London, 14 June 1967
Top Secret
Mr. Holt thanked Mr. Healey for his welcome and referred to the discussion in the Cabinet Room on the previous day.2 Some of the issues had not been explored as far as he would like, and he proposed to take them further today. He was gratified that the British Government now proposed to maintain a substantial naval and air force capability for use in the Far East beyond the mid-1970s, and he welcomed this statement.
2. Mr. Holt said that the degree to which Mr. Lee Kuan Yew accepted the British proposals had perhaps been over-stressed. He had received a long message from him just before he left Australia, and had shown it to the Prime Minister. He would like to read one passage:
‘You can quote me as having said to you that their plans for withdrawal undermine Singapore’s interests and are against my expressed wish. You may also quote me as having told Healey on 23rd April that any residual capacity the British may keep in 1975 would not be credible if it were confined to purely naval and air units. For without supporting ground forces, the British commitment could be withdrawn even more speedily than they could be dispatched. Nobody would treat seriously a British undertaking to defend us if their earnest consisted only of mobile units. I had referred Healey to the elaborate exercise in airborne reinforcements of troops and armour the Americans had to mount to demonstrate to sceptical Germans their solemn intent that they could augment their forces rapidly in an emergency.
The tenor of my argument is that unless there are compulsive pressures on Britain to make a public commitment now, such a decision should be deferred for reassessments between now and 1970/71. All the parties with vital interests in this decision could take a closer look and a better picture of the possible repercussions on such a decision.’
3. On the previous day Mr. Healey had canvassed the pros and cons of announcing the British Government’s intentions for the mid-1970s. Mr. Holt accepted the argument that to say that planning assumptions had been made, but no final decision taken on the date of withdrawal, would leave it open for some people to argue that the withdrawal might take place before 1975. But if the area was to become so peaceful that such an early date for withdrawal should become desirable, no doubt the Australian Government would also take note of this improvement. It was however clearly undesirable in the present situation in South-East Asia, an area subject to various kinds of threats, to close the options prematurely by taking decisions now when so much might occur before 1975. Unless there were compulsive reasons obliging the British Government to take a decision for the mid-1970s at this time, it would be wiser to look at the problem again in 1970–71 to see whether the planning assumptions had been confirmed. He was sure that the New Zealand and United States Governments, as well as the Australian Government, were anxious that no decision on this point should be taken or announced at this time. Mr. Lee’s views were contained in his letter, and the Malaysian Government would surely prefer to accept whatever risk lay in not announcing a decision of this kind rather than experience the chain reaction which would be set off by an announcement. As a politician he believed that the British Cabinet could find a form of words which put the matter acceptably.
It could even be said that the probable need to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore in the mid-1970s was a dominant element in our thinking in devising our forward plans, so long as it was not presented as anything but a piece of contingency planning. Circumstances would alter the situation, and the date might move forward or back; it was important to keep the situation flexible. This would be more acceptable to all the Governments concerned than the announcement of a firm decision, and he hoped that the views of the most moderate and helpful of Britain’s Commonwealth partners would be given the weight and consideration that they deserved.
4. On the threat to the security of the area, Mr. Holt quoted an assessment by ANZAM in April 1966:
‘There can be no question that Communist China’s policy is to use every means at her disposal, excluding if possible, however, actual military intervention, to ensure that the governments of countries on her southern borders are favourably disposed to her interests. In particular, she seeks to eliminate Western military presence from South East Asia. Regarding Thailand, she will clearly not be satisfied until the present anti Communist government is succeeded by one that is either Communist or neutralist and allied presence is removed from the country.’
The Chinese wanted to push the Western presence out and a British withdrawal would be a move in the direction they wanted.
5. Mr. Holt continued that Australia certainly attached importance to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as confirming the military presence of the ANZAM Governments in the area. He did not know what this involved for the British in the way of finance. But the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister had mentioned that there had been a British suggestion of a Gurkha element in the Commonwealth Brigade. Mr. Holt felt that even if this enabled the Brigade to be retained the absence of any British military participation in it would take away an element of great psychological importance; Mr. Fairhall would pursue this point in greater detail later.
