Canberra, 12 January 1968
The Australian Government has received from the Secretary of State the proposals of this Government providing for complete withdrawal of British defence forces from bases in Malaysia and Singapore by 31st March, 1971. The proposals make no provision beyond that date for any form of continuing British military presence in the region. The only provision spoken of, which in itself must be open to question as to its availability and effectiveness, is a possible provision derived from a general military capability located in Europe.
2. It is stated by the Secretary of State that announcement of withdrawal and other aspects of the policy is to be made next week and that there is no possibility of postponement, either of decision or announcement.
3. The Australian Government has heard these proposals with dismay and anxiety. They represent a basic and drastic change in the British decisions taken and announced in mid-1967, which were themselves a considerable modification of previous understandings.
4. There is at the outset one fundamental point. It is that questions of security are global questions and the security of all countries, including Britain, would be threatened by conflict in South-East Asia. The presence of allied forces in Malaysia is not only, or even principally, a question of the defence of continental Australia, though obviously that is not absent from the situation. But wider security is the present issue. There are present and potential threats to peace in South-East Asia. The most aggressive nuclear power is in Asia. Furthermore, while Australia appreciates British statements that Britain will rally to the assistance of Australia if it is attacked, aid in extremity is not our chief present worry. The real objective must be to prevent global or regional security ever deteriorating to such a point that Australia and its neighbours come under attack, or that conflicts develop, however small or local in origin, which consume world peace. British policy hitherto has contributed, in concert with our allies, to regional security. Its newly decided policy can do no other than damage the regional security system.
5. Furthermore, even though the withdrawal may not be finally accomplished until 1971, the announcement of final withdrawal from the mainland without provision for continuing presence in any form will inevitably produce in the short term as well as the long term political uncertainties and risks in the South-East Asian region.
6. These defence policy changes are permanent and perhaps irreversible. Their consequences in the short and long term for morale and security in this critically important region, and in our opinion for Britain itself, outweigh the contribution which they can make to the necessary objective of restoring Britain’s economic position. Given that expenditures must now be reduced in the order spoken of by the Secretary of State, there is surely justification for pressing from Europe more saving so that in the sensitive area of South-East Asia, where dangers are now more present, a continuing presence could be maintained. In relative terms, the magnitude of the outlay required for this is small.
7. It appears that the British proposals place emphasis on British forces for the future being orientated to Europe and European requirements. This suggested to the Australian Government that such forces would not be sufficiently mobile nor be of a nature suited for use in South-East Asia. Moreover, their use appeared to be subject to approval by Britain’s NATO allies. Mr. Thomson suggested that these difficulties might be overcome. Very relevant were the structure and character of the British forces. This was a matter calling for examination by the defence authorities in London after Cabinet had made its decision in broad principle. The Australian Ministers emphasised that the availability, mobility and suitability of the British forces for use in South-East Asia were of crucial importance and should not be regarded as a matter of detail to be worked out subsequently.
8. It is essential that neither in appearance nor in fact should the responsibility for regional security in the Malaysia/Singapore area be transferred, virtually in total, to the United States. It would be an error on the part of the United Kingdom to formulate their policy upon the premise that the vacuum that would be created by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom would, since it cannot filled by Australia, be automatically filled by the United States for reasons of its own total strategy. As the Australian Government sees it, there is already abundant evidence of the great risks that attend any world power, however great, being seen or placed in the position of sole guarantor, and in any case, it is a question whether the United States electorate would accept any extension of United States commitment.
9. If withdrawal must proceed, the Australian Government believes that the timetable for it should be stretched out. More time is a prime requirement in both a military and diplomatic sense. For instance, the current position is complicated by the existence of the Vietnam conflict and by the facts of the United States Presidential election year. Time is also needed to allow Malaysia and Singapore to make economic and other adjustments.
10. The Australian Government has been and still is prepared to work in association with Britain to preserve the concept of Commonwealth defence co-operation in this part of the world. We have indicated our readiness to take part in Five Power talks to discuss the arrangements required for this purpose for the future. But we do not have the capacity to replace Britain. We believe most emphatically that Britain has continuing obligations for the security of Malaysia/Singapore while these countries build up their own defence forces and a better basis for stability in the region is established. Here again time is the vital factor.
11. It is our view that it is in the interests of the partner countries that United Kingdom, Australian and New Zealand forces should continue to be in Malaysia and Singapore within at least for the time being the framework of the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, which provides the best basis for Commonwealth co-operation. But any decision by the United Kingdom to create a situation where there would be no effective military presence by Britain must bring into the most serious question the continuing significance and value of the Agreement. Moreover, whereas in the discussion in 1967 the British Government clearly recognized the importance of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve for Australia as the essential basis for the presence of our own forces in Malaysia, there seems to be no future for the Reserve under the proposals that have been outlined by Mr. Thomson.
Conclusion
12. For the reasons set out above and more extensively elaborated in discussion with the Secretary of State, the Australian Government profoundly disagrees with what the British Government now proposes and asks that it reconsider its proposals. If the British Government is not prepared to depart from the fundamental bases of its proposals, the Australian Government asks that the time now set for the major withdrawal of British forces in Malaysia and Singapore be extended as long as possible and that thereafter some British forces should still remain available in the area to provide balanced forces in concert with those contributed by other partner Governments. Finally, the Australian Government urges that the public announcement of policy should make clear Britain’s continued interest in the maintenance of security in South-East Asia areas and its intention to continue to play such part in this as it can.
1 This aide-memoire was enclosed with Johnston’s despatch to Thomson (no. 10/l), 16 January 1968, reporting the Commonwealth Secretary’s visit to Australia. Commenting in his despatch on the reaction of Australian ministers, Johnston observed: ‘The restraint and courtesy of their manner did not disguise their deep feelings of dismay and anxiety at what you had to tell them.’ Ministers were, however, friendly and sympathetic towards Thomson on account of ‘the extraordinarily difficult task which you had to carry out. … The feeling uppermost in the minds of all the Australians you met was one of sorrow at what you so accurately described as “the end of an era’”.
[UKNA: FCO 24/95]