Canberra, 30 January 1966
Meeting with Mr. Healey
The subject is so vast with so many sub-headings, each capable of giving rise to argument, that the most useful contribution I can make, I think, is to put down in as short a form as I can the dominant issues. Wherever the discussion may lead in detail, it will be to these central matters that the Australian Ministers should continually return.
2. The first thing is to know what Mr. Healey will say. On this we have two or three papers plus the benefit of discussion with British officials to guide us. It seems that it will boil down to the following, though allowance needs to be made for the effect which Healey’s Washington discussions may lead him to vary his piece:–
(a) That the strains of the Budget, the balance of payments and of physical resources require Britain to reduce its defence commitments in the Far East.
(b) That although Britain would like to stay in the Malaysia and Singapore bases as long as it remains useful to do so, there is a continuing risk of eviction by decision of the Governments concerned.
(c) That the long-term aim for containing China should be to build-up a group in South-East Asia of ostensibly non-aligned States with sufficient economic and political strength to resist Chinese political or subversive pressure—in which case a Western military presence on the Asian mainland may, in the long run, be counter-productive, although powerful Western forces would be needed in the background.
(d) For a variety of reasons therefore—financial, political and strategic appreciation—Britain concludes that in the Seventies it will no longer be possible to continue to retain British, or for that matter any Western bases, in Malaysia and Singapore.
(e) If therefore a British defence contribution to the area is to be maintained, as Britain desires it should, alternative facilities will be necessary, and Australia seems to be the only possible site.
(f) The detail of the forces which Britain would envisage basing on Australia is set out in the papers. They would mean the stationing in Australia of about 26,000 men.
(g) It will be pointed out by Mr. Healey that his mission is exploratory, that except in regard to money ceilings he has no firm conclusions, and that in any event there could be no question of leaving Singapore while confrontation lasts.
3. From this, two things in particular emerge.
4. The first is that Britain is thinking in terms of voluntary withdrawal from Singapore. Mr. Healey will say, and go on repeating, that they are ‘not putting a date’ on it. But this should give us no satisfaction at all. If it is merely a question of a date, then the basic decision is made. We must get Britain to think as we do in terms of staying on in Singapore and Malaysia.
5. A second follows from the first. It is the centre-piece, and even more serious. Our belief is in a forward defence policy which, in concrete terms, means the Western military position on the South-East Asian mainland. Britain, on the other hand, is arguing against a Western military presence. Here is the fundamental difference—the strategy for the defence of the area, including the defence of Australia. This must surely be the battleground with Mr. Healey and our position must be that we can entertain no new arrangements unless they have been thoroughly debated and agreed in Four Power talks or, if these prove impossible to arrange, until we ourselves have had our own bilateral talks with the United States and are ready for a further round with Britain.
6. Those, as I see it, are the prime points—we must resist the ‘leave Singapore’ complex, and we must be ready with our own positive arguments of political appreciation and military strategy with a view to getting Mr. Healey to review the strategy, which might be described as fortress Australia, on which he is very largely basing himself.
7. There are two additional matters which ought to be mentioned.
8. The first is the question of contingency planning. Mr. Healey is going to say that whatever our views about Singapore and strategy generally, the risk of eviction is real and that planning for alternative bases in Australia should begin now. This strikes me on the substance as being almost irresistible. The only room for debate is in relation to our tactics in replying. We must not turn Healey down flat. But if we agree too readily, we will give the impression that we are willing to plan not for the contingency of departure from the mainland, but for the event. There are two things in between these extremes which we could say, and I think we should say them both:–
(a) That we agree that contingency planning makes sense against forced withdrawal, but that it should come as a result of the Four Power talks and not be agreed upon in advance of them.
(b) That we will proceed to study the increase of our own bases for our own purposes with the understanding that the increase in our facilities would be relevant to British forces as well as Australian in the event of forced withdrawal.
9. The other point concerns the role of the British forces if they were to be based in Australia, in the strength and formation suggested by Mr. Healey. (In one way I would prefer this to be left out of discussion because I regard it as a secondary and not primary element of the debate. But it is as well that I should refer to it.) According to our Defence authorities, it is likely that the force foreshadowed would be more relevant to Britain’s own responsibilities towards India, and even in Africa, rather than to the defence of Australia. In effect, there is some view in our Defence area that Britain would merely be holding a section of its forces in reserve in Australia for use anywhere, and since, on their scheme, we would have provided the capital cost of the bases, they would be doing so on the cheap. I do not interpret the British proposal in this manner, but you should know of this suspicion. On Defence figuring, the cost of establishing bases for the forces mentioned would be in the region of £250 million to £300 million.
1 Harold Holt succeeded Menzies as Prime Minister on 26 January 1966.
[NAA:Al209, 1965/6595 PART 3]