London, 13 July 1967
Top Secret
Thank you for your message which Alick Downer sent to me on 30th June. I too greatly valued the cordial atmosphere in which we had our talks.
We had several meetings with Harry Lee and we now have the Tunku here. You will wish to know how these went. Harry Lee was his usual stimulating self: he was throughout both frank and realistic. He did not raise any objections over our plans for the years up to 1970–71. He is naturally concerned over the impact on the Singapore economy of our rundown, but we have not yet completed our assessment of what we may be able to do to help over this and we were not therefore at this stage able to take the matter further with him.
Harry Lee understood our need to make plans for a withdrawal from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia; but he was concerned at the implications of any fixed timetable and pressed very strongly that we should not make a public announcement committing ourselves to a date for withdrawal. While he is anxious that a British presence in some form should be maintained in Singapore for as long as possible, he did not contest our plans for concentrating on naval and air forces after 1970. He wishes to plan his own defence forces so as best to fit into any gaps which would be caused by our rundown, and we made it clear that we would be very glad to exchange further views with him about this.
Looking further ahead he was, I think, impressed by the likely scale and character of the military capability we plan to retain for use, if required, in the Far East. He showed considerable interest in making his defence plans in such a way as to provide secure facilities for any British forces deployed in the area. He made the suggestion that at some not too distant date consideration might be given to including contributions not only from ourselves, Australia and New Zealand but also from Singapore and Malaysia in some kind of Commonwealth force. This would be in relation to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore and not of course in a SEATO context. He thought that something of this kind would be helpful for relations between Malaysia and Singapore which he spoke about at some length. In the longer term he still has a fear of aggression from Indonesia.
The Tunku’s main anxiety was about our continuing capability to honour our obligations to Malaysia under the defence agreement. We made it clear that it is our intention to honour our obligations under the agreement but that, as changes were made progressively in our forces, we should want to consult with Malaysia on the way in which we should plan to meet them. The Tunku thought that some forces were necessary on the ground in order to give credibility to the agreement and having regard to Singapore–Malaysia relations, but he acknowledged that our decision to provide maritime and air forces was the correct one. He accepted our force level proposals for 1970–71 and for 1975–76. He was anxious that the Commonwealth strategic reserve should continue in being and hoped that Australia and New Zealand might be able to share in some formal commitment towards the defence of Malaysia. We mentioned—without attributing it to Harry Lee who had specifically asked us to be careful not to do so—the idea of a Commonwealth force in which Malaysia and Singapore might participate. The Tunku indicated that he was planning to have another private meeting with Lee in a few weeks’ time.
In general, the Tunku was anxious not to make difficulties and did not dispute our decision to reduce our forces but hoped we would not do it in a way which would bolster communist morale and let down our friends. Having heard what we had to say about the force levels we plan to maintain up to 1975–76, our continuing capability for use in the Far East after withdrawal, and the general lines of the kind of announcement we are working on, I think he was reasonably content.
We have had a number of ministerial meetings about all this and it has now been before the Cabinet. It has been very helpful to us to have had the discussion with our Commonwealth partners. The letter1 you left with me was circulated to the Cabinet and I can assure you that the Commonwealth Secretary and I reported fully on the points which you stressed in our discussions and that we had them very much in mind. All our partners have expressed their concern about our longer-term intentions and, while the considerations that you and they have in mind differ in many respects from country to country (as one would expect), we fully understand the fundamental concern that is shared in common by you all. And, as I explained to you, we not only understand this but we sympathise with it and wish to do everything we can to mitigate it. But we have had to reach our decisions, after the fullest consultation with our friends and allies and taking due account of their views, on the basis of our best judgement of what is politically and economically right for this country.
The decision we have taken has been reached in the light of the best assessment we can make of the likely development of political relationships in the area in the second half of the next decade; and of the economic requirements if Britain is to play any continuing part there at that time. We in this country will be unable to play any such part—or indeed any effective part in world affairs as a whole—unless we get our economy straight now. We discussed all this together at some length, and I know that you appreciate the compelling nature of this consideration and the fact that we have no option but to bring our defence spending in line with our resources. If this is to be achieved, it requires long term decisions about the overall shape of our forces, and about weapons systems which we must take now.
