Canberra, undated [March 1973]
Confidential
I have adopted the practice of writing to Heads of Mission at the time they take up their appointments in order to provide an account of the Government’s views on Australia’s major interests and objectives in the country for which they are responsible. I discussed your work in London with you before you left Australia and I know that you already have a thorough understanding of the Government’s new policies and of what we want to achieve. It may be useful for you, nevertheless, to have a record of the general considerations which we shall be bearing in mind in dealing with the British, and l am therefore setting these out for you. I want to take full advantage of your own views on developments in Britain and particularly on the significance which these developments may have for Australia, and I shall certainly appreciate any comments or recommendations you make in the light of your own experience in Britain.
Australia’s relations with Britain are undergoing important changes and it is appropriate that the appointment of a new Australian High Commissioner in London, who will not be circumscribed by judgements or attitudes deriving from the past, should coincide with these changes.
The present phase in Anglo-Australian relations is one of change for three main reasons. In the first place, the Government which I lead was elected to office on the basis that it would initiate a programme of change for Australia. We intend to honour our undertaking, both at home and abroad. We are taking a fresh look at even our closest relationships in the light of what we believe to be Australia’s best interests in the world as it now exists and as it is likely to develop in the future. Our political and constitutional links with Britain are already being considered in this context. Secondly, the transfer to the Department of Foreign Affairs of responsibility for the administration of the Australian High Commission in London brings with it a change in the way we conduct our relations with Britain. We aim at making those relations an integral and important part of our general foreign relations and not something apart, as they have been in the past. Hitherto British attitudes have tended to play either too great or at times too small a role in the development of Australian policy. In the third place, it is apparent that the immediate interests of both Britain and Australia have now diverged to the extent that a change of relationship is inevitable. It is particularly important in these circumstances that we be clear in our own minds about the type of relationship we want with Britain.
We have first of all to overcome what I might describe as negative attitudes among the British and among our own people towards that relationship. These attitudes have risen because in nearly all fields—and often by deliberate choice on our part or on the part of the British—the relationship between us has become markedly less important than it was 30 or 35 years ago. Until the late 1930’s we regarded the relationship with Britain as of supreme importance.
Thirty years ago our people were almost entirely of British stock; our origins are now much more diverse. Trade with Britain was a matter of economic life and death to us; now she ranks third in trading importance to us after the United States and Japan, and her trading importance to us may well decline further with her entry into the European Economic Community. (The up-to-date comparisons are as follows: in 1956/57 Britain took 28 per cent of Australia’s exports compared to nine per cent in 1971/72; and she supplied 41 per cent of our imports as against 21 per cent in 1971/72.) In the 1930’s we saw our defence as being assured mainly by the shield of British sea-power and we tailored our defence effort so that it locked into the British system; that shield failed and the British military presence in our region is now very modest. Thirty years ago Britain ruled a significant part of the area in which we live; but her former colonial authority has disappeared except for a few minor remnants.
While admitting the reality of the changes, I am still very conscious of those elements in our relationship with Britain which remain of great importance and are likely to do so for some considerable time. Indeed the number and diversity of your official staff in London reflect to a degree the common interests and connexions between us. First and foremost, there are ties of blood, whose continuing effectiveness is by no means to be underestimated. There are also ties of language and common culture extending into the law, education, science and technology. There is a common political heritage, including the Monarchy and the parliamentary system. While it has declined in relative importance, Britain’s extensive trade with and investment in Australia should not be underestimated—and it is worth noting how very many important people in Britain have substantial financial or commercial interests here. Finally, there is our defence co-operation with the British. For the present, this includes our co-operation with the residual British Military forces in South East Asia under the Five Power and ANZUK arrangements.
I believe that these common interests and connexions provide us with great advantage in building a new relationship with Britain and that it is in our national interest to put them to the best use. The task of building a new relationship with Britain, a task for which you have prime responsibility, is well worthwhile. Britain, despite the reduction in power which she has suffered, still retains considerable prestige. As a permanent member of the Security Council she retains the right of veto there. She remains one of the world’s major financial centres. Her defence apparatus is sophisticated and her sources of intelligence and quality of assessment are of high order. I describe below the various elements in a new relationship which we should seek with the British. The elements themselves are not new; but we shall be approaching them in a new way.
