London, 26 June 1961
Secret
Base Facilities in Australia
At your recent meetings with Mr. Townley, he emphasised that we should make an early approach to the Australian Government if we were to secure base facilities which we might require in the future, when our other bases east of Suez might no longer be available.
2. When the Chiefs of Staff subsequently discussed the matter, we concluded that it would be sufficient if, in our initial approach to the Australians, we listed our requirements in the broadest terms only. We consider that these requirements would be of the order of:–
(a) Accommodation for up to two resident Infantry Brigade Groups (one of which may be the Commonwealth Brigade).
(b) The use of two and possibly three airfields.
(c) A suitable fleet anchorage and the use of emergency naval repair facilities.
(d) An allocation of frontage on Cockburn Sound.2
(e) Facilities for headquarters, communications, training areas, and accommodation and amenities to scale.
(f) Certain base repair and storage facilities which would probably include maintenance and servicing of guided missiles, aircraft third line servicing, and storage for nuclear weapons.
3. As you are aware, Mr. Townley has two reasons for urging H.M. Government to make an early bid for base facilities; first, the desirability of obtaining agreement in writing from the present Australian Government before the forthcoming elections,3 and secondly, the necessity of obtaining an allocation of frontage on Cockburn Sound which was already undergoing rapid development. We cannot judge the force of Mr. Townley’s arguments, but we see danger in pressing on too fast, for although our future security of tenure in Singapore may be in doubt, we have no intention of leaving the base until we are forced to do so. If we discuss alternatives to Singapore we might not only create a false impression as to our real desires, but might also prematurely set in motion the very thing which we wish to avoid. Accordingly, the timing of any submission to the Australian Government will need careful consideration.
4. No doubt you will wish to consult with the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations to decide the best manner in which to bring our requirements to the attention of the Australian Government. In this connection, we understand that the Commonwealth Relations Office intend to provide Mr. Sandys with a defensive brief for use during his forthcoming visit to Australia in case the question of base facilities should be raised by Mr. Townley.
5. Finally, the development of new base facilities in Australia will necessitate heavy Government expenditure, but no discussions with the Treasury have yet been initiated on this matter. You may therefore decide to seek the advice of the Permanent Secretary as to whether or not the Chancellor of the Exchequer should be consulted before any approach is made to the Australian Government.
1 H.A. Watkinson, British Secretary of State for Defence, 1959-62, who commented on this minute (7 July): ‘We shall have to play this slowly until we are through our other difficulties’, a reference presumably to the looming Kuwait crisis of July 1961 when UK emergency forces were sent to Kuwait to forestall an invasion threat from neighbouring Iraq.
2 An inlet of the Indian Ocean on the coast of Western Australia, south of Perth. It extends south of the Swan River at Fremantle for 25 kilometres to Point Peron near Rockingham.
3 A federal election was held on 9 December 1961 and the Menzies Government was returned with a two-seat majority.
[UKNA: DEFE 7/ 1726]