6. Mr. Healey queried Mr. Holt’s interpretation of the passage of Mr. Lee’s letter which he had quoted. It referred to the situation after 1975, not the rundown to a naval and air presence in 1970, on which Mr. Lee had professed himself satisfied. It seemed that Mr. Lee was referring to the kind of capability that would make sense after 1975, and was discussing the proposition that, if there were no British forces in the area, a reinforcement capability from the UK would still be a valuable asset. Mr. Healey would consider whether he could give Mr. Holt the text of his conversations with Mr. Lee and the Tunku, though it might be necessary first to obtain their agreement to his doing so. Mr. Lee was not worried, when he had seen him, about the military aspects of the plans for the rundown up to 1970/71, and certainly not about the removal of ground forces from Malaysia, since he knew that he was all right so long as there were substantial British naval and air forces in Singapore. Mr. Lee had then thought that Malaysia would react against the British proposal to withdraw ground forces from the country. He had however been worried over the credibility of a commitment to defend the area after 1975 with only mobile forces stationed outside it. Mr. Healey did not dispute that Mr. Lee did not wish the British Government now to take or announce any decision about final withdrawal in 1975.3
Speaking personally, Mr. Healey thought that there must be a way of presenting the British position without saying that we proposed to leave the bases in 1975. But he stressed that there would be great political pressure to go for an early announcement of a decision to withdraw. Mr. Holt commented that while this might bring immediate popularity, the Government would be stuck with the results of the announcement for the next eight years. Mr. Healey replied that this point might well be decisive when the Cabinet came to consider the matter. It would be helpful to say that Mr. Holt accepted that the formula left open the possibility of leaving the bases earlier than 1975 as well as later. Mr. Holt agreed, while pointing out that although the Viet-Nam war might by then have reached a satisfactory settlement, the situation might instead have got more precarious.
7. Mr. Healey continued by saying that he did not wholly share Mr. Holt’s views on the Chinese threat and the problem of the Commonwealth Brigade. So long as some of our allies were fighting the Communists in Viet-Nam it was important that the rear area of Malaysia and Singapore should be kept stabilised. But he thought that the general view in the political departments was that, now that the Communist Party of Indonesia had been liquidated for perhaps the next ten years, the military threat to Malaysia was unlikely to revive in a serious form. (There were however dangers in Borneo, where much would depend on the wisdom of the Tunku in handling Sabah and Sarawak, and on developments over Brunei.) An Indonesian blitzkrieg on Malaysia was an unlikely contingency, though the existence of powerful British deterrent forces would do much to influence the Indonesians from contemplating any aggression. Mr. Holt said that there was also the problem of insurgency, since if the Communists were checked in Viet-Nam their activities could spill over into terrorism in Thailand or Malaysia. Mr. Healey replied that Britain had accepted no obligation to protect internal security in Malaysia. The Malaysian Government must handle such problems on its own, and this had been made very clear when we withdrew our troops from East Malaysia. The Malaysians might allege that they were menaced by Communists acting with support from outside—they were inclined to say this of anyone they distrusted, such as Ningkan4 —but Britain did not see the problem in this way. There was a threat of insurgency in Sarawak, but Indonesia and Malaysia decided that apart from some helicopter assistance it would be better to handle the matter in cooperation with the Thais. On his recent visit the Tunku had told him that this policy had led to an entirely new degree of cooperation between the two countries.
