Singapore, 6 July 1967
Secret
I received your letter 16th June, 1967, on 21st June, in London. My colleague Goh Keng Swee1 was briefed by W. B. Pritchett of your External Affairs Department in Singapore before joining me. I found your letter and the briefing and a further discussion with Tom Critchley in London most valuable for the discussions which followed.
I have given Tom Critchley on Saturday, 1st July, a resume of the discussions. To sum up the position I can do no better than to quote what Dick Crossman, Leader of the House, said to me after an hour demonstrating his tough-minded approach to Britain’s problems. ‘My point of view is winning on the ground, amongst the rank and file and the back-benchers. But with all your reasonable talk and playing up to the sentiments of the British people, I am a minority in the Cabinet. For the time being you will have your way. But I shall win in the end.’
Flattering though he may sound, unfortunately, I do not believe we will have our way. For then there should be no change in the kind of role the British will play in Southeast Asia. All we can expect is that between now and mid-July, probably 13th or 14th, a White Paper will be tabled, which will set out:
- That British Forces will run down to half the 1966 defence review figure by 1971.
- There will be a residual capacity after 1971.
- Hope that the peoples in the area can live in peace with each other and British Forces can be withdrawn from the mainland when conditions permit, but no firm date.
- After the departure from the Asian mainland, there would be continued capability for action in Southeast Asia.
A continuing British presence as against a continuing British capability is what is required. But as of now, this is about as far as Denis Healey, Bert Bowden, or Harold Wilson will go. I do not believe Harold Wilson wants to throw away his options. It is not in his nature to do this. But a number of his Cabinet colleagues, and ex-Ministers like Christopher Mayhew, together with a highly intelligent and articulate group of backbenchers, economists and accountants, a number of whom are on the Public Accounts Committee,2 are most anxious to close these options for the present and subsequent British Governments. They have more than a suspicion that if and when the British economy picks up, they will never be able to pin Harold Wilson down again as they can now. We must hope that the British Government can leave these options open and that there are no further grave pressures on the British economy.
My worry is not this time. Already there have been three Defence White Papers. As I told Harold Wilson, if any reliance on Britain’s solemn statements of intentions was not to disappear, there must be some finality in this matter.
He told me in front of Denis Healey that he has promised Denis this was the last review Denis was going to make in the life of this Parliament. The jocular reply from Denis was that his fear was that there would be general elections next year and the whole process would start all over again.
My fear, which l kept to myself, was that if the need arose there would not be anything so drastic and unpredictable as a general election but more simply a promotion for Denis Healey to some other important Ministry and a replacement in the Ministry of Defence by a spirit kindred to that of Dick Crossman. Then brutal injury will be inflicted.
However, l took heart from my meeting with Opposition Cabinet Ministers and even Enoch Powell. He was present when I had an hour and a half with the Conservative Parliamentary Defence and Commonwealth Committees. They will all help in the debate in Parliament and in setting the mood in the country. Enoch Powell saw me the following day for nearly an hour. Whilst he did not move his position significantly, he had taken cognisance of the fact that the issues in Southeast Asia cannot be reduced in simple black and white as he would wish it.
I have written with candour, for if our own co-operation is to grow in mutual trust and confidence, we must be frank and discreet in briefing each on our common areas of vital interest.
1 Singapore Defence Minister, 1965–67.
2 A committee of Members of Parliament which examines whether sums of money for public spending agreed by Parliament have been properly spent.
[NAA: Al838, T5691/1 PART 11]