First of all, Britain retains a political, commercial and military presence in the area of East and South East Asia of most immediate concern to us. The continuing though diminished interests that she has in the region should provide the basis for a close collaboration and interchange of ideas between us. It is to our advantage that the British should maintain such interests as they have in the region, and should not lose sight of the possibility that they may be able to influence their partners in the European Communities on attitudes towards developments in East and South Asia. I have referred already to the residual British forces in South East Asia. Until the time comes to phase out present arrangements, we shall continue to co-operate with and help support the British force in Singapore. Britain has played a useful role in the provision of economic aid to countries in South and South East Asia. We should be doing what we can to encourage her in this.
Secondly, there is the British membership of the European Communities which is usually considered solely as something dividing Britain from Australia. Certainly it marks the end of the special trading relationship that existed between us: from now on Britain will be only one part of a much larger trading unit and our policies will have to be formulated looking towards the Communities as a whole rather than separately to Britain. The end of the system of duty-free entry for many of our exports and of a fixed preferential treatment for many will probably give rise to much more frequent official Australian representations in Britain about trading relations. But British membership of the Communities will also provide us with better opportunities than we have had before to influence them on the very numerous and important matters that are of concern to us. We should aim at a close working relationship with Britain on these questions. At the same time we must avoid giving Britain or the members of the Communities the impression that we intend Britain to represent us in some way in them. Nor should we labour under any illusion that she should be prepared to do so, given the great stakes for which she herself is playing. We have to develop a separate substantial relationship with other members of the Communities and in particular France and West Germany. We are well on the way to achieving it. Nonetheless it does seem more likely that Britain will be more sympathetic to Australian interests than are other members of the Communities and it may be possible to gain from the British a sense of the Communities’ main policy directions particularly as concerns the EEC. To sum up, we should regard Britain as an especially valuable window on the Communities.
Diminished though our trading relation is, Britain remains a very significant trading partner for Australia and is likely to continue to be one. The Minister for Overseas Trade has exchanged assurances with the British Minister for Trade and Industry2 that we should continue to work together towards maintaining a high level of trade and that we shall keep the way open for consultation on matters of mutual trade interest. In that exchange of letters, it was agreed by Dr Cairns and Mr Walker that the close and cordial trading relations which have existed for so many years between the two countries provide a basis for our working together for the future.
The third important element in our relationship with Britain involves the exchange with the British of a mass of information on a wide range of matters of Government concern, including highly complex technical matters as well as information about broad policy formulation on matters of mutual interest. London remains a great centre for informed opinions on all sorts of international issues and the High Commission should not confine its reporting to the local scene but should include reactions to world events as they occur. We have had in the past frank and informal exchanges of view with the British on most matters of importance concerning our two Governments. You will be aware already of the substance and range of these exchanges. Some of the exchanges of information are governed by formal agreement and may go as far, for instance, as to entail the standardisation of equipment and procedures in the defence field. But most are informal and carry no commitment with them. Their continuation depends on maintaining ease of access within the British Government and British official institutions at a time when, on major questions of policy, we may have less in common than in the past. It is important that exchanges be responsive to changes in policy.
Finally, I should mention as an element in our relationship with Britain the fact that we are both monarchies with the same Head of State and that we are both members of the Commonwealth. Tradition and sentiment apart, powerful as their influence may be in certain sections of the Australian community as in Britain, the importance to us of the monarchy and the Commonwealth is that they give us a certain position in British political life; and certain assured places in Britain which, apart from Canada and New Zealand, others do not have. But I wish to make the connexion with Britain through the monarchy a less exclusive one than it has been in the past. l mention below some of the plans we have under this heading. I attach importance to Australian membership of the Commonwealth as a valuable framework for co-operation and for keeping in touch with a wide range of African, Caribbean and Asian countries; and I wish to avoid any suggestion that the Commonwealth connexion between Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand is exclusive.
