London, 24 July 1961
Top Secret
Thank you for your letter of July 4 enclosing one from Mr. Menzies about giving the Australians information about nuclear weapons. 2The Foreign Secretary has minuted on this as follows:
‘I have read Mr. Menzies’s letter and these are my feelings.
It is in everyone’s interest including Australia’s that there should be a ban on nuclear tests and a successful agreement embracing all countries. If Indonesia was to gain a manufacturing capacity the results could be most harmful to Australia. The latter ought therefore to support an agreement without exceptions.
To give this manufacturing data to Australia would have to be a secret act with the connivance of the Americans. If we attempted to make an open exception of Australia the Russians would almost certainly do the same for Indonesia, or other potentially hostile countries.
If this information was secretly given, Australia’s use of it would have to be clandestine. That would in practice be almost impossible. The process of manufacture could hardly be concealed if weapons were to be ready against an emergency.
I would feel that it would be much better to suggest that we and the Americans should enter into a commitment now, not only to supply the weapons, but the means of delivery, when Australia felt that her safety was in imminent danger. This would need American co-operation but I don’t see why they should object to a secret agreement of this kind.’
Although there has now been another approach from the Australians to the Atomic Energy Authority and, through them, to the Ministry of Defence, I am not sending copies of this letter to anyone. Perhaps you would do any distributing that you may think desirable. 3
1 Ian Samuel, Home’s Principal Private Secretary; Philip de Zulueta, Macmillan’s Foreign Policy Private Secretary.
2 See Document 8.
3 In reply to Menzies, Macmillan said the UK would need to consult the US. He also offered to provide information about tactical nuclear weapons, and this was the basis of UK Ministry of Defence discussions in September 1961 with Lt Gen. Sir R. Pollard, Chief of the Australian Army General Staff (UKNA: DEFE 7/2148). On 6 September Menzies sent a further message to Macmillan suggesting, in view of renewed Soviet nuclear testing, that the matters raised in his letter of 29 June should be deferred for the time being (UKNA: PREM 11/3202).
[UKNA: PREM 11/3202]