Australian High Commission, London, 1 June 1966
5295. Secret
Holt from Downer
1. I saw Harold Wilson at 10 Downing Street at 4 o’clock this afternoon, and talked with him for over three-quarters of an hour.
He received me in the Cabinet Room, and was very friendly, relaxed and frank.
I related to him all the points in your 3067 and your 3125.1
I developed somewhat the point in your 3125 concerning Britain’s future place in the world.
I also asked whether in his opinion a majority of the Labour Party was now opposed to the Government’s East of Suez policy, and did the Government still stand by their Defence Review published last February especially paragraph 24?2 Could we still assume that this was still valid Government policy? Wilson several times said he agreed with all the points I put forward, and in fact there was virtually very little—if indeed anything—in our case with which he would disagree. I always find him a very easy man to talk with, and today’s discussion was no exception.
2. Before unfolding our case, I mentioned the press coverage particularly in Australia. Wilson said that he thought it was perhaps a pity that you or someone in authority in Canberra had told the press that you had instructed me to seek this interview as the subsequent publicity in London would give the Labour back-benchers who had raised this issue a flattering feeling of false importance. He considered that the less publicity there was about the matter the worse the dissidents in the Labour Party would be served. The Press were now inflating the matter almost to an international issue. I replied that personally I disliked publicity on these occasions but that public opinion in Australia was naturally aroused by what they had read, and if the Government were about to alter their defence policy this would be a decision of utmost gravity for us.
3. Wilson replied by saying that the Government had not changed its policy nor was it going to change its policy. He then began a surprisingly candid discourse on various strands of opinion in the party and the way the press had written up the incident. He mentioned, in language which seemed very familiar, the fact that party meetings were supposed to be private, and that reports there from were in the nature of those who wished to emphasise their attitudes. In this case, the press had slanted the discussions out of all proportion. He was not present at the beginning of the meeting, only entering after it had got under way. He thought it was precipitated by several men who were disappointed at not being given office. ‘Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned’ and Christopher Mayhew, Woodrow Wyatt,3 and one or two others were in that category.
The way they were going on now only emphasised the rightness of his own judgement in not appointing them to the Ministry. ‘Mayhew is a nut case’ said Wilson, and there were several others in the party room who were not much better. Reginald Paget4 (another signatory of the resolution) he also singled out for criticism, pointing out that he was really an eccentric 18th Century Tory squire who had wished the Industrial Revolution had never occurred.
In addition to the disappointed men, there was the left wing who were really pacifists, people with whom it was impossible to reason, although these were the ones who wanted war against Rhodesia!
4. Wilson then devoted a good deal of time to discussing—really thinking aloud—what he was going to say at the next meeting when the resolution came up again. He said that he had spent part of last Monday meditating about this, but his present intention was to issue the text of his speech after the forthcoming meeting so that there should be no ambiguity about the Government’s policy.
I encouraged him to do so. He did not think the matter would be pressed to a vote in any case; if it were he thought the Government would win it. He was confident of his ability to flay his opponents. ‘When I have finished with Mayhew he will have such a sore tail he will not be able to sit down’, was one of the typical observations he made. Even in the unlikely event of the vote going against the Cabinet this would make no difference to the Government’s defence policy. The Government had stated its policy. It intended to adhere to it. If the dissidents wished to take their opposition to the House of Commons, they could do so.
They knew perfectly well, Wilson went on, that if they defeated the Government he would then call another general election, and after it some of those who had precipitated such a consequence would not be back in their seats to complain.
5. We then had some discussion on the Singapore Base. Wilson said that we had more confidence than they did of Britain’s ability to remain there with the consent of the local population, although he had a good opinion of Lee and believed that so long as Lee controlled Singapore all would be well. Taking the long view, he thought both of our countries would be on a surer foundation to develop an alternate base in Northern Australia, but none the less he agreed with me when I pointed out the moral value of Britain remaining firmly established in Singapore for as long as possible.
6. Reverting to the party discussion, Wilson said that those who criticised the Government’s East of Suez policy did not seem to realise that if they withdrew from Asia, the Americans would have to increase their commitments in Asia, but that the United States would compensate themselves for this by withdrawing some of their forces from Europe, thus leaving Britain a heavier burden to bear in NATO.
7. Pursuant to your instructions I made an offer of help as set out in your 3067 paragraph 8,5 but he did not advert to this, nor take up the suggestion. He seemed completely confident of being able to carry the day, and gave me the impression of being quite adamant in pursuing his defence policy. Smilingly he said ‘Presumably Harold Holt has troubles like this, as did Bob Menzies before him, and I am sure he is quite capable of dealing with them. He must trust me to do equally well.’
8. Wilson is looking forward to meeting you in July. I told him that your arrival date seemed to be approximately 6th July, and that you wished to discuss these and other matters fully with him yourself. He still did not know whether a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference will be held then or in September, except that he feels that his insistence on all Prime Ministers attending and not being substituted by Foreign Ministers has put a spoke in some of the African wheels. Therefore perhaps September could be the more likely date.
9. My impression is that Wilson regards this resolution as being not so serious in itself as in being a manifestation of critical attitudes by his back-benchers in the future on other things. He said there was still a good deal of opposition to his Government’s policy over Vietnam and last week’s party meeting was not unrelated to it.6
10. All in all I formed the impression that Wilson was perfectly genuine in what he said. He spoke as if he were in complete command of the situation. Certainly has had unbounded confidence in his own powers of persuasion and leadership, and what he can do when pressed, with the rank and file of his party. If you will allow me to make a suggestion, I think we shall be wise to play down the disquiet aroused in Australia, and accept his assurances.
In my own experience I have seldom had a franker or more forthright discussion with any man in politics.
1 In cablegram 3067 of 27 May 1966, Holt referred to Australian press reports of a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting at which a draft resolution had been discussed calling for ‘a decisive reduction in our military commitments East of Suez by 1969–70, including withdrawal from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf’. The reports said Healey and Stewart ‘went a long way towards agreeing’ that the UK should withdraw. Holt wanted Downer to see Wilson urgently to impress upon him the effect of such reports on Australian opinion. Britain’s presence at Singapore and in Southeast Asia was ‘vital’ for Australia. Holt disputed the ‘theory abroad’ that the problems of Southeast Asia would be solved if the US and UK withdrew. ‘There is nothing in the past history of Asia to support this theory, unless what is contemplated is the dominance of the whole area by a tyrannical power.’ The Prime Minister emphasised that Australia was still ‚actively pursuing’ the matter of alternative facilities in Australia for use by UK forces ‘in certain contingencies’. Once Downer had seen Wilson, the Australian Government would be able to consider what support could be given ‘to sustain the position of the British Government’. In cablegram 3125 of 31 May 1966, Holt emphasised that the issue was not simply a question of Britain’s future role in the world. The future of Asia was at stake. Holt wanted Wilson to know that he had Australian sympathy and support in contending with domestic political pressures (NAA: A1945, 287/3/24).
2 For the text of which see Document 55, note 1.
3 Author, journalist and broadcaster; Labour MP for Bosworth, Leicestershire,1959–70.
4 Labour MP for Northampton, 1945–74 (life peer, Baron Paget of Northampton, 1975).
5 Asking if the Australian Government could do anything to help Wilson.
6 At a Parliamentary Labour Party meeting on 15 June I 966, the motion calling for a withdrawal from East of Suez and a reduction in defence expenditure was defeated by 225 votes to 54 with reportedly 50 abstentions.
[NAA: A1945, 287/3/24]