Canberra, 28 August 1972
No. Ppp 40 (Final). Confidential
**Anglo-Australian Relations: Prospects and Initiatives1 **
This paper is founded on the premise that our dealings with Great Britain would appear in recent years to have lost some of the warmth and closeness that previously characterised them. An examination of what may be done to stop the drift in our relations is particularly appropriate at this time for the following reasons:
(i) the Prime Minister’s recent visit to London, where good will towards Australia and an anxiety to improve relations was evident at the highest levels;
(ii) Britain’s entry into the EEC, with its implications for our relations;
(iii) the impending transfer of Australia House to the Department of Foreign Affairs, with the diplomatic opportunities and scope for initiatives this reorganisation should afford.
Present state of Anglo-Australian relations
2. It is beyond the scope and purpose of this paper to examine the historical development of our foreign relations with Britain. Opinions will vary as to the degree of our dependence on Britain in the field of foreign policy since Federation; and, equally, as to the point or points at which our interests began to diverge significantly. Suffice it to say that until the Second World War, our foreign policy was closely aligned to Britain’s; consultation with Britain was close and we were generally kept very well-informed. The establishment of posts overseas during and after the War, and the setting up in 1935 of the Department of External Affairs, necessarily drew heavily on British experience and assistance.
3. This was achieved through close collaboration and co-operation at official level, ready and informal access to British officials, both in London and overseas, and a free and highly valuable transfer of information. Britain had a great deal to offer, while we had a great deal to learn, and did so willingly. It was, in short, very much a mother and son relationship.
4. Despite growing links with the United States, and, later, with Japan, and the gradual and natural divergence of our interests from those of Britain, Australia’s intimate, informal relationship with Britain continued through the 1950’s and into the early sixties–although this is by no means to suggest that the relationship was without occasional and even serious strains. In recent years, however, a certain abrasiveness—going beyond what might have been expected to result from this divergence of interests—has become a more consistent feature of our dealings with Britain. The flow of information has become less extensive (partly because we have tended to rely increasingly on information obtained from the United States, rather than from Britain); the old mutual trust, assistance and collaboration have been marred by an element of guardedness; the old informal channels in London seem to yield less now than they used to and we consult less closely with British posts overseas. The reason for this lies on both sides, although, if anything, perhaps more with us than with the British.
5. It is difficult to characterise these changes; they have been gradual and almost intangible, and there is little one can actually point to, unless one were to undertake a rigorous examination of how the relationship has changed over the years: again, this is beyond the present paper’s scope. The changed relationship is perhaps thrown into relief most clearly in co-operative fields, such as the Five Power Defence Arrangements, where Britain finds it difficult to relinquish her pre-eminent role, while Australia thrusts itself forward. The negotiation of the Post-AMDA Annexes were marked by a good deal of Anglo-Australian sparring, as was the inception of ANZUK. Mr Jenkins, in a statement last July, referred to Australia as the ‘toughest, roughest, most self-interested’ country with which he had had to deal. The changed atmosphere comes through clearly in the London High Commission’s annual review for 1971, which speaks rather despondently about the lack of contact by the Foreign Affairs Branch with British Ministers and senior FCO officials (doubtless, largely stemming from the fact that under present arrangements the Branch is not chiefly responsible for bilateral relations), and refers to difficulties in preserving our ‘special relationship’:
‘This past year has demonstrated that Anglo-Australian relations are no longer as self-sustaining in important respects as of yore’.
The Review concludes that
‘the changes in Anglo-Australian relations over the last decade and in immediate prospect are so fundamental as to require close study and consideration being given the nature and conduct of these relations in future’.
This sense of our special relationship with Britain having declined is evidently shared by the British, from accounts of the Prime Minister’s discussions with senior British Cabinet Ministers in London in November—although he also encountered very definite goodwill and intentions of re-establishing our relations.
6. Among the main reasons for the decline in this ‘special relationship’ would appear to be:
(i) a natural divergence of interest, Australia turning to South East Asia and the Pacific, and the United Kingdom turning inwards and to Europe;
(ii) the son has grown up and become healthy, wealthy and somewhat assertive; and the mother perhaps a little resentful at her diminished responsibility and authority;
(iii) the strains imposed by successive British approaches to Europe, and British entry into the EEC on terms that did not appear to take Australia as fully into account as they might have done;
(iv) the diminished significance of the Commonwealth, at least as a political entity;
(v) our own lack of effort to keep up the relationship.
