British High Commission, Canberra, 20 December 1975
Confidential
Footnotes to the Constitutional Crisis
1. On Thursday, 11 December the Governor-General and Lady Kerr kindly asked my wife and me (and my daughter Laura, who is staying with us over Christmas) to tea at Government House in Canberra. In the main the conversation was non-political. However, in discussion with me Sir J Kerr made the following points which (though not adding notably to our existing understanding of the situation) are nevertheless of some interest in view of his forthcoming visit to London (he leaves on 23 December):–
(a) Sir J Kerr thought it no bad thing that the public in Australia (and perhaps also those in other monarchical Commonwealth countries, not excluding Britain) should have been reminded that the Crown possessed reserve powers. Maybe such a reminder need only be given every twenty-five or maybe fifty years, but it was salutary that from time to time people should be brought to realise that the Crown’s functions were not merely titular and/or ceremonial. Mr Whitlam had proclaimed repeatedly his belief that the Governor-General of Australia had no power to act save as the Prime Minister advised. But on this—as on other matters—Mr Whitlam had not done his homework;
(b) I would appreciate that a factor which had been very much in Sir J Kerr’s mind throughout had been the need to protect The Queen from being drawn into the Australian political mêlée.
2. On Wednesday of this week (17 December) I delivered to Mr Whitlam in Canberra (as already reported) the message in FCO telegram No 820 from our own Prime Minister. 1 After I had handed over the message, Mr Whitlam volunteered the following comments on his dismissal by Sir J Kerr. Speaking reflectively and with no particular heat, he said that it had come as a great shock to the whole Labour movement to find that the Crown’s reserve powers of (he had thought) long ago could be resuscitated at this late stage to the advantage of those forces here who were opposed to social progress. As he had already said in public, Mr Whitlam himself did not believe that The Queen would have acted on 11 November as her Governor-General here did. However, the fact was that the Monarchy itself was henceforth at risk in this country, since it would not be possible to get rid of the Governor-General and the powers which he purported to have—which would henceforth become a standing ALP objective—without abolishing the Monarchy too. Mr Whitlam personally thought this a matter of great regret, but he had to say in all frankness that in the long run he thought Sir J. Kerr’s action would prove to have given Republicanism here a considerable boost.
3. Mr Whitlam added that some untoward consequences could arise for Sir J Kerr himself from what he had done, during his remaining tenure of the Governor-Generalship. For example, there would be places and occasions in Australia where he would not be able to go in future without provoking popular demonstrations against him. It was probable that at the next Opening of the Australian Parliament he and Lady Kerr would be booed on arrival at Parliament House; the Labour Senators might well walk out when he entered the Senate; the Labour members of the House of Representatives might well remain in their seats when summoned to attend in the Senate to hear the Governor-General’s speech; and Labour members might also decline all future invitations from the Governor-General and his wife to social functions at Government House.
4. Mr Whitlam added that he felt sure Mr Fraser knew in advance about what the Governor-General intended to do, and did, on 11 November. He did not suspect the Governor-General himself of divulging his plan to Mr Fraser. But he thought it probable that the Chief Justice of Australia (Sir G Barwick), to whom the Governor-General had confided his intention, had told Mr Ellicott, now Attorney-General in Mr Fraser’s new Liberal/Country Party Government, about it (Sir G Barwick and Mr Ellicott were cousins twice over), and that it was Mr Ellicott who had alerted Mr Fraser.
Comment
5. It remains to be seen whether things work out as foreshadowed in these gloomy comments of Mr Whitlam’s. I think they should be regarded at this stage more as a reflection of his own deep-seated disappointment and bitterness than as an objective forecast of what is actually going to happen.
6. I attach as an annex to this letter a record of some other points made to me by Mr Whitlam.2 As you will see, they deal with the post-election prospects of the ALP (and with his own future position as leader) and do not directly relate to the constitutional issue between Sir J Kerr and himself.
1 Not traced.
2 Not published.
[UKNA: FCO 24/2052]