Our relationship with Britain will not be conducted without generating certain frictions and I mention below some of the subjects on which we should not expect always to see eye to eye with the British or on which there may be misunderstandings or disagreements between us.
The reorientation of our defence and diplomatic strategy in Asia may be a cause of friction with the British. It was largely in response to what they believed to be the wishes of the Australians and others concerned that the British retained some military presence in South East Asia under the Five Power Arrangements and ANZUK. The application of our policies on these matters will closely affect British participation but we have advised Lord Carrington of our intention of fully honouring our commitment. It is also worth mentioning in this context that we have refused a British request for a joint survey of a BBC relay station on Christmas Island and have reacted cautiously to proposals for a British nuclear-powered submarine to enter Australian ports. Our policies towards SEATO are different from Britain’s.
The views of the present British Government and our own views on Southern Africa diverge, as is already evident from recent proceedings in the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. For two main reasons Australia needs to allay suspicions that it is a racialist and colonialist power. First, there are racial differences of a clear kind between us and other countries of our region: in our relations with them we certainly cannot afford to be marked by any taint of racialism or colonialism. Second, we have to be aware of the 35 African countries south of the Sahara. They make up nearly one-third of the membership of the United Nations and a majority of the Commonwealth. We shall find it easier to pursue our objectives internationally if we have at least their tacit understanding and if possible a measure of their support. To gain it we have to make clear our own sympathetic understanding of the Africans’ concern with issues of race and colonialism. These preoccupations will lead us to vote against South Africa and Portugal in the United Nations; and our votes are also likely to differ from those of Britain on some issues relevant to Rhodesia and other colonial territories. On Rhodesia the basic difference between us is that, while Britain would be prepared to accept a settlement which included independence for Rhodesia provided that subsequent progress towards majority rule was guaranteed, we consider that the majority rule should be a condition for granting of independence. But we believe that it would be unreasonable to ask Britain to use force to bring down the Smith regime3 and we shall not be a party to resolutions urging the use of force.
There may still also be room for misunderstandings over migration between Britain and Australia. The old days of virtually unrestricted movements between the two countries have gone and the restrictions now current may well cause public irritation from time to time. But the revised regulations now accepted by the British Parliament will no doubt blunt criticism of British restrictions on Australian entry to Britain; and we hope that, with the changes being made in Australian policy, there will no longer be grounds for the public criticism in Britain that Australian immigration policy is racialist. I do of course recognise that the shift in emphasis we are making from recruitment to sponsorship and the elimination of discriminating benefits (for example, visa-free entry), which have favoured British migrants, could cause resentment in Britain. It will be important that you try to ensure that the Australian position on these matters is not misunderstood or misrepresented.
It would be natural if there were some misapprehensions in Britain about the Australian Government’s intentions in regard to Australia’s formal links with Britain. As you know, we intend certain changes relating to the powers of the Governor-General, to appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, to the power of the British Parliament to legislate with respect to Australia and to The Queen’s styles and titles, so that for Australian purposes The Queen is Queen of Australia without the rest. The oath required of new Australian citizens has been drastically revised with the effect among others of deleting references to The Queen. These changes are not aimed at Britain: they are designed to reflect the development of a more independent Australia.
I read with great interest your cablegram of 5 March to me in which you reported that there is an atmosphere of uncertainty towards British investment in Australia. We have taken careful note of your observations and we shall keep your office informed of policy developments here. At this stage, the Government has not yet taken basic decisions on the issue of foreign ownership and control of Australian industry, and it is therefore not yet possible for me to say what will be the implications for foreign investment.
