Washington, 8 July 1967
2877. Secret
Following is text of letter from Rusk to Brown:–
‘The President has just written to the Prime Minister on the Middle East and on our deep concern about any decision to reduce your presence in Southeast Asia. We continue to feel very strongly that this is not the time to rock the boat in any way.
On the second point I should like to add somewhat more detail.
When we first discussed this subject in April, I pointed out that the announcement of sharp reductions could have serious effects in this country. It would contribute to a growing impression that the American Congress and people are being asked to bear an undue burden of the job of bringing about a lasting peace in Asia that is as much in your interest, and in the interest of others, as in ours.
But I am most concerned with the impact in the area itself. And this would be raised to the critical point if you were to couple any announcement of reductions with a decision, or even a ‘planning assumption’, to the effect that you were going to withdraw entirely from the area in the mid-1970s.
The underlying point is that no one can foresee what the problems will be eight to ten years hence, or what actions might be necessary to deal with them. We are in a particularly uncertain period at the moment, and Communist Chinese behaviour has meant a state of apprehension in Southeast Asia that is unlikely to die down. The change in Indonesia is hopeful but still precarious. Embryonic regional organizations are taking shape, but it is clear that they need time to gain strength and cannot for some years contribute to the security of the area. In short, we have a mixed picture, and it is likely to remain so. If Britain injects into this picture a categorical decision to pull out, even at some period many years hence, the result can only be severe damage to confidence and to the frail but real hopes that now exist that Southeast Asia can in due time stand on its own feet and become a part of an Asia at peace.
From your talks with Lee Kuan Yew and the Tunku, I hope your colleagues no longer believe that you, either as British or as ‘white men’ are not wanted in the area. They have effective, competent and responsible Governments friendly to you, and they continue to rely on you. In these circumstances, mindful as we are of your economic pressures, we simply don’t see the reasons for you to make firm decisions now on withdrawal that could possibly counter-balance the extremely adverse effects on the Asian situation.
We appreciate the opportunities you have afforded us to make our views known on these matters. We are also encouraged by the alternatives you are considering to meet the principal objections raised. It seems to me that a more workable arrangement can be fashioned, reasonably acceptable to all. Surely none of the possible ways of keeping an effective presence in the area involves such a scale of forces as to require final decisions this far in advance.
We would hope that you could avoid altogether the question of your posture beyond 1970–71.
We hope at the very minimum that you could limit yourself to some statement that you intend to maintain significant military capabilities in the Southeast Asian area in the foreseeable future, making clear at the same time that the form this capability would take after 1970 has not been decided and must await assessment of the situation nearer to that period.
Such a statement would leave you free to decide in the future what your policy would be, and it would be vastly less damaging to confidence than any firm decision—or a ‘planning assumption’ that would surely become known and would be virtually as damaging as a decision. If you adopt this course, we would be entirely ready to have our people meet with yours at the working level, and with the Australians and New Zealanders, to explore the kind of defence arrangements that might be developed beyond the 1970–71 time period. On the other hand, I note that the Tunku is already suggesting such consultations without our presence. You may prefer this approach, but if we can help in any way I assure you of our willingness to consider fully with you what defence arrangements might be worked out.’
[NAA:A1838, T5691/1 PART 11]