Canberra, 23 November 1965
Top Secret
Discussion with the British High Commissioner
I attach:–
- Mr. Wilson’s latest message—19th November;
- Your message of 22nd October, to which Mr. Wilson was responding;
- Extracts from the Eastman/Hartnell/Bunting account on your meeting in London with Mr. Wilson and other Ministers at the House of Commons.1
2. I have included the third of these because I do not disregard the possibility that Johnston2 will have been furnished for his meeting with you with an account of the various discussions on Singapore which, for this purpose, began with your London meeting. Therefore a refresher for yourself may be useful. The important thing for present purposes is that although you agreed that it could be unwise to rely indefinitely on the use of Singapore, and that contingency planning, privately conducted, was therefore a prudent course, you made it clear that we want the British to stay in Singapore as long as they can. Mr. Wilson acknowledged that this was their intention.
3. The particular reason for the High Commissioner’s call on you is to seek elaboration of that part of your message to Mr. Wilson which refers to the British staying in Singapore, even in adversity. Therefore I will deal with that first, though I realize that you need little reminding of it.
4. When Hicks and Mclntyre were in London,3 and again later in a message from Mr. Wilson of 25th September,4 there was reference to withdrawal ‘in good order’ and also to ‘no intention of being forced out of Singapore in a humiliating manner’. Throughout, there is considerable emphasis on this idea of respectable exit. This emphasis, notwithstanding other references to a more tenacious attitude, gave the impression to us that the British may be in the process of giving up the idea of staying in Singapore as long as possible.
5. There was also the background that Enoch Powell5 had just spoken at the Conservative Party Conference, putting forward his neutralization theory—that the Western presence should be withdrawn from South-East Asia so that a natural balance of forces would come into existence.
6. It may be that what Mr. Wilson now seeks from you is not so much what you had in mind by suggesting staying in Singapore even in adversity, but what degree of adversity we would expect them to endure.
7. This leads me to a list of points which you might draw from in talking to the High Commissioner. They refer partly to Singapore itself, but partly also to the British position in Singapore/Malaysia taken together. They have been contributed chiefly by the Departments of External Affairs and Defence. This is attachment (d).
ATTACHMENT D—NOTES FOR DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER ON RETENTION OF THE SINGAPORE BASE AND ASSOCIATED MATTERS
We should stay in Singapore ‘even in adversity’:
1. We emphasize our apprehensions about China.
2. We adhere to the view that the Singapore and Malaysian bases come most importantly into the defence of South-East Asia and that they must be retained as long as possible.
3. Regarding Singapore, Lee and his colleagues for a number of years now have shown themselves ready to live with the bases, as has the Singapore population in general. That is a central fact.
4. We think we (Britain and Australia) should be prepared to accept superficial pinpricks from Lee without investing them with too much significance. He is bound to say things from time to time, e.g. in Afro-Asian meetings, that will be irritating to us. But his record to date shows care on his part to avoid hurting essential British interests, which are in large part his interests.
5. Our view is that the British position in Singapore need not necessarily be eroded in the foreseeable future. We have to be ready to live with awkward and at times trying circumstances, but should not regard them as necessarily indicative that loss of the bases is inevitable.
6. While the Treaty position needs to be restored as far as possible, Treaty rights are only part of the guarantee. Even when Singapore had internal self-government and later when it was part of Malaysia, the usefulness of the bases hinged largely on the attitude of the local Singapore politicians and the local people. (The bases depend substantially on the 40,000 local workers and the maintenance of essential services like electricity and water.)
7. The important objective is mutual understanding over the base with Lee and his Government, even if this means giving a little ground on the formal wording of the Treaty.
Overall Strategic Considerations:
8. The future of the area depends largely on China, and it is for the global strategic objective of containing China that, in large part, the bases should be retained.
9. The bases are planned for support of SEATO operations or other similar operations on the South-East Asian mainland to counter the Chinese Communist threat. Without the bases we could not make a contribution in the times presently planned and known to be necessary.
10. The bases and the Commonwealth forces deployed there act as a general deterrent against Indonesian expansionist aims and are well placed for counter action against Indonesian aggression.
11. The British position in Singapore/Malaysia gives assurance of passage between the South West Pacific and the Indian Ocean which would probably be seen as of increasing importance by the Americans.
12. Singapore/Malaysia can provide main base facilities backing British operations in the Indian Ocean area in support of countries bordering the Indian Ocean.
13. There is no real substitute for continued use of the Singapore/Malaysian bases (bases in Australia cannot possibly serve the same purpose).
14. Withdrawal of Commonwealth strength from Singapore/Malaysian could have an unsettling impact on United States determination to retain a forward military presence in South-East Asia.
1 Attachment (a) is Document 43, Attachment (b) is Document 42, Attachment (c) is Document 30.
2 Sir C. Johnston, British High Commissioner to Australia, 1965–71.
3 See Document 35.
4 See attachment to Document 40.
5 Conservative politician in the UK who resigned from the Shadow Cabinet in 1968 over immigration. He had strong views on national identity and Britain’s role in the world. He was opposed to entry into the EEC and dismissive of the Commonwealth. But in that he saw neutralisation as the solution to the problems of Southeast Asia, his views were similar to those of the Foreign Office in Britain.
[NAA: A1209, 1965/6595 PART 2]