Canberra, 4 July 1967
Secret
Without Memorandum—British Defence Policy East of Suez
The Cabinet noted that information to hand suggested that the British Government would, within a matter of a few days, begin its series of meetings bearing on its defence policy East of Suez. It also noted that so far as avoidance of decision and announcement of withdrawal from the South-East Asian mainland by 1975 are concerned, it appeared that the submission made by the Prime Minister (and other Heads of Government) might be successful. What was likely to be announced were details of run down of forces up to 1970/71 with provision for a review of the situation at the end of that period. However, on the remaining chief element of the Prime Minister’s submission—that is, the retention of effective ground forces—it appeared that the British position was unchanged and that it would be moving in the 1970s to a situation in which naval and air forces only would be maintained in the area.
2. The Cabinet discussed the question of further action on its part at this stage. It noted:–
(a) that the Prime Minister had in the previous week-end sent a further message to Mr. Wilson;
(b) that the Ministry of Defence had been in informal touch with Australian Service authorities about planning level talks on ground forces possibilities and also on financial aspects of the retention of ground forces;
(c) that the New Zealand Prime Minister had, on the previous day, written to the Australian Prime Minister concerning possible initiatives for future military co-operation with Britain in the area.
3. It was agreed:–
(a) that the best prospect for successful intervention at this stage in the outstanding matter of retention of ground forces on the mainland lay with the United States, and that a message to the United States Government suggesting a final intervention should therefore be sent;
(b) that in relation to the informal suggestions through British Ministry of Defence and Service channels, that Australia might contribute financially toward the retention of a British element in the Commonwealth Brigade, there need be no response at the moment by Australia—partly noticing that there had been no political suggestion in this direction but principally on the argument that a money approach was likely to be either irrelevant, or on any scale open to Australia to provide, unrealistic;
(c) that further consideration might be given to joining in the planning talks suggested by Britain, but on the basis of discussing means by which British ground forces might be retained—i.e. complementary to the submissions of the Government through the Prime Minister;
(d) that a reply in terms agreed by Cabinet should be sent to the New Zealand Prime Minister.
[NAA:A1838, T5691/1 PART 11]