I am sure that you will already have formed some impressions of the way in which we need to handle our relations with the British at this time and of the changes which need to be made in methods of work in the High Commission. It seems to me that, so far as relations with the Government and the Civil Service go, and if we are to ensure that the advantages we now enjoy are maintained, we may need to be more active in taking formal initiatives in various fields than in the past. It is important that we leave the clear impression at senior levels within the British Government that we are intent on maintaining a close and fruitful relationship with Britain. The personal relations that you and the members of your staff have with those who manage and influence British policies will be of more than usual significance to us. You have, of course, direct access to Mr Heath just as Sir Morrice James in Canberra has direct access to me as Prime Minister. While the British Civil Service is first-rate, it is of great importance that you and senior members of your staff establish close and intimate relations with British Ministers. Apart from the value that could accrue to Australia in its bilateral relations with Britain, it is worth bearing in mind that the important EEC decisions are made in Brussels in the Council of Ministers and that Britain is of course represented there at an appropriate Ministerial level.
Your own relations and those of members of your staff with members of Parliament on both sides of the House are obviously worth cultivating and I hope that you will do what you can to encourage a trend in this direction.
I have the impression that in the past our official representatives in London have not cast their nets widely enough beyond the Government, Parliament and the Civil Service. The High Commission needs to have its contacts also in industry and the professions, in whose ranks there are many with special Australian interests and connexions; and you and your staff will need to make special effort to build up personal relations with influential figures in the information media in Britain. The editors, leader-writers and correspondents who specialise in international affairs, not only for the written press but also for radio and television, are people of great influence in Britain. In recent years Australia has had a bad press in Britain and we have been criticized specially over Viet Nam, our treatment of aborigines and our migration policy. The policies of my Government on these issues provide an opportunity to retrieve this situation and we must take it. Much of the same general comment might be made about the High Commission’s relations in academic circles, which, I think, have been somewhat neglected. Finally, in this context, I should mention the diplomatic corps. It would be undesirable for you and your staff to devote too much time to members of the diplomatic corps; but as a group they should be knowledgeable about British affairs and they provide a means of extending your range of British contacts. Our Heads of Mission have developed, in addition, the practice of keeping in especially close touch with the representatives abroad of the countries of East and South East Asia.
You will no doubt be giving some thought about how to project an appropriate image of the new Australia in Britain. There is certainly a need to bring the British perception of Australia up to date and to bring home to the British the view we now have of our relations with them. As you know Conservative forces in British politics have been able to interpret Australian views of the connexion with Britain to further their own political ends. I think that we must realize that the main impression on British public opinion will not necessarily be derived from the actions of the High Commission and its staff: an Australian film or play running in London or a television feature about Australia may leave a deeper impression than anything the High Commission does. You will, however, be able to project a certain image of Australia at least on official opinion and in the circles I mention above; and your cultivation of representatives of the information media should enable you to modify or correct impressions of Australia where it is necessary to do so. Your choice of audiences for public speaking engagements should also enable you to influence the views that the British public have of Australia; and the more catholic your choice the better. You will need to ensure by regular consultations with the senior members of your staff that they are aware of your own approach to these questions—and I hope that you will be able to carry with you the Agents-General and other senior Australian representatives such as the Heads of the Marketing Boards. You may find it worthwhile to consider the establishment of a Standing Committee on which representatives of departments such as Overseas Trade and Immigration and the Australian Information Service would sit with Foreign Affairs representatives and others to plan and co-ordinate our information activities in Britain, especially so that there is no overlapping.
Hitherto the Australian High Commission in London has not worked as a unified diplomatic mission representing the interests of the Australian Government: on the contrary, representatives of the many departments with officers stationed in London tended to go their own way and to pursue their separate departmental interests with little or no co-ordination. Each of these departments certainly has its own important interests to pursue. But their contacts with the British Government and the British public and the substance of the business they transact must now be considered not in isolation but as part of our overall relationship with Britain. It will be one of your main tasks to try to bring together the many facets of our Government-to-Government contacts with Britain and to fit all our many and varied connexions into our overall policy framework. Of necessity, you and your Deputy will have to take a very close interest in the work of all departments represented in London, especially those concerned with major policy, and you will have to co-ordinate the activities of their representatives. I see the Deputy High Commissioner playing a very important role in assisting you in this important and difficult task.