8. As for the Commonwealth Brigade, if Britain had the money she would not be proposing cuts. But as things stood the decision to make these cuts must be taken with reference to the economic and financial circumstances and the politico-military requirements. He was aware that the British withdrawal of logistic support would make it harder for Australia and New Zealand to maintain their battalions in Malaysia, and he had suggested to the New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister on Monday one or two ways of mitigating this effect. For example, there was no reason why the British Commando in the amphibious forces should not undertake some training with the Australian and New Zealand battalions on land. Similarly it might be good sense for an Australian battalion or company to take a spell embarked on a vessel of that force. This would be a demonstration of Commonwealth solidarity quite as meaningful as was provided by the Commonwealth Brigade. A second suggestion was that although we planned to withdraw the British battalion from the Brigade by 1969, a Gurkha battalion would be available until 1972: would the Australian Government consider having Gurkhas associated with the Brigade, since this would give them more time to adjust their policies? Finally there was the question of logistic support. It was not easy to see how Australia could replace the British logistics elements. But the present support was based on the requirements of limited war. If it could be agreed that the assumption should be that the Brigade was equipped only to meet an internal security situation at the level of the Malayan ‘Emergency’, the logistic support which it required would be smaller. It might also be possible to use Gurkha logistic units to reduce the load on the Australians; would they consider that? These were questions which could well be explored. There was a real practical administrative problem here, and he would like to do what he could to help in solving it. He was deeply conscious of the obligation to minimise the difficulties which our proposals might cause for the Australians and New Zealanders. But he must make it clear that he still thought it sensible to concentrate on reducing the army units in Malaysia first, so as to go down to a mainly naval and air presence in Singapore in 1970/71.
9. Mr. Holt said that he wished once more to stress the psychological importance of the British presence in South East Asia, in addition to the great arc of United States involvement. The Australians had no complex about the use of Gurkhas, but if there were no British soldiers in the Commonwealth Brigade an asset of great psychological value would have been lost. It did not require great numbers of them; a few British soldiers and a larger number of Gurkhas would do.
10. Mr. Healey suggested that the psychological factor could be met by concentration on the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, to which Britain would still be making a massive contribution both in 1970/71 and in 1975. The Commonwealth Brigade had never worked as a Brigade, it was more a device for administrative convenience.
11. He wished to mention some planning figures which had been put forward by his Ministry; they were not as yet an agreed Government view, though they well might acquire that status. In March 1971 the fleet based on Singapore would consist of a commando ship, an assault ship, a cruiser, eight guided missile destroyers/frigates, one fleet submarine, two patrol submarines, six MCM5 vessels, two naval support ships and eleven Royal Fleet Auxiliaries. The land element of the amphibious force would consist of a commando regiment RA, an independent field squadron RE, and two infantry battalions or commandos. At any one time one battalion or commando, one battery and half the engineers would be afloat, and a similar force would be ashore. When they were afloat they could go for exercises to places as far away as Borneo, Hong Kong and Australia. The RAF would have based in Singapore one Phantom fighter squadron, one Maritime Reconnaissance squadron, half a Hercules transport squadron, one Wessex, one Whirlwind and half a Chinook helicopter squadron. In March 1976 (on current costings) the fleet in the Far East would consist of one commando and one assault ship, six destroyers/ frigates, one fleet submarine, three MCM vessels (in Hong Kong), two naval support ships and ten Royal Fleet Auxiliaries. The military element of the amphibious force would be the same as in 1971. The RAF, on current plans, would not expect to have aircraft in the theatre. There was the possibility that, if Singapore should remain stable we might conceivably be able to use civil facilities there—for, say, ship repair or rotation of forces—provided that we did not have to protect those facilities. In preparing plans it had been contemplated that the ships and aircraft might then be based in Australia, with the agreement of the Australian Government. But it was not yet necessary—nor had there been time—to consider such matters in detail. The important question was where the ships were to be based, since the aircraft could fly out from Britain very fast. Sir Richard Hull said that the position then over aircraft would be very similar to that of the V-bombers over many years in Malaysia. They had been birds of passage, rather than residents, except for a period during confrontation. He hoped that they would be allowed to share in the use of Australian airfields, e.g. atAmberley. But British plans envisaged the naval forces as being resident in the theatre. The F111s would not be resident. Mr Cooper added that in terms of manpower there would in 1970/71 be 18,000 British servicemen in Singapore and Malaysia and about 5,000 Gurkhas. In 1975/76 there might, on our tentative plans, be roughly a total of 8,000 British servicemen in the theatre. The figures from both years excluded about 9,000 troops in Hong Kong.
