London,29 June 1966
Secret
Statement for the Foreign Secretary in Canberra: Attitude of the United Kingdom in the Event of Aggression against Australia
The Commonwealth Secretary2 referred to telegram No. 915 of 26th June from Canberra containing a message from the Foreign Secretary.3 To dispel doubts in some circles in Australia that, as a result of the Defence Review and the end of confrontation, the United Kingdom could no longer be relied on to come to the assistance of Australia if she were attacked, the Foreign Secretary wished to take the opportunity of his speech on 30th June to the Australian Institute of International Affairs to give a robust reassurance to Australia that in the event of her being attacked, it was unthinkable that we would stand aside and not come to her assistance. The Commonwealth Secretary agreed that a statement on these lines was desirable and would be in accord with the general understanding in this country of our position in relation to Australia, which was widely held even among those critical of other aspects of our defence policy East of Suez.
In discussion, it was recalled that in 1955 the then Foreign Secretary (Sir Anthony Eden), speaking of our readiness to assist Australia in the event of an attack, had said: ‘I can see no circumstances in which, if Australia or New Zealand were involved in danger, Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom would not be at their side.’ This was presumably understood in Australia as well as in this country to be the present position, and any statement made by the Foreign Secretary in Canberra could not say less without arousing Australian anxieties. At the same time it would not be desirable for any statement to go further than that by Sir Anthony Eden; and it was important that it should not be formulated in such a way as to commit us to retaining forces in the Far East against the unlikely contingency of our being required to assist Australia or New Zealand against external attack. On the other hand, it was pointed out that if we could reassure the Australians of our readiness to come to their assistance, it could well facilitate our policy of major withdrawals of forces from the theatre and of holding forces in the United Kingdom in readiness to be sent out when the need arose.
In further discussion it was suggested that to link our readiness to go to the help of Australia with the readiness shown by them to come to our help in two World Wars would be appropriate: it would reflect a widespread sentiment, would convey the idea of our sending forces to help rather than stationing them in the area, and would provide a means of distinguishing our relationship to Australia and New Zealand from our relationship to other Commonwealth countries, since we would not wish to give a similar undertaking to all of them.
The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee agreed that the Foreign Secretary should make a reassuring statement to his Australian audience, but were concerned that the precise formulation should not imply any new commitment on our part to maintain forces in the Far East for this purpose. To this end, the Foreign Secretary should be invited to recast the terms of his assurance so as to refer to the help given by Australia to us in two World Wars and to assure Australia and New Zealand that we would similarly go to their assistance if they were attacked.
The Committee:–
Invited the Commonwealth Secretary to send a reply to telegram 915 from Canberra as indicated in the Prime Minister’s summing up of these discussions.4
Background to the UK Defence White Paper of July 1967
In a submission on defence expenditure to Cabinet in March 1967, Brown and Healey argued that without any change in overseas commitments the most that could be saved in the defence budget by 1970–71 would be between £100 million and £125 million. This fell well short of the targeted savings of between £200 million and £300 million towards which the Labour Government had been working since it entered office in 1964. The UK therefore had to decide between accepting much smaller savings than had been planned for on the defence budget, or changing its overseas policies. Brown and Healey concluded: ‘For the health of our economy we must change our overseas policies.’ The indications were that in the next few years ‘our room for manoeuvre is limited mainly to our Far East deployment and commitments’. Withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore would have to be phased over a number of years. The aim would be ‘to try and reach the half-way mark by 1970–71, and to be completely out by 1975–76’, earlier still if it were politically possible. In negotiations with allies, the UK should offer, if necessary, to maintain a small maritime and air presence, on an unaccompanied basis in Australia, using Australian facilities after the withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. The Brown–Healey memorandum estimated that this would bring savings in the region of £150—£200 million by 1970—71, and up to £300 million by 1975–76. The two ministers acknowledged that economic aid would be required to mitigate the consequences of withdrawal, especially in Singapore where the local economy was ‘highly dependent’ on the presence of UK forces.1 Palliser’s reaction to the proposals when he first saw them ten days earlier was to tell Wilson: ‘If we pursue the policy suggested here, we should be under no illusion that it is anything but the end of Britains “world role” in defence—at least in the eyes of our main Far Eastern allies (the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malaysia) and of course in those of our potential European partners (though this of course would not be disadvantageous’).2 From the Commonwealth Office, the recommendations were challenged by Herbert Bowden,3 who believed total withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore represented ‘a major reversal of the policy’ announced only a year ago. As an alternative, Bowden suggested the UK should reduce its forces to half their current level ‘over the next few years’, initiate consultation on this basis, and take a decision on final withdrawal ‘in the light of developments in what is bound to be a fluid situation in the Far East’.If, however, Cabinet accepted the Brown–Healey recommendations, Bowden emphasised that great care had to be taken to avoid creating a ‘chaotic’ situation in Malaysia and Singapore, that aid to both countries would have to stepped up, and that there should be ‘full and frank’ discussions with Australia and New Zealand, as well as with the two governments most immediately affected4 Cabinet considered these submissions at two meetings on 4 and 11 April 1967. Ministers authorised consultation with allies upon the basis of the Brown–Healey proposals. Brown would take soundings from the US Australia and New Zealand during a forthcoming SEATO Council meeting in Washington, after which Healey would visit Singapore and Malaysia. The eventual date of withdrawal and decisions about stationing forces in Australia, and how large they might be, would be taken in June–July upon completion of the defence review.5
1 OPD(66) 30th meeting.
2 Arthur Bottomley.
3 Michael Stewart.
4 In his Canberra statement Stewart commented: ‘[J]ust as Australia and New Zealand came to the help of Great Britain in the two World Wars, it is unthinkable that if Australia and New Zealand were the victims of aggression, Great Britain would not similarly come to their assistance. This is not a matter of treaties or legal obligations. It is unthinkable that the British Government or people would act otherwise.’ Stewart emphasised, ‘we have neither the wish nor the intention to tum our backs on the world East of Suez’. Wilson referred to these comments during his speech of welcome to Holt during a dinner at the Savoy Hotel in London in July 1966. He confirmed Britain’s intention to maintain a military presence in Southeast Asia, and acknowledged ‘that it is in the Far East and Southern Asia that the greatest danger to peace may lie in the next decade’. He also commented on the UK’s problem of ‘over-stretch in both military and economic terms’, and reiterated the UK view that an overseas base was indefensible, both militarily and morally, if it did not have the goodwill of the local government and people. Britain intended to reduce its forces when confrontation ended. ‘But … the reduction of over-stretch is one thing, abdication is quite another. We intend—depending more on improved mobility than has ever been possible in the past—to discharge our responsibilities to our Commonwealth partners and allies in the area. This has never been questioned. In the modern world where Prime Ministers can fly from London to Canberra in a little over 30 hours, long-range transport aircraft, combined with strategically situated staging posts, can achieve a quick build-up precisely where that build-up is needed’ (NAA: M 1003, Sir Harold Wilson and the Labour Government, Wilson’s speech, 12 July 1966).
1 UKNA: CAB 129/128/2, C(67)40, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, memorandum by Brown and Healey, 31 March 1967; also ESAC, Part I, Document 22.
2 UKNA: PREM 13/1384, minute to Wilson, 21 March 1967.
3 Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations/Affairs, 1966–67.
4 UKNA: CAB 129/128/2, C(67)41, ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’, memorandum by Bowden, 31 March 1967; also ESAC, Part I, Document 23.
5 UKNA: CAB 128/42/1, Cabinet Conclusions, CC 16(67)3 and CC 19(67)4.
[UKNA: CAB 148/251]