Your administrative responsibilities bulk large. As to organisational changes in the High Commission, Mr J.E. Collings will be looking into them and will be in close touch with you. He has been designated as your Special Assistant partly to give you what assistance you need and partly to ensure that in his dealings with officers of the High Commission, he will be able to act with appropriate authority. He will also carry with him certain delegations under the Public Service Act about which you will be advised at a later stage. With his help, we hope to establish whether all officers in the High Commission, both Australia-based and locally engaged, are involved in necessary work on the Government’s behalf, and we also hope to effect economies in terms of numbers and funds wherever possible.
While London is of course a very important post for us, it is difficult to believe that it is four times as important as Washington or ten times as important as Tokyo, which the present staffing levels would seem to imply.
As part of the reorganisation being effected to bring Australia House into line with the system under which our other Australian missions operate, the High Commissioner Act will be repealed before long. It is intended that the present Regulations should be incorporated as fully as possible in new Regulations to be made by the Public Service Board pursuant to the Public Service Act. The rights of existing staff at Australia House are being examined closely to ensure that they are not impaired. At an appropriate stage, details of what is to be done will need to be tactfully conveyed to the Staff Association at Australia House.
The adequacy of both office and residential accommodation for Australia-based officers in London will need to be reviewed. We should be glad if you would keep it in mind, though little can be done about the problem until Mr Collings has finished his work.
One other administrative issue deserves mention as it needs sensitive handling. Under present arrangements, some locally-engaged staff working in the High Commission have access to information and material to which nationals of a country other than Australia should not now have access. The days have passed when Australian and British interests coincided to such an extent that we could confidently employ British nationals in these vital areas. You might let the Department of Foreign Affairs have your views on this problem after you and the Deputy High Commissioner have had time to assess the work of the various branches of the High Commission.
In writing to you, I have been concerned to outline the fairly broad terms of my views on your overall responsibilities and objectives. Within this framework there are of course many more limited aspects of our relationship with Britain with which you will no doubt wish to acquaint yourself. The Department of Foreign Affairs has sought advice from other Departments about their particular interests in Britain and their replies are being sent to your Mission separately. I am sure that you will find them of interest and value.
Our relationship with Britain has changed. The British are less important to us than they were but there remains a number of very substantial elements in our relations—and some possible causes of friction or misunderstanding. The High Commission’s contacts with the British, its methods of work and its organisation need to be brought up-to-date so that they reflect the character of our relations with Britain. As I remarked at the beginning of my letter, I shall look forward to having your own comments and recommendations on the way in which we should proceed to develop our relations with Britain. I have every confidence that your long and distinguished career in public life in Australia suits you eminently for the role which an Australian High Commissioner in London should now play. I am sure that you will succeed admirably in winning respect as an outstanding Australian possessing a real understanding of and feel for his own country. We certainly do not want any breach with Britain, but we do most certainly want to face up to realities and to stress our attitudes and qualities as Australians. I wish you luck in this exacting but, I hope, interesting and worthwhile work.
1 J.I. Armstrong, Australian High Commissioner in London, 1973–75. Whitlam’s letter is not dated. Armstrong was appointed in December 1972 and took up office on 29 January 1973. At a press conference on 12 December 1972 Whitlam explained that the appointment would run until 1974. The Prime Minister said he had been urged by the Department of Foreign Affairs to fill the vacancy promptly because there had been ‘ an embarrassing hiatus in the post’, with Downer’s tenure having been extended several times and Downer himself rejecting a further extension. The appointment according to Whitlam had always been of a ‘political nature’, with the incumbent having the ‘ear’ of the Australian Government. It was an embarrassment to have the post—Australia’s first diplomatic mission—vacant any longer. Armstrong’s appointment was an indication according to the Prime Minister of the importance he and his government attached to the post (NAA: A1838, 67/1/3 part 7, DFA cablegram 15874 to Australian High Commission, London, 12 December 1972). Bunting succeeded Armstrong on 1 February 1975.
2 Peter Walker, UK Minister for Trade and Industry, 1972–74.
3 See Document 416, note 3.
[NAA:A1838,67/1/1/ PART 12]