Canberra, 25 January 1968
Secret
Submission No. 7—Implications for Australia of the British Defence Decisions, January 19681
Submission No. 8-Australia’s Role in Asian Security2
The Committee noted the timing of developments relating to the recent British Defence decisions, viz.
- Completion by 18th February in Singapore of British military plans for withdrawal from the area.
- Consideration of these plans in early March by British Chiefs of Staff and then by the British Cabinet.
- The publication of a further British White Paper on Defence possibly about mid-year.
- Possible Five Power talks also about mid-year.
It was also noted that Australia would have an opportunity for discussion with the United States and New Zealand at the time of SEATO meetings in Wellington in early April.
2. The Committee endorsed the proposal that the Minister for External Affairs visit Malaysia and Singapore this month for consultations, a purpose of which would be to avoid any misunderstanding about Australia’s future role in the area. The Minister informed the Committee that he would seek to spend a day in Djakarta on his return journey in order to reassure the Indonesians, if necessary, about Australia’s intentions.
3. The Committee had a general discussion about the direction and objectives of Australian policy in relation to South East Asia. It noted the changes taking place in Asia, as set down at page 2 of Submission No. 83 and the great uncertainties which are necessarily part of the present situation—e.g. in relation to Vietnam, Indonesian policy, co-operation between Malaysia and Singapore, future U.S. policy in the Far East, the threat of Chinese aggression post-Vietnam.
4. Fundamental objectives for Australia were seen as those described generally at paragraph 7 of Submission No. 7 (e.g. stability in South East Asia, continued American support, and maintenance of the Australian–American alliance) and consonant with this the direction of Australian diplomacy to securing the understanding and, where possible, the co-operation of as many as possible of the countries of the region in working for their own security.
5. The Committee regarded the American alliance as being of crucial importance and agreed that Australia’s policies should be such as will command respect from the United States and have the effect of cementing our ties with the Americans. Thus it was felt that while the forces which Australia could provide in Malaysia and Singapore might not in themselves be credible in military terms, they would be symbolic and was this that would count with the Americans.
6. Having regard to the uncertamt1es of the present situation—including the fact that details are not yet available of possible British assistance to Malaysia and Singapore, e.g. the proposed joint air-defence system and migratory aid—the Committee agreed that, at this stage, Australia needed to keep her policies flexible and should, as far as practicable, continue the course which she had been following of endeavouring to keep options open. She would not want to court a situation where her forces would be found in an isolated position in Malaysia/ Singapore. Accordingly, Australia’s attitude now should be on the lines of paragraph 19 of Submission No. 7: ‘ … We cannot afford to create a situation where it is thought that we are staying until 1971 but going automatically after that or, at the other extreme, that we are staying until 1971 and necessarily remaining thereafter, perhaps with additional commitments. We will want, on the contrary, to convey the impression that while we will have a continuing interest and involvement in the region, the form and shape of our contribution from time to time may change in accordance with practical requirements and new regional arrangements which may be developed. Most certainly, there can be no illusions that we are taking over the role of the British or anything remotely resembling it. And always in our own minds will be our concern to discover what U.S. policy towards South East Asia will be after Vietnam. This known, we could face a major re-assessment of our own position’.
7. On the detailed recommendations of paragraph 25 of Submission No.7, the Committee approved that–
(a) For the time being, Australia should continue to maintain in Malaysia and Singapore a military contribution of the order of existing operational force levels, it being understood that it may become necessary to change in some degree the composition and disposition of our forces. The Committee accepted that Australia is not in a position to consider raising the present level of forces beyond what may be essential to provide that logistic and other necessary support for our own forces at present provided by the British.
(b) The maintenance of our forces there should be in the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 9 of the Submission.
(c) The Australian military contribution should contribute to the limited tasks mentioned in paragraph 10 of the Submission.
(d) Any commitment of our forces to operations including involvement in internal civil disorder and external threats continue to be subject to the agreement of the Australian Government.
(e) The attitude to Indonesia be as mentioned in paragraph 12 of the Submission.
(f) In future arrangements with Malaysia and Singapore, Australia, while being willing to see a continuance of A.M.D.A. provided any re-interpretation of it did not involve Australia in particular commitments, should if possible avoid any binding treaty. The Committee preferred the course of having invitations from Malaysia and Singapore to Australia to maintain forces in the area leaving the purpose of their being in the area as flexible as possible. More detailed arrangements could be required regarding the status of our forces if A.M.D.A. ceased to apply to Australia. It noted that, as matters stood, A.M.D.A. did not extend to Singapore.
(g) The military reconnaissance already approved proceed and military planning talks in Malaysia/Singapore be on the basis outlined in paragraph 15 of the Submission; this to be subject to any problems arising from the projected visit of the Minister for External Affairs. The Committee commented, in relation to paragraph 15(b), that it should be for Malaysia and Singapore to seek to acquire ‘British assets’—with Australia to get the use of these assets wherever possible without payment.
(h) While Australia need take no initiative in pressing for Five Power talks, she should participate in them at Ministerial level if they are convened.
(i) The Australian contribution to these talks should be directed to the ends mentioned in paragraph 17 of the Submission, subject to the points made in relation to A.M.D.A. under (f) above.
(j) The overall impression of the Australian attitude which should be conveyed is that set out in paragraph 19 of the Submission (see paragraph 6 above).
8. Looking to the possible need to deal with questions in the House and elsewhere about the operation of ANZUS in relation to Australia’s role in Malaysian/Singapore defence, the Committee recognised that this matter was one which needed to be handled carefully bearing in mind United States views. It agreed that, for this purpose, a form of words should be worked out in consultation with the Americans.
9. For the purpose of dealing with questions about the talks to be held by Mr. Hasluck and the military mission, the Committee asked that there be prepared for consideration by Ministers a paper which could be the basis for public comment and which would emphasise the exploratory nature of the talks.
1 See Document 91 .
2 See Document 92.
3 That is, points (i)–(v) of Document 92.
[NAA: A5867 VOLUME 1]