My colleagues and I have decided, as foreshadowed in our discussions, to reduce our forces in Singapore and Malaysia to about half the current levels by 1970–71.2 These plans will take a little time to work out in detail and we shall be keeping in touch with you. I know that in this context you are concerned about the future of the Commonwealth Brigade. For the reasons which Denis Healey explained, we have come to the conclusion that in order to achieve our 1970–71 plans and secure the necessary savings, we must withdraw our present contributions from the Commonwealth Brigade and complete this process by the 1st April, 1970. This will mean that while some Gurkhas are likely to remain in the area until 1972, the residual British land forces will be based on Singapore and be part of the amphibious force. We should, however, be very glad to follow up the suggestion which Denis Healey made and to have early discussions with your people and with the New Zealanders for the purpose of examining what could be done to mitigate the problems created for Australian and New Zealand forces in the Brigade. I would suggest that these might take place at the earliest convenient date.
Looking beyond 1970–71, we have come to the conclusion that we must plan on giving up our bases in Malaysia and Singapore by the mid-seventies while recognising, which was a point that you yourself particularly stressed, that the precise timing of our eventual withdrawal would depend on progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in South East Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East. We are resolved that Britain shall have a continuing part to play in the area though one that must be commensurate with our resources and we have therefore also confirmed our decision to retain a military capability for use, if required, in the Far East after that time; we are leaving open for the time being the precise character, size and deployment of this capability. But, as you know, we do not think it makes sense for us to offer to provide indefinitely ground troops to defend Asian countries who have it in their power to train and provide their own. What we can do and intend to do is to maintain a military capability for use in the area which provides the sophisticated sea-air support which they cannot afford to provide as an assurance against external aggression.
You are, I know, particularly concerned, as are our other partners, over what we should say publicly about our posture in the mid-1970s. The fact is that so much has appeared publicly in various parts of the world about our long-term intentions (and this was certainly not something that we either wished or accept responsibility for) that it is simply impossible for us now to avoid giving some public indication of what they are. Otherwise there is a real risk that it may be believed that we are planning a more rapid rundown than is in fact the case. In any event, we must in all fairness give our armed forces some idea of their long-term size and shape and equipment, when the process is completed in the middle 1970s, particularly as the careers of many are involved. This is difficult unless we indicate the major premise on which our planning is based. In any case, as the process gets under way in the coming months, our long term intentions are bound to become known. Even if we ourselves attempted to disguise them, other governments concerned might not be able to avoid some disclosures in order to kill rumours and speculation and to explain the consequential adjustments to their own policy. I believe a continuation of the present uncertainty would be damaging to us all. But we are anxious to do all we can to meet your concern by avoiding anything too specific.
We are now working on the text of a White Paper which on present plans will be published on the 18th July. We shall avoid specific terms and propose to say that, while we plan to withdraw altogether from our bases in Singapore and Malaysia in the middle 1970s, the precise timing of our eventual withdrawal would depend on progress made in achieving a new basis for stability in South East Asia and in resolving other problems in the Far East. We shall also announce our retention of a military capability for use in the Far East thereafter. We will send you the relevant sections of the draft White Paper as soon as they are available, so that you will be able to see what we have it in mind to say.
These have been difficult decisions and we are well aware of the anxieties which you and our other partners feel. We much appreciate the spirit of frankness and cooperation which has been evident in our discussions. We shall be considering Lee’s idea for a Commonwealth force and we shall wish to exchange views with you about it.
We have noted in our talks with Harry Lee and the Tunku their realistic approach to our problems. They are ready to collaborate with us in a determined effort to give effect to our decisions through a process of orderly change; and they take the point I have made above about the need for them to make the contribution to their own defence that best accords with their own resources, while we help with a more sophisticated capability. I believe that in this spirit we can work out a sensible programme of transition in consultation with all our partners in the area: in this it will be important that we shall all give Singapore and Malaysia all the support we can.
I have gone into all this at considerable length and detail because of the frankness and straightforward approach that has always characterised the exchanges between us. But you will realise how essential it is to hold this information very tight until our White Paper is published.
I know I can rely on your total discretion here.
I am writing on similar lines to Keith Holyoake.
1 See Document 75.
2 In the Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy (Cmnd 3357), published on 18 July 1967, the personnel at British bases in Malaysia and Singapore were to be cut from 80,000 in 1967 to 40,000 by 1971 (at which point over half would be civilians), and a complete withdrawal would follow by the mid-1970s. Obligations under SEATO would be honoured but the troops assigned to SEATO, including the Commonwealth Brigade, would be reduced. Future strategy in Southeast Asia was to be based on sending forces out from the UK rather than on maintaining permanent bases in the area. The main UK commitment in future was to be in Europe with NATO. The strength of the total UK armed forces was to be cut from 417,360 in 1967 to 380, 100 in 1971, with a further cut of 38,000 by the mid-1970s and a reduction of 80,000 in the number of civilians employed by the services.
[NAA: A1838, TS691/1 PART 11]