Canberra, 25 May 1967
Top Secret
Submission No. 283—Britain East of the Suez
The Committee considered the report of the Defence Committee annexed to the Submission. The Committee agreed:–
(a) that the central objective of Australian policy is to secure a continuing British commitment to the Malaysian region, the text of which would be the preparedness of the British Government to maintain an infantry force within the area;
(b) that, as seen at this distance, the Prime Minister could best initiate his discussions in London by dealing with and seeking to affect the British Government’s mind on the long term position—that is, after 1970/71—rather than allow the discussion to concentrate itself on the detail of the reduction of British forces in the short and medium terms;
(c) that in dealing with the long term position, the Prime Minister might:–
(i) show in terms of the British interest, the developing economic significance of Asia;
(ii) invite Britain to consider the consequences for her world position of withdrawal from Asia;
(iii) invite her, conversely, to consider the importance for world security and stability which attaches to a full continuing relationship with the United States in NATO, CENTO, SEATO and the Indian Ocean;
(iv) to make clear that if Britain withdraws her commitment to South-East Asia then in effect Britain would be revoking a bilateral security arrangement which is both integral and complementary to the pattern of treaty arrangements developed by the United States for the security of the Western position in Asia;
(d) that it should be argued as necessary:–
(i) that contrary to the sense of claims made by certain British Ministers, the United States is continuing its policy of establishing in Asia the necessary military infrastructure and capacity to discharge its treaty obligations and that suggestions of American withdrawal are without true foundation;
(ii) that, again contrary to some claims by British Ministers, the ‘white faces’ argument is without true foundation;
(e) that the Prime Minister’s discussions with the President of the United States in advance of his visit to London and also the discussions scheduled to take place between the President and the Prime Minister of Britain will be of particular importance;
(f) that any final decision by the British Government to withdraw from South-East Asia would have fundamental and far-reaching consequences for Australia’s external position as to require the re-casting of Australian external policy in fundamental terms;
(g) that if, notwithstanding all that will be said to the contrary, Britain decides upon withdrawal by the mid-1970s, the Australian objective should be to have all announcement of such a decision withheld, since to announce would be to being to bring about the effects of withdrawal;
(h) that if, on the other hand, Britain is brought to agreement to maintain a continuing commitment to the Malaysian region, the Prime Minister should as a consequence indicate willingness to accept such run down of British forces in the short and medium term, though reserving an influence with Britain in how the run down might best be achieved in the collective interest;
(i) that if the British decide to withdraw voluntarily—i.e. in a situation where the countries in the region wish them to stay—it does not necessarily follow that it would be in Australia’s best interests in these circumstances to have the British established in Australia, and any commitment by Australia to make financial contributions towards the establishment of British bases in Australia should not be assumed;1
(j) that action be taken to inform the Malaysian and Singapore Governments of the Australian Government’s position and to secure their support for it;
(k) that action be taken also to inform the New Zealand Prime Minister of Australia’s position.
1 General Sir R.M. Carver, UK Commander, Far East Land Forces, visited New Zealand in May 1967. The Australian High Commission in Wellington reported him saying that ‘the concept of British forces based on Australia (as discussed in 1966) was “dead”’ (NAA: A1209, 1966/7335 part 4, cablegram 482 to Canberra, 26 May 1967).
[NAA:A1838, TS691/1 PART9]