Prospects
7. The Prime Minister told Parliament on his return to Australia that while in London last November, he had expressed his concern that consultation between British and Australian Government representatives was not always as continuous, full or complete as Australia would like.2 The reactions of senior British Cabinet members are interesting for the fact that they seem clearly to share our consciousness of a drift in relations, and for their uniform anxiety and willingness to effect an improvement. Mr Heath said that the British would be very happy to have the closest exchanges at all levels, which he regarded as automatic and natural due to the general understanding each had of the other, and assured the Prime Minister that he would be anxious to do all he could to help eliminate any slowness or blockage. Lord Carrington agreed that there was need for closer consultations and co-operation between Britain and Australia; all the elements for a sound relationship were there and it should not be allowed to go by default. Mr Barber3 emphasised that the British wished to keep very closely in contact with Australia on all fronts, and that as regards the Treasury he wished to see the closest consultation. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, when asked about the implications for Anglo-Australian relations of Britain’s entry into the EEC, affirmed that the FCO intended to maintain the most intimate relationship it could manage with Australia.
8. While we should be careful not to rely too heavily on assurances of this nature, these statements would seem to go beyond the normal polite references that are required on such occasions; they represent affirmations of good will that it would be prodigal for us to ignore. This is not to say that we should seek to return to the former special relationship with the United Kingdom; but equally, nor should we reconcile ourselves to thinking of the United Kingdom as just another country with whom we must attempt to cultivate our relations as well as possible.
9. In the first place, the factors that lay behind our special relationship have by no means vanished. We remain Commonwealth partners (about which it is easy to be sceptical, but at the very least the organisation retains a value as a forum for discussion and occasional useful initiatives between nations with common British backgrounds); bilateral trade and British investment in Australia are likely to remain important for some time; we remain tied to Britain through a number of institutions, of which Royalty, with its periodic well-received visits, is not the least; the bulk of our migrants still come from Britain; large numbers of Australians feel the desire to visit (and if possible work in) the United Kingdom; and we retain common defence and intelligence interests. In addition we share a common culture and philosophy as well as a number of practical links in various fields, including law, education, science and technology. Finally, we are likely for some time to continue to require from Britain a number of very practical benefits that we have received in the past—markets, investment funds, migrants, scientific and technological benefits, and defence co-operation (including in weapons development and supply).
10. No doubt the importance of many of the factors that went to make up our special relationship in the past may decline: the Sterling Area amounts to less, the newly signed Five Power Defence Arrangements may prove transitional, bilateral trade may dwindle. Other far-reaching changes could occur. But at the very least we should still be left with a body of natural or historical advantages, such as cultural, linguistic and ethnic ties, that should remain strong enough to set our relations with Britain apart from those we enjoy with the nation-in-the-street.
11. Secondly, it may be argued that the awkwardness that has lately crept into Anglo-Australian relations is in part a transitional phenomenon; in time, the pendulum may swing back. Britain is in the process of learning to regard Australia as fully independent, a realisation that has come as Britain adjusts to a diminished world stature. Australia for the her part will, presumably, in time refrain from asserting her new found sense of sovereign equality.
12. Thirdly, the British negotiations to join the EEC, with the implications for our trading interests, have necessarily placed a strain on our bilateral relations that should fade once entry is accomplished, although there may be further difficulties ahead during the transitional period as commodity situations arise and the safeguard clause is put to the test.
13. Fourthly, although there has emerged a realisation that our major interests no longer necessarily coincide with Britain’s and the EEC negotiations have left a scar on relations, Australia and Britain continue to have a great deal to offer to one another in the conduct of their international relations, precisely because their fields of interest and expertise have diverged. We, for example, are undoubtedly better informed than Britain on Indonesia and, indeed, most of South East Asia; while corresponding British strengths in which we would be interested include the EEC, Eastern Europe, Southern Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the Persian Gulf. The British entry into the EEC opens a totally new dimension. The importance Britain will add to the organisation makes it all the more relevant for us to re-develop Anglo-Australian relations.
