elsewhere in the Department. Its main policy task would, I hope, be to keep itself informed about the general conditions and balance of the relationship and to provide advice and policy recommendation in this connection. It may prove desirable to give the Section responsibility also in respect of the Republic of Ireland.
Policy Consultation
36. I believe British eagerness for the consultations and ‘more formalised exchanges’ proposed to be incorrectly reported in the Policy Planning Paper. I have found no such eagerness. There is rather a reluctant and somewhat embarrassed acknowledgment of a requirement to respond to what is seen as an Australian eagerness.
37. In particular the notion of a ‘formalisation’ of relations with Australia (para. 27) would be repugnant to the general run of British officers, in particular senior officers. They regard the sort of meetings they, and we, have with the Japanese and the Indians as a mark of a lesser relationship, unnecessary and undesirable when there already exists ease of access and consultation. If there is a close and friendly relation between countries, in the British view the foreign ministries and diplomats are falling down on the job if special arrangements have to be instituted for consultations. They comment further on the general uselessness of the annual confrontations—although Heads of Mission often like such meetings, because they provide a focus of senior attention. The British do, however, see value in limited ad hoc consultations, to discuss in depth a particular subject or group of related subjects. They would generally keep these to one or two officers, reinforced from the post, and want the contact to be informal enough to allow free probing and discussion. The statement at the beginning of para. 28 is, I believe, not true.6
38. The Department may wish to consider the question anew in the light of the British attitude. Meantime the Planning Paper’s case for a new category of consultations with the British and a new quality to our relationship is unconvincing. I do not believe that there is much of significance that we cannot get from the British in the normal course of routine consultation if this is handled effectively (para. 27). I do not accept the statement about an ‘erosion of informal channels’. But, in any case, I should think that, despite the marked decline in policy business, the flow of information and assessment from British sources is greater nowadays than it has ever been, because of the intelligence link. Closer co-operation between Departments and Mission would be one way of increasing the effectiveness of consultations short of the establishment of special meetings. (I deal with this in other correspondence.) The advantage of the type of meeting envisaged by the Policy Planning Paper can be superficial and illusory.
39. As to ‘formalisation of relations’ being a desirable object of our policy in respect of any country, I can only express horrified disagreement. Surely our goal is to move away from formality towards informality: the contrary seems the concept of the bureaucratic, not the political mind.
40. As distinct from formal confrontations involving teams of officials, maybe supporting a Minister, I strongly favour visits by one or two officers from head office, to which the relevant member of the local mission can be attached. The British notion of occasional contact in limited fields, for consultation in depth, appeals to me, preferably between officials from each side in the functional branches where there is expert knowledge and detailed grip of policy issues. I would like to see each Divisional Head visit London once every eighteen months or so and visits by the Branch Heads every couple of years. (We must be careful not to add too many meetings and visitors to the burden of busy British officials, with other countries to attend to than Australia. ANZUK JIC thought a meeting every fourteen months or so adequate.)
41. Despite the foregoing, it could be argued that some understanding with the British about regular contact additional to the normal diplomatic contact could offer some safeguard in case we experience difficulties in the next few years as Britain settles in to Europe. I do not expect such difficulties, but at this stage we cannot be certain how things will develop.
42. The question of special meetings and exchanges, as put forward in the Planning Paper, requires special study. Perhaps the Planners could produce a separate paper, discussing pros and cons.
Conclusion
43. As far as I know, this is the first governmental paper to be produced on the Anglo-Australian Relationship—an event of some moment! It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the Paper itself is so limited in scope and so often trivial, superficial and inaccurate in its treatment. It falls far short of the ‘close study and consideration’ that I appealed for in the Post Review. More disturbingly, it expresses serious misconceptions and underestimations of Britain and Australia’s complex, extensive relations with that country.
44. I conclude by appealing once more for a close study of the Anglo-Australian relationship. This is beyond the resources and competence of the Policy Planners; nor can it be lumped together with questions of our relations with the EEC (which is only one element in the situation). I consider that the nature of the responsibilities we can expect to assume requires us to set up a special group to investigate the British relationship. If this was necessary in respect of Japan, how much more so in the case of Britain.
1 Several drafts were produced of the policy planning paper discussed by Pritchett in this memorandum. The final version is published as Document 438. The version to which Pritchett addresses his comments here was one of two Australian planning papers forwarded to London by James at the end of 1971. The second dealt with Australian policy in the South Pacific. That both papers had been made available was evidence according to James that the Australians were ‘anxious’ for an improvement in relations. He was given the paper on Anglo-Australian relations by Sir Keith Shann, now Deputy Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs (1970–74). According to James, ‘He did so with a request that we should ensure that no Australian outside the DFA should get any inkling that we had a copy of the paper. It has been written for Australian eyes only, and those in a narrow circle, and contains some abrasive remarks from our point of view. Shann was clearly aware of this but let me have the paper as an earnest of his wish to take us into the DFA’s confidence’ (UKNA: FCO 24/1047, letter, James to Greenhill, 30 December 1971). For the abrasive remarks in the earlier version, see Document 438, note 5.
2 Pritchett refers here to a paragraph in the earlier version which read: ‘A turning point in our relations with Britain came in 1942, when we found ourselves threatened by Japan without any possibility of receiving the assistance we required from Britain and without a formal alliance or even understanding with the United States. When Singapore fell Australia appealed directly to the United States and help was forthcoming.’ As Pritchett points out, John Curtin, Australia’s Prime Minister at the outbreak of the Pacific War, appealed to the US, ‘free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom’, in December 1941, before the fall of Singapore in February 1942. For another critique of the historical context of this earlier version of the planning paper, see NAA: A1838, 67/1/3 part 5, memorandum no. 72, Plimsoll (now Ambassador in Washington) to Waller, 7 January 1972.
3 Paragraph 8 in the earlier version commented on the ‘abrasiveness’ which had crept into Anglo-Australian relations in recent years.
4 The references in paragraphs 28 and 29 of Pritchett’s memorandum are to two quotations which the planning paper had selected from the London High Commission’s annual review for 1971. They were: ‘This past year has demonstrated that Anglo-Australian relations are no longer as self-sustaining in important respects as of yore’, and ‘the changes in Anglo-Australian relations over the last decade and in immediate prospect are so fundamental as to require close study and consideration being given the nature and conduct of these relations in future’.
5 Documents 260 and 261 .
6 The statement in question read, ‘Indeed the British have already made overtures in this direction, and clearly themselves perceive the need for more formalised exchanges’.
[NAA:A1838,67/1/3 PART 4]