Canberra, 24 January 1968
8/1968. Secret
Australia’s Role in Asian Security
The report of the Defence Committee on the ‘implications for Australia of the British Defence Decisions: January 1968’ has been circulated to Cabinet.1 We invite Cabinet’s attention to the wide issues of national policy to be borne in mind in making decisions on the matters in that report.
The visit which the Minister for External Affairs is undertaking at the end of next week to Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta, is the first step in a series of important discussions and decisions by Australia. The technical mission will immediately thereafter visit Singapore and Malaysia to investigate the facilities the Australian forces will need to retain. The ANZUS Council will meet in Wellington on 5th April. Informal exchanges will occur with the British representatives who will be in Wellington at that time for a meeting of the SEATO Council. Five-power talks among the Commonwealth countries will probably take place, possibly in April or May. Along with these discussions there will be continuous diplomatic activity on our part.
In preparing for and conducting these activities the Government will be developing its conception of the fundamental purposes and directions of our basic national security policies. Cabinet has agreed that the many uncertainties in Asia, and such factors as American policy towards Asia after Viet Nam, make it impossible for Australia at this stage to undertake new commitments of a kind which would determine our long-term national responsibilities. However, consistent with this position, we need to establish as clearly as we possibly can the guidelines both for our political and diplomatic activity and for defence planning, force compositions, and deployments. It is clear from the report of the Defence Committee that not all decisions can be postponed, and that in the course of the discussions referred to above matters will arise that will have to be faced.
Among the changes that are taking place in Asia, and which basically alter the security environment in which we have worked in the past, are:
- the breaking down of the ANZAM system of security;
- the weakening of SEATO by the gradual disengagement of Britain, France and Pakistan;
- the emergence of Communist China with nuclear capacity, a development which directly affects the security thinking of India and Japan;
- the need for Malaysia and Singapore to think of their security more in terms of regional co-operation and of associating the United States;
- the role, still uncertain, which a non-communist government in Indonesia will want to perform.
The fundamental question for Australia is whether we intend to play a positive and sustained part in shaping arrangements for security in Asia, notwithstanding the British disengagement. Australia needs to have friendly states in South East Asia working with others in their own defence. We need United States backing and in certain circumstances active participation. To achieve this Australia has to play a role that is more than nominal. Up to now, we have played a worthy part in a forward defence policy.
In considering the Report of the Defence Committee we should have in our minds that what we do in Malaysia will be taken widely in Asia, the United States, and elsewhere, as an indication of our continuing intention to participate directly in the security of mainland Asian countries.
While it is necessary that as far as possible we keep options open, and avoid precise commitments which would bind Australia to specific courses of action and rule out some other courses, it is not practical to decide simply to maintain existing levels of forces in Malaysia until 1971 and to put off for some time to come decisions of what to do after 1971. The uncertainty caused in other countries about future Australian intentions would be harmful. In addition, there are practical reasons referred to by the Defence Committee in paragraph 4 of its report.
A practical example of the kind of situation which will develop is the proposal for a joint air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore. Malaysia will probably press Australia to take part in this system by making available the air capability at Butterworth. There is some suggestion that Singapore might be interested in Australia stationing half a squadron of Mirages there. Both those Governments will want to know what Australia’s intentions are as soon as the whole scheme has been fully studied so that they in tum will be able to make whatever plans they think necessary for their air defence. This is something which will be examined in the course of this year and will not be left for the post-1971 period. At the same time, the Australian Government will be conscious that, if it were to agree to take part in the system, we would inevitably be committing ourselves beyond the 1971 period. This is an example of decisions that will have to be faced long before 1971, and indeed may have to be faced fairly soon.
A primary aim of our diplomacy will be to secure the understanding and where possible the co-operation of as many as possible of the countries of the region in working for their own security. It is too soon to say how this can be done, as the attitude of different countries, inside the region and also some outside the region like the United States and Japan will develop as time goes on and will be affected by what they see others, including Australia, doing.
A selection of telegrams is attached.2
1 See Document 91 .
2 Not published.
[NAA: A5867 VOLUME 1]