14. In sum, the strains that have emerged in recent years in Anglo-Australian relations appear by no means to form the start of an inexorable trend. There remain very real reasons why a special, though modified, relationship should exist between Australia and Britain, and for us to foster this as best we can.
Possible initiatives
15. It remains to examine the initiatives, or techniques, we should adopt in setting our relations with Britain on the sort of footing that can be supported.
16. In general terms, there are persuasive reasons why any initiatives to improve our relations should come from us. That goodwill and a spirit of co-operation persists in Britain, and at the highest levels, is abundantly clear from the Prime Minister’s London talks, and we should capitalise on this situation; and in deference to many past favours and also to Britain’s status as a major power, we should not be backward in knocking on the door. Moreover, we have on balance probably more to gain from any such moves than has Britain. Britain’s entry into the EEC opens a new dimension in which we will have a considerable interest; her prestige remains high in many parts of the world; she is a member of the Security Council and an atomic power; we need to recognise that a close relationship with Britain could be a source of diplomatic strength rather than weakness.
17. In seeking to reinvigorate our diplomatic dealings with the United Kingdom, we must expect to work more on a basis of reciprocity and equality. Our relations must come more to approximate those we have with other countries of importance to us, such as the United States and Japan, although we can expect that our relations with Britain will regain rather more traces of the earlier informality and confidence than we have achieved in our relations with at least Japan. Our dealings with Britain must necessarily become more formalised, if not more formal, in the sense that certain formal arrangements should supplement our present informal contacts. We cannot expect to regain the earlier relationship—indeed, neither we nor Britain would wish to do so—and we must not expect unreserved confidence from the British, and vice versa. They will continue to keep secrets from us as we will from them. The relationship will have some limits, and it will be the healthier for our recognising this.
18. The following are some substantive suggestions which could be expected to contribute to an early improvement in Anglo-Australian relations.
I Transfer of Australia House
19. The transfer of Australia House from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet to the Department of Foreign Affairs is one of the major steps which can be taken to improve our relations with Britain; it should facilitate the conduct of our relations, and afford us a greater opportunity to maintain a general oversight of their various aspects. The fact that our relations with Britain have traditionally been handled by the Prime Minister’s Department has contained unavoidable disadvantages, in that our foreign policy with respect to Britain has been separated from our foreign policy towards the rest of the world. There has of course been close liaison between the Prime Minister’s Department and Foreign Affairs, but the separation of direction has inevitably meant that on some occasions we have paid too little attention to Britain, and on others too much. Another defect flowing from the division between the two Departments has been that Australia House does not seem to have reported on Britain in the same way that other posts have reported on the countries to which they are accredited; and the Department of Foreign Affairs has been unable to give the London mission direction equivalent to that given other posts. Such direction and co-ordination of activities will come within the Department’s compass when responsibility for Australia House is transferred from the Prime Minister’s Department.
20. The transfer to Foreign Affairs of responsibility for Australia House will have staffing implications for the Department. It will require either the strengthening of the Western Europe Section or the establishment of an independent section, equivalent in strength possibly to the section currently dealing with Japan. One of the principal purposes of such a reorganisation should be to provide a capacity for the formulation of specific queries, of which London at present feels a lack. These should cover
(a) areas of interest to Australia in which Britain has particular knowledge and expertise;
(b) areas of mutual interest and co-operation;
(c) areas of relative Australian expertise.
21. Some of these areas are listed below, but are not examined in detail. The functions and organisation of Australia House perhaps also warrant examination, as may the general subject of our changing relations with Britain, in an attempt to identify the principal areas of co-operation and conflict and their inter-relationships. This should enable the Department to advise the Minister on his new field of responsibility, to deal authoritatively with other governmental agencies at present concerned with Australia House, and generally to extract what we can from our relationship with Britain.
II High Level Access
22. The Prime Minister was assured by Mr Heath that the High Commissioner should continue to have immediate and direct access to him. This is an offer we should not ignore. Possibly on such occasions the High Commissioner could stress the importance to Australia of access not only to the Prime Minister but to Ministers generally and to senior civil servants (either by the High Commissioner himself, or senior Foreign Affairs representatives). Such contact need not necessarily be confined to specific topics of current importance, but should aim at a general familiarity with developments in British thinking and attitudes.
