Canberra, 14 July 1967
7227. Top Secret Immediate
Repeated:
Australian High Commission, Wellington 602 (for McNicol)1
Australian Embassy, Washington 2356 (for Furlonger)2
For High Commissioner from Bunting.
The Prime Minister wished to have the following message conveyed to Mr. Wilson, and would appreciate it if you would arrange this urgently:–
Begins:–
Dear Harold,
I received today your message3 through the British High Commission. In concluding it you spoke of the frankness and straightforward approach that has always characterised the exchanges between us.
You would expect me to reply in that spirit.
After studying the message myself, I called in those of my senior colleagues who were in Canberra preparing for our budget talks next week. Ironically enough, having doubled our defence expenditures over the past four years, the major problem we face in the forthcoming budget is to cope with the substantial increase in that expenditure we face in this financial year. This is not to imply that we do not appreciate the weight and significance of your own economic problems. We had hoped, however, that if this were the over-riding consideration, ways and means could have been found over the period ahead to meet the recommendations I had made to you in the letter”4 left with you in London, and which you have discussed with your Cabinet colleagues. We had hoped you would have found it possible to retain the limited, but credible, British military presence on the ground in the Singapore/Malaysian area that would have contributed so much more than the numbers involved to the stability and security of the whole area.
Having had a series of messages from me, and a full discussion together in London, it will come as no surprise to you to know how deeply disappointed we feel. The general considerations I stressed in my message of 21st April,5 and reaffirmed in substance in my London letter, remain the firmly held views of myself and my colleagues. We regret that they have made so little impact on the collective mind of your own Cabinet. We cannot escape the conclusion that involved in your decision is very much more than the question of economics. We see the United Kingdom Government as having taken historic decisions to reduce its world role and contract, to a significant degree, from the kind of international responsibility Britain has carried for many, many years with credit to itself and value for mankind. Some of the basic assumptions on which the foreign policies of our two countries have been based—at least in relation to this area of the world–seem to us to have been destroyed, and we must re-think our whole situation.
If, as we must assume, your decisions are final, when they are announced we shall have very much in mind the need to sustain confidence in Malaysia and Singapore—and indeed through South East Asia generally. Even Hong Kong could hardly remain unaffected. We must avoid giving any encouragement to those who could conceivably threaten the good order and security of the whole area. We know these considerations will be in your minds as you prepare the text of your own statement.
Sincerely yours,
Harold Holt.
Ends.
For McNicol—Please inform Mr Holyoake of text on personal basis.
For Furlonger—For background information and for drawing on in informing U.S. Administration of Prime Minister’s message but not for communication in full. You will gather that we have today had from the U.K. message indicating decisions of a largely unsatisfactory nature.
1 D.W. McNicol, Australian High Commissioner to New Zealand, 1965–68.
2 R.W. Furlonger, Minister, Australian Embassy, Washington, 1965–69.
3 See Document 80.
4 See Document 75.
5 See Document 64.
[NAA:Al838,T5691/1 PART 11]