12. Mr. Healey commented that the composition of the British forces sketched in these plans could be varied according to circumstances. He thought that the problem of demobilising the Gurkhas might provide a useful analogy with the question of announcing a decision on withdrawal in 1975. It would not be sensible to keep a Gurkha force as small as two battalions, because of the overhead costs of such a small force together with the drawbacks of the political uncertainties of its future, depending on the attitude of Nepal, and the geographical limitations on its use. It was therefore intended to run the Gurkhas down to extinction, but it was not possible to reduce numbers by more than two thousand every year. It had already been announced that the Gurkhas would be run down to 10,000, now that confrontation was over, and the first men in this rundown would go in the autumn of 1967. Future plans showed the last battalion in Malaysia going in about 1972 and the battalions in Hong Kong by about 1971. But the announcement of the rundown of five or six thousand would not be made until after the announcement of our current plans in the White Paper; it might be made this autumn. The intention of bringing the Gurkha force to an end would be kept totally secret until it was announced, perhaps in 1970. This illustration suggested that it might be wise to keep our long-term decision on withdrawal secret until an appropriate time to announce it.
13. Mr. Holt said that these explanations were most helpful. No doubt the attitudes of the Tunku and Mr. Lee would be clarified when they visited London. He hoped that the British Government would give due weight to the psychological importance of a British presence in the Far East, its effect in maintaining the general stability of the area and in deterring those who wished to upset it, since it showed that Britain still had to be counted on in any argument, and the impact that British withdrawal would have on the United States. If the British Government could find a formula which enabled them to proceed with their planning and with making their financial savings, without giving the impression the world East of Suez could go to hell, it would be highly desirable.
14. Sir R. Hull said he wished to add a purely military point. They had looked to see whether it would be possible, with the same manpower, to keep in being both the Commonwealth Brigade and the amphibious force. The Commander-in-Chief, Far East, had been asked to advise on this, but it seemed that militarily, unless there were a considerable increase in costs, there would be a grave danger of keeping two inefficient forces, since the logistic and support units would be spread too thin to be effective. It would need more money and more men to obtain the required standard of efficiency. Mr. Healey commented that the Army had not been at all happy about cutting the Commonwealth Brigade and had, quite rightly, been doing its best to avoid having to do so. The Commander-in-Chief had tried to square the circle, without succeeding, and the Chiefs of Staff had tried again the previous week. There seemed to be no way out without increased expenditure, and there was the risk of keeping two nothings to make nothing. Mr. Holt replied that it was sometimes necessary to accept a less effective military result if there were compensating advantages. For example, the New Zealand contribution in Vietnam was very small, but was exceedingly welcome. He often thought the British underrated the moral influence which they exercised upon other countries.
15. Mr. Holt and Sir John Bunting then took their leave and withdrew.
16. Mr. Fairhall, continuing the discussion, said that it seemed there was to be a continuation of British force in the area larger than he had anticipated—or, Mr. Healey added, than the British Government were prepared, until very recently, to offer. Mr. Fairhall said that he saw a continuing threat to Malaysia. He noted that the estimate of the number of guerrillas on the Thai Border has recently been increased, and it would be necessary to look again at the question of when their activities might take the form of true insurgency.
17. Sir E. Hicks said that Australia would prefer the Commonwealth Brigade to remain in its present state up to 1970/71, but he understood that Britain could not do this. Was there a possibility of Britain helping by keeping her infantry battalion in the Brigade, while there was an exploration of the possibility of the problems of logistical support being solved with the aid of the Malaysians or Australians? If this too was not feasible, could we explore whether the British Commando could in some degree be integrated or exercised with the Commonwealth Brigade? What was needed was some way of continuing the British presence as part of a manifestly Commonwealth military effort.
18. Butterworth Airfield would have to be kept by the Australians. It was an RAAF station, and substantial sums of Australian capital had been spent on it. Furthermore there was no place in Australia for the units now at Butterworth, and the base was used in connection with Australia’s effort in Vietnam, for the evacuation of medical cases.
