British Embassy, Washington, 10 May 1968
Confidential
In his despatch of 21 May (10/1 )2 Sir Charles Johnston gave an account of how Australia saw, and reacted to, Her Majesty’s Government’s decision to withdraw from East of Suez.
He went on to describe the attitude of the new Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Gorton, towards foreign policy in general and more particularly he considered Mr. Gorton’s attitude in the light of his then forthcoming visit to Washington. In this despatch I have the honour to offer some observations upon the impression made by Mr. Gorton on his hosts here and how he reacted to them.
2. My Australian colleagues here have described Mr. Gorton’s attitude before his visit here as ‘dubious’ about the future in three respects. First, Mr. Gorton wondered whether the Americans were prepared to see the war through in Vietnam, or whether they would fall victim to the peace movement mentioned in Sir C. Johnston’s despatch and cut and run. Second he was uncertain whether America was not headed toward isolationism and that this would mean a U.S. withdrawal from any involvement in Asia and hence reneging on her existing commitments. Thirdly, Mr. Gorton was doubtful whether there was any role which Australia could, or should, play in the ‘Far North’ in her own interests.
3. To the first and second questions Mr. Gorton received firm answers from the President himself. The President went out of his way to show that the mantle of his affection for the late Mr. Holt was Mr. Gorton’s for the asking. As I have already reported by telegram the President defied protocol and the printed programme by inviting the Prime Minister and Mrs. Gorton (whose American origin was highlighted by the President) to dine with him on the Presidential Yacht almost as soon as they had arrived. It was perhaps a prescient move for torrents of rain the next morning would certainly have washed out the welcoming ceremony on the White House lawn, which was rendered unnecessary by the supper party on board. The President, as a Texan, feels that he has a close affinity with Australians and went out of his way to demonstrate this, but as my New Zealand colleague has, I understand reported to Wellington, though there may be at this moment in time a special Australian/U.S. relationship, a President who loves Australians may not be seen again in the next hundred years! Be that as it may, Mr. Gorton was undoubtedly reassured that the Administration was not negotiating from weakness, or going to cave in over Vietnam, or seeking almost any way out of its Asian mainland troubles. Moreover the President affirmed that he would use whatever influence he possessed to see that the U.S. maintained its commitments in Asia in the years to come. I am told that while in respect of Vietnam he reiterated the content of the 1966 Manila declaration,3 he spoke also of Thailand and said that a U.S. presence would be maintained there for some time. Mr. Gorton was particularly pleased with this second assurance because of its relevance to his own problem of trying to decide where Australia’s forward defences should be. Obviously President Johnson could not commit his successors, but it is of some interest—though now tragically irrelevant4—that I am told on good authority that at Mr. Gorton’s talks with Under Secretary of State Katzenbach5 (Mr. Rusk being absent with a heavy cold for the greater part of Mr. Gorton’s visit) the latter said that he was able to give the same undertaking to Mr. Gorton on behalf of Senator Robert Kennedy as the President had given. Whether this was because Mr. Katzenbach knew the Senator’s mind as a result of briefings at which the Senator had said that he agreed with the Administration’s policy, or whether the Under Secretary had been asked to convey this undertaking I do not know. The effect, however, on the Prime Minister was to reassure him and this reassurance seems to have been made public on his return to Australia.
4. On the third point to judge from all that I have heard, the Administration set out to convince Mr. Gorton that S.E. Asia was important; that an external stabilising element was necessary; and that an Australian presence, including ground forces, was not only important in itself in achieving this, but that it would make it that much easier for a future U.S. Administration to play its part in Asia if Australia committed itself to a post-1971 presence, preferably as part of a collective Commonwealth effort. This seems to have been the point drummed home by the President, the State Department and by the Secretary of Defence. Indeed it seems to have been the focus of all substantial discussions, because, although the Prime Minister also saw the Secretaries of the Treasury and of Commerce, my Australian colleague says that there was nothing of sufficient importance said on either occasion to justify the writing of a record!
5. The Americans sought to counter Mr. Gorton’s arguments that Australia was too small to play an effective role in South East Asia and to bring home to him the importance which they attached to a continued Australian presence in Malaysia. They stressed that there was no question of their taking over British and Australian responsibilities and that for the Australians to operate from the base of their own country made no sense from either a military or a psychological point of view. They also sought, without putting forward any detailed proposals, to show the Australians the way forward, stressing collective action, which would be likely to be acceptable to the U.S. Government and with which in an indirect way they might be able to associate themselves. (An example of this in relation to the Singapore naval dockyard was given in my Tel. No. 1756 which dealt with matters which I thought it best to report separately because of the imminence of the five–power meeting.) It struck me as particularly significant and indicative of American interest in the Kuala Lumpur meeting that a paragraph in the communique should have been devoted to it.
6. What sort of impression did Mr. Gorton himself make on the Administration and on the country at large? The friendliness of his reception made, of course, for a certain amount of publicity, but press coverage of the visit was strangely muted and the fact that Mr. Gorton spoke ex tempore at the National Press Club meant that his remarks got much less cover than if he had spoken from a text, so lazy have the press become. The speech went well enough, but was not famous, although Mr. Gorton made a good impression in the answering of questions. I fear, however, that despite all the President’s good will, Mr. Gorton will have been compared unfavourably in stature with both Sir Robert Menzies and Mr. Holt. As Mr. Bundy6 told the Minister, ‘Mr. Gorton does not have South East Asia in his bones, as Mr. Holt had, nor in his head as Sir Robert Menzies had’. Mr. Gorton’s obvious lack of grasp of some of the subjects under discussion and his inexperience, plus his tendency to speak before he had really thought matters out were apparent to senior officials who met him. Nevertheless, he was straightforward and very ready to listen and, given time, and provided he takes the right decisions (from an American point of view) in the months to come, I see no reason why he should not be taken into the confidence of Americans at all the higher levels of the Administration.
7. I attach7 to this despatch for the record, the formal programme as drawn up for the Prime Minister. It was upset, as I have said, by the invitation to dine on the first evening of arrival and by the President’s invitation to the Prime Minister to join him at the LBJ Ranch in Texas where General Westmoreland8 was able to confer with the two leaders. You will see, Sir, that the programme also contains the names of the Prime Minister’s party which strangely enough included no one from the Departments of External Affairs or Defence, though I understand that an officer of the latter Department, who happened to be in New York on other business was roped in. The text of the communique on which I have also reported by telegram is attached.
8. To sum up, I would say that many Americans realised the President was overdoing the warmth of his reception, but that he was doing it as an investment for the future and as a means of influencing Mr. Gorton to move in the way the Administration want the Australian Government to go. The President has probably shrewdly summed up his man but Mr. Gorton will no doubt wrestle strongly with his inner convictions which seem to urge him to keep out of South East Asian involvement if he can. However, Mr Bundy has told us that he seemed now more aware of the importance of not creating instability or uncertainty by some ill-advised action. The Americans think moreover, that they have succeeded in convincing Mr. Gorton that Australia has a role to play in South East Asia and they are undoubtedly pleased with the seriousness with which he appears to regard the Kuala Lumpur meeting. He will, I am sure, press for collective Commonwealth action and seek for means to cut us in on the effort in some small way. This is certainly how the Administration here would like to