Washington, 12 May 1967
Secret
Thank you for your letter of May 1.1 Denis Healey told Bob McNamara he will be reporting to the Cabinet on May 12 on his visit to Singapore/Malaysia, and presumably, on his conversations with Bob. I am answering your letter now so that you will have it in advance of that meeting.
I am especially pleased by what you said about consultation. The decision your Cabinet is considering making to withdraw entirely from the area will have the most devastating repercussions in all kinds of directions, and, since it will set up chain reactions that will strike at the very basis of our whole post-war foreign policy, it is of transcending importance that the Cabinet fully understand the grave implications of such a decision.
McNamara has reported on his talk with Denis. His report was anything but assuring that your Government is facing up to this fundamental aspect of the problem. Bob underscored what I have already told you. He made it clear that a decision made now to withdraw entirely in the 1970s would be a disaster to us, that American opinion would not stand for picking up the abandoned British position, and that if Europe is withdrawing from the world while the US is carrying a major burden for defending Europe, the pressures in the US might also lead to a US withdrawal from Europe. Denis has never addressed himself to these aspects of the problem. He said that there was no chance of changing the decision to run down your forces to zero by 1975–6, he stressed that this decision was associated with budgetary savings and the initiative to get into Europe, and that association with Europe was incompatible with remaining in Southeast Asia. He indicated that he wants to announce the long-term plan in early August.
There will be further opportunity for discussion when the Prime Minister and the President meet on June.2 Holt and the President will talk on June 1, and we are giving some thought to having the three of us meet at that time. 21 must ask you to convey to Harold the importance of making no decision on this matter in advance of these talks.
Meanwhile we have had reports of Healey’s meetings with the Tunku and Lee Kwan Yew,.and have been talking further with the Australians and New Zealanders.
The opinion of all five is unanimous. All of us understand the UK need and desire to reduce forces. None of us understand why a further decision must be made now to withdraw entirely by the mid-1970s.
There is one point in your letter with which I want to take issue. You observed that your plans for withdrawing amount to little more than a statement of what Australia, New Zealand and we will in fact have done or be doing about the same period for the same political and economic reasons.
Frankly, that startled me. We have undertaken to withdraw from South Vietnam once the North has gone home, though even there I would assume we might well need bases in standby conditions to preserve confidence. In Thailand, we may well wish to be there longer, and the Thai may want us to do so.
But aside from these specific countries, our long-range plans assume that at least selected countries in the area will continue to need outside support and guarantees and, to the extent required, presence. We don’t know the exact shape of future arrangements, but we would regard it as extremely dangerous and premature to deny ourselves now the possibility of a future military presence.
What we are hoping is that over the next decade the Governments of the area will grow more capable, that their economies will develop more muscle, and that more effective local military and police forces capable of inhibiting subversion will be developed. We also are hoping that over the next decade there will be a growth in regional cooperative arrangements in all fields, including defence.
I don’t think any of these are vain hopes, providing the free Asian nations and we can build on what already exists. This is what makes a British withdrawal so dangerous. It would undermine confidence in the very foundations on which we are building, setting in motion adverse reactions in Singapore and Malaysia, in South east Asia generally, and most serious, threatening to set in motion isolationist sentiments in the United States that could affect our worldwide policies.
I implore you and your colleagues not to underestimate this last danger. There is already a body of sentiment in important Congressional and other circles here critical of the Japanese for their easy assumption that they can concentrate on trade and investment in the East while we look after security and defence. This promises to become an increasing problem between us. The UK also have important direct and indirect economic interests in the area, and some of your colleagues are saying there is no need for the British to show the flag since the United States will provide for security.
These are dangerous assumptions, whether made by Japan or by Europe or the UK. If the American people should ever get the idea that our job is defence and security while others concentrate on trade and investment, no American administration will be able to hold the line on our commitments.
I must say to you, in all frankness, I am astonished that the UK should even consider taking such a decision at this time. The substantial withdrawals you have in mind by 1970–71 should ease your immediate domestic pressures. I see no overriding need why you must decide now on what you will do six or ten years hence.
Once Vietnam is settled and we have a better idea of the shape of the future in that area and a better measure of what regional cooperation will contribute, various possibilities might then emerge which would not be too great a burden on you. Meantime the important thing is continued British visibility in the area, even if it is a reduced presence.
1 See Document 63, note 4.
2 Wilson was determined to avoid a tripartite meeting on his visit to Washington. He wanted bilateral discussions with the President. ‘He does not want any ganging up between the President and Holt’ (UKNA: FCO 46/53, letter, Palliser to C.M. Maclehose (Foreign Office), 15 May 1967).
[UKNA: FCO 46/53]