19. Sir R. Hull drew attention to the substantial costs of maintaining the Commonwealth Brigade in its present form. Even if the brigade ceased to be equipped for limited war, but only for counter-insurgency, the cost would be smaller but still sizeable—roughly in the order of £6m. Sir E. Hicks said that the Brigade contained 1,100 Australians, 700 New Zealanders, and 2,400 British. It could not continue if the British withdrew. Even if Australia tried to maintain a battalion group it would be necessary to supply between 600 and 1000 more men to make it viable. He hoped that discussion on the future of the Brigade could be continued.
20. Mr. Healey said that the Ministry of Defence would like to help as much as they could. He did not want to hold out any hope that the Government would change their basic position, but nevertheless he would hope to maximise the benefit that could be obtained from the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. If it were possible to cushion the shock to Australia and New Zealand every effort would be made to do so. He suggested that there should be further discussions in the Ministry of Defence and that the Australians might pursue the matter later with General Carver in Singapore if they wished.
21. Force reductions would also have an impact on SEATO since they would cause Britain progressively to revise her force declarations. It would be necessary to give careful thought about how publicity should be handled and how the matter could be presented as well as possible. It would be necessary to revise the declaration for SEATO Plan 4 early next year, as a medium battery which had been declared to it was then to be withdrawn. In 1968/69 the cuts would go deeper, and in 1967, on current plans, the British contribution to the Commonwealth Brigade would go. Therefore the process of revising the force declarations must start this autumn meeting of SEATO. Sir E. Hicks said that it was not Plan 4 that concerned Australia, but Plan 8,6 which was more likely. Mr. Healey said that we would keep very close on this matter and handle it in the least damaging way. Much of the work would have to be done by the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Office. Mr. Fairhall said that he viewed the problem with tremendous concern.
1 The UK was represented by Healey, Field Marshal Sir R. Hull, G. Thomas (Minister of State, Commonwealth Office) and officials. Present for Australia were Holt, Fairhall, Downer, Bunting, Hicks, Mclntyre and Critchley.
2 See Document 73.
3 In Healey’s account of his conversations in Singapore, Lee Kuan Kew’s main concern, both in the short and long term, was ‘the maintenance of internal and external confidence in Singapore’. He was worried that a statement about a complete withdrawal by the mid-1970s ‘would inflict psychological damage on Singapore which could be far more serious than the direct economic effects of our proposals’. Lost jobs and reduced income would be hard to accept but the main danger would come from the potential power vacuum in the area, creating a sense of insecurity and threatening the inward investment upon which Singapore depended. On the specific defence aspects after the 1970s, Lee Kuan Yew wanted a continued military presence of some kind, preferably on the ground in Singapore though he did not discount the potential value of rotating forces from the UK or Australia. Malaysian ministers told Healey they wanted the UK to retain maritime and air forces in the area after 1971, ‘which would provide a sophisticated military contribution towards stability; they recognised that these forces would be mainly or wholly based on Singapore’. Healey came away believing the governments of Singapore and Malaysia had ‘reacted more helpfully and constructively than we had grounds for expecting’. Total withdrawal would create in Singapore a range of problems—political, military and economic—which were likely to be far more serious than those of Aden and Malta. There were 32,000 uniformed personnel and 40,000 dependents in Singapore, an island about the size of the Isle of Wight. They were ‘scattered widely among nearly two million Asians of different races who have a record of turbulence’. The UK was fortunate in having to deal with Lee Kuan Yew; indeed the survival of the existing regime would be an essential condition of plans for orderly withdrawal over the years ahead. (UKNA: CAB 148/32, OPD(76)29, memorandum, Healey for Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, 4 May 1967, published in ESAC , Part I, Document 25.)
4 Dato Stephen Kalong Ningkan, Chief Minister of Sarawak, 1963–66; President, Sarawak National Party, 1964–75.
5 Mine countermeasures.
6 SEATO Plan 8 involved the possible use of military force to counter insurgency in Thailand.
[UKNA: PREM 13/1323]