British High Commission, Canberra, 21 April 1967
636. Immediate Top Secret
For the first time in my experience of him, Mr. Holt looked badly shaken and grey in the face. His tone was calm throughout and he emphasised that the message1 to the Prime Minister which he had sent after getting Mr. Hasluck’s reports from Washington had not been expressed in a ‘scolding’ tone. It was quite obvious however that he was profoundly upset.
2. He reacted with remarkable calmness to the 50% cut by 1971. It is the possibility of complete withdrawal that disturbs him. In addition he is particularly ruffled by two points on which the Prime Minister’s message2 differs from Mr. Hasluck’s account of his talks with Mr. Brown; first, whether or not the consultation with Australia and the other allies is to be a real one, and secondly whether or not we have been influenced by the ‘white faces’ argument. As you know, this is a red rag to the Australian bull. Financial necessity they can understand—also, if it happened, the need to leave Singapore and Malaysia because of local political opposition. What they do not accept is that we should withdraw because of some theoretical reason about relations between the West and South East Asia, an area which they claim to understand far better than we do.
3. If consultation is not to be a reality, and if we are partly influenced by the ‘white faces’ argument, then it will be important in the interests of our relations with them for us to tell the Australians so as soon as possible.3 Otherwise they will merely conclude that the Prime Minister’s message is lacking in frankness.
4. I recommend as soon as possible a further message should be sent from the Prime Minister to Mr. Holt, acknowledging Holt’s message which crossed his and clearing up those two points so far as that can be done. If this is agreed, could I please be so informed at once? I can then let Mr. Holt know that another message is on its way and thus prevent a further crossing of messages.4
1 See Document 64.
2 See Document 61 .
3 Emphasis in original.
4 According to Johnston’s later account, proffered at the end of his posting in 1971, when in mid-1967 the UK Government made its decision to withdraw forces from Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s, the UK High Commission at Canberra cautioned London that it would be unwise to use with the Australians the argument about ‘white faces’ on mainland Asia doing more harm than good. The High Commission suggested instead that the UK case should rest on the economic and financial arguments. As Johnston put it in his 1971 recollection, the ideological point about white faces was bound to have ‘the worst possible effect, and would jangle nerves very deep in the Australian character; after all, if you come to think of it, the Australians themselves are “white faces” on their own mainland’. According to Johnston’s account the warning was at first heeded, and Britain’s economic and financial case was made. But then ‘an authoritative British source conveyed to the Australians the political arguments in favour of planning to remove white faces from the mainland’. When they received this message, Holt and his government ‘simply exploded’; Johnston had ‘never known relations between the two countries more difficult’. The ‘inherent frivolity’ of the episode was what vexed the High Commission. To Australia the defence of Southeast Asia was a matter of ‘national survival’. For the UK to say it was withdrawing its forces, and to offer in justification ‘a piece of trendy left wing ideology’ was the equivalent of seeing a swimmer in difficulties and throwing him water wings by the London fashion designer Mary Quant. ‘It all accentuated the flibbertigibbet impression which, during these years, our country all too often gave overseas. In the eyes of Australians, Britain seemed to be dwindling to a minute island where there was practically nothing except “swinging London” and in which Westminster and Whitehall were insignificant compared to Carnaby Street and the King’s Road. We had lost our reputation for gravitas …. It was a heart-breaking period for British representatives on this side of the world, a time of severe national humiliation …. our country was despised’ (UKNA: FCO 24/1072, despatch, Johnston to Sir A. Douglas-Home, 2 April 1971). Similar views were held within the Malaysian Government. In August 1967 the Permanent Secretary at the External Affairs Ministry in Kuala Lumpur told the UK High Commissioner that the UK seemed interested only in ‘safety, security and mini skirts’ (Nicholas J. White, ‘The survival, revival and decline of British influence in Malaysia, 1957–70’, Twentieth century British history, vol. 14 (2003), p. 231 ).
[UKNA: FCO 46/54]