III Exchanges of Information
23. It would clearly be in our interests to increase the extent to which we draw on the British for information and assessments in fields where they possess greater knowledge and experience than we, and to discuss as far as possible matters in which we are mutually interested; we would also stand to gain from talking to the British more freely about matters on which we are perhaps better informed or more interested than they.
24. We have been told that the distribution to the British of the NIC 2 paper was much appreciated, and this raises the question of passing to the British rather more Departmental papers, such as Policy Planning papers, long term political assessments and certain despatches, as well as broader assessments such as NIC papers. We would have to be careful to ensure that any papers we might pass to the British were of a high professional standard. Posts might be encouraged (slowly) to step up the amount of reporting they pass on to the British, thereby encouraging them into reciprocating. In a related sense, the traditional flow of visitors—parliamentarians, officials, academics and scientists, businessmen, sportsmen and tourists—should continue to be encouraged; it is a process that has very real advantages for both countries.
(A) Areas of interest to Australia
25. Among the matters in which the proposed United Kingdom section (paragraph 20 above) would be interested to receive detailed reporting from London would be the following:
(i) Systematic reporting on the British political situation, especially broad assessments of major political developments, particularly those likely to have an effect on foreign policy; reports on party conferences, by-elections and electoral trends, Cabinet changes, relative party strengths and leadership changes, Welsh and Scottish nationalism and the situation in Northern Ireland.
(ii) Soviet and East European affairs, in which Britain retains considerable interest and expertise.
(iii) China, where again Britain has a substantial bank of useful experience and information on which we should draw.
(iv) The EEC. This may prove to be a sensitive matter. We would wish neither to embarrass Britain by seeking information not hers to pass on, nor to give the impression to the rest of the EEC that we were trading on our traditional association with the United Kingdom to pry information out of her and to oblige her to represent our interests in the EEC. We will need to represent our own interests to the EEC as a whole, from Brussels, and should regard Britain not as a door but as a window to the EEC. Recent events have, however, underlined the need for representations to the EEC to be made to individual member states as well as to the Commission in Brussels, and we will therefore have a continuing need to make representations to Britain, for us possibly the most important single member of the enlarged Community.
(v) NATO, the WEU and general political defence arrangements in Europe.
(vi) Africa generally; the Middle East and Persian Gulf; the Indian Ocean.
(B) Areas of mutual interest and co-operation
26. (i) British interest in the Commonwealth and views on its future. Although British interest in the Commonwealth may have diminished, to a large extent the Commonwealth as an organisation remains dependent on the degree of British interest, both Governmental and public. Apart from this, London, where the Commonwealth Secretariat is housed, should be a source of valuable reporting on the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth retains significance for us, and London remains the most effective place for us to work towards its continuation and to prosecute our interests through it.
(ii) Five Power Defence: we do of course already maintain close contact with the British in the Five Power capitals, but need to be kept informed from London of thinking at high levels on British defence policy and its future role in the Five Power arrangements. We are already reasonably well served in this area, and the links that we have with Britain in the ANZUK Chiefs of Staff Committee and the ANZUK JIC are valuable aspects of our relationship.
(iii) International economic matters, including OECD and DAC: there should be scope for policy consultations in London as well as Paris and elsewhere: the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s remark to the Prime Minister on the desirability for close Treasury liaison may be borne in mind here, especially in view of Australia’s particular interests in the role of sterling in any new international monetary arrangements.
(iv) United Nations and subsidiary agencies: again, there is scope for policy consultations and reporting on United Kingdom views.
(v) The United Kingdom and we are involved in the South Pacific. We have a common interest in the constitutional development of surviving colonies, including Papua New Guinea.
(vi) SEATO.
(vii) Trade, investment, science and technology, migration, defence and weapons development
(viii) Law of the Sea, and related subjects, where both sides would seem to have much to offer.
(ix) Asia. At present we obtain little of interest from the British on Asia except as regards India/Pakistan (on which they are good) and Malaysia/Singapore (in relation to Five Power defence). However, the British still have sizeable missions in most Asian countries and are presumably well informed. Britain’s relations with Australia are believed to be an important element in British Far Eastern policy formation. It would obviously be to our mutual benefit to exchange information on the Asian region in both London and Canberra, and in Asian capitals.
(x) South Asia. As elsewhere in the world, Britain has deliberately reduced its stature in India and concentrated on its commercial relations. The British have, however, substantial residual interests in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. They have by reason of their diplomatic dexterity maintained a position from which they can now influence the dominant partner—that is, India—more effectively than can the United States. While Britain sees things from its own commercial point of view, there remains a substantial identity of interest between Australia and Britain in keeping up the western presence and influence in India and Bangladesh.
(C) Areas of interest to Britain
27. Areas where Australia might have something to offer Britain would centre largely on South East Asia, as a region of Australian diplomatic concentration from which the British have been withdrawing militarily, politically and economically. Britain however retains substantial economic interests in the region, remains a co-chairman of the Geneva Indo-China Conference and has recently extended its Five Power Defence commitments, all of which form real reasons for a continuing British interest in Australian political and intelligence assessments of the region. In addition, Britain’s awareness of Japan’s steady emergence as a super-power, or at least a great power, and her own commercial, educational and cultural links with that country, should render our growing diplomatic liaison with Japan of close interest.
IV Policy Consultation
28. In view of the erosion of our informal exchanges, there is a certain incongruity that we should hold bilateral talks with India, Indonesia and Japan, and (through ANZUS) the United States and New Zealand, but not with Britain, with whom we have much to exchange, and an ideal background of mutual friendship and confidence for doing so.
29. This is not to suggest that we should think solely in terms of regular, formal bilateral talks, although these can be useful. Mr Pritchett, the Deputy High Commissioner in London, has reported that in general British officials
‘regard the sort of meetings they, and we, have with the Japanese and the Indians as a mark of a lesser relationship, unnecessary and undesirable when there already exists ease of access and consultation. The British do, however, see value in limited ad hoc consultations, to discuss in depth a particular subject or group of related subjects. They would generally keep these to one or two officers, reinforced from the post, and want the contacts to be informal enough to allow free probing and discussions’.4
Our main aim should be to ensure that there is a frequent exchange in depth between officials from each side in the functional branches, where there is expert knowledge and a detailed grip of policy issues. Mr Pritchett suggested that Departmental Divisional Heads might visit London every 18 months or so, and Branch Heads every couple of years.
30. There have already been several developments in this direction. Sir Denis Greenhill accompanied Sir Alec Douglas-Home to the SEATO talks in Canberra in June, and spent a day or so afterwards in discussions with the Secretary and other senior officers of the Foreign Affairs Department. The Head of the FCO Planning Department, Cable, was also in the delegation, and had talks with the Department’s Policy Planning Group.
31. Sir Morrice James, who is himself anxious to re-establish some of the former warmth of our relationship, has suggested—as purely personal ideas—that there would be value in exchanges in the following fields:
(i) finance: visits between Australian and British Treasury officials having day-to-day responsibility for handling overseas finance as it affects the other country. The September meetings of Finance Ministers provide an opportunity, and there is regular consultation with Treasury staff in Australia House, but there might be special March or April meetings, alternatively in London and Canberra.
(ii) foreign affairs: there exists a well developed habit of consultation, but, in Sir Morrice’s words, this has perhaps ‘fallen away a little’, and it could be useful to institute regular, more formal consultations.
(iii) trade: the commodity discussions, already begun with sugar, could continue on a programmed basis. Sir Morrice believed Mr Rippon would be willing to come to Australia for discussions at some future time.
(iv) defence: integration between our two intelligence services is already considerable, but perhaps exchange visits by planning staffs could be useful.
32. The Prime Minister has already endorsed in principle the idea that both formal and informal exchanges, including between the respective policy planning officers of the two foreign services, might be encouraged. Before taking this matter further, however, it would seem wise to await the conclusion of the officials’ talks to be held in Canberra in June. We would then be better placed to examine the relative advantages and disadvantages that might follow from further talks of this nature, and the advisability of visits such as those envisaged by Mr Pritchett.
V Public Statements
33. Finally, we may ask whether such initiatives to build what we can onto the solid foundations that still exist might not be reflected in public statements. A few well-placed, cordial public statements, expressing goodwill towards Britain could provide a fitting backdrop.
Conclusion
34. A qualitative change has emerged in recent years in Anglo-Australian relations. The change has, largely, been inevitable, as Australia has evolved from a position of de facto dependence on Britain in foreign policy matters to a greater independence and activity in the conduct of our relations with other countries. Britain’s recent negotiations to enter the EEC are a good example of this natural divergence in our interests and of the fact that a one-way relationship is no longer appropriate. This is no cause for concern, but, we should endeavour to ensure that our relations with Britain are no less close than those with other major allies, and to take advantage of the numerous existing ties of friendship. There is much that could be extracted from a careful cultivation of our relations with Britain, underpinned as they are by all that we still have in common, and a fund of goodwill.5
1 For comment on an earlier version of this paper, see Document 435.
2 McMahon visited London in November 1971, and made the point in conversation with Heath that Anglo-Australian consultations in recent years had been ‘neither as continuous nor as frank as desirable’. An exchange of correspondence between the two prime ministers followed on how to redress the balance. McMahon did not think it necessary to establish formal machinery for consultation. He was keen to see greater defence cooperation at the ‘senior planner and policy adviser level’, and he thought it would be useful, on Treasury matters, to have more UK financial officials visit Australia from time to time. He welcomed a suggestion coming from the UK side to establish a direct telex or telephone link between London and Canberra. (UKNA: FCO 24/1342, letter, McMahon to Heath, 6 April 1972, and Heath’s reply, 8 May 1972.) Unlike the High Commission in Canberra, UK officials in Whitehall were not keen on exchanging planning papers, fearing this would open a ‘Pandora’s box’ and remembering a 1965 UK paper on Southeast Asia which took, inter alia, a pessimistic view of likely developments in Vietnam. Copies were given, exceptionally, to the Americans and Australians; their reactions had been ‘predictably hostile’ (UKNA: FCO 24/1342, minute by J.E. Cable, 6 June 1972). In June 1972 Sir Denis Greenhill, Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, led a UK delegation at a SEATO meeting in Canberra. Talks were held with Sir Keith Waller, his opposite number at the Department of Foreign Affairs, on a range of foreign policy issues and also on Anglo-Australian relations. On the EEC, Waller agreed with Greenhill’s view that British entry would not produce a ‘sudden dislocation’ in Anglo-Australian relations; the ‘corner’, according to Waller, ‘had been turned on the EEC question’. British immigration controls, though, were still causing difficulty. But Australia, unlike the Canadians ‘who were more inclined to go their own way’, still wanted to maintain close relations with the UK (UKNA: FCO 24/1343, DFA paper, ‘Record of the Australian-British Talks’, Canberra, 28–29 June 1972). In May 1974 Alan Renouf, Secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs, suggested to James there should be annual FCO–DFA political consultations at permanent head level. Information and views exchanged through the normal diplomatic channels were not, he argued, adequate. James agreed and raised the matter in London. Sir Thomas Brimelow, Permanent Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1973–75) in succession to Greenhill, thought it would be better to agree in principle to meetings ‘as and when they seem desirable’ (NAA: A 1838, 67/1/3/5 part 2, minute by Renouf on a conversation with James, 7 May 1974, and letter, Brimelow to Renouf, 10 June 1974).
3 Anthony Barber, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1970–74.
4 See Document 435.
5 The earlier version of this paper concluded: ‘A qualitative change has emerged in recent years in Anglo-Australian relations. We tend to regard “the bloody Brits” as somewhat capricious, fickle, and faintly ridiculous representatives of an effete power. But there is much that could be extracted from a careful cultivation of Anglo-Australian relations. Britain’s entry into the EEC has undoubtedly shaken relations, and there are further reasons why we should not aspire to return to the old “special relationship” days. But very real links survive, which it would be prodigal for us to squander or ignore. In placing our relations with Britain on a more formalised footing, in the manner of our relations with other countries of importance to us—but underpinned by all that we still have in common, and a fund of goodwill—the gracious thinking might be for the first overtures to come from us. It will be a matter for diplomacy to ensure that this occurs neither too slowly to throw away the natural advantages we retain in Anglo-Australian relations, nor too rapidly and blatantly as to embarrass the British.’
[NAA: A1838, 67/1/3 PART 5]