Australian High Commission, London, 16 May 1967
6008. Top Secret
British Defence Policy
United States embassy officials are pinning their hopes on the President being able to persuade Wilson in Washington that it would be unfriendly and unwise to say the least to insist on taking a decision now to withdraw militarily from South-East Asia. At a high and selective level British have been warned that the President with his political troubles over Vietnam will be in no mood to hear Wilson plead political problems to justify making the President’s own problems so much graver.
2. If the concerted representations including our own Prime Minister’s contributions in both Washington and London have their effect there will remain the problems of what Wilson will actually tell his Cabinet and his Party. He will need to show financial savings for the British but an American subvention which we know the United States are prepared to offer (my telegram 5930) would run contrary to the mood of this country. In particular it would upset the sensitivities of the Labour Party as well as being badly timed for Europe and De Gaulle.
3. It occurs to me that you might consider the alternative of American financial support for Australia (e.g. through F111 purchases etc.) which we could pass on as grants in aid of British defence expenditure in South-East Asia. The latter might for example be conveniently related to Terendah and the Commonwealth Brigade.
4. Contrary to an American offer an Australian subvention could have political advantages as well as meeting the British argument of economic necessity. There is a good deal of sentiment in Britain for continuing to work closely with Australia and our offer would also underline the importance we attach to a continuing British military presence. The faint blush of shame that some British might feel need not be to our disadvantage. Even if not accepted an Australian offer could increase the pressures on the British to modify their plans.
5. I would see advantage in the British not being privy to our arrangements with the United States although this may have disadvantages for the Americans and possibly leave us more exposed to continuing obligations without American support in the future.
6. Irrespective of the foregoing I believe it will be important within the next month to persuade the British to agree to a continuing military presence somewhere in the Far East with the financial commitment for them that this would involve. Provided the political will to stay in the Far East remains there would be continuing opportunity to demonstrate that the present bases are more efficient and economical than bases elsewhere.
1 T.K. Critchley, Senior External Affairs Representative, London, 1966–69.
[NAA: A1209, 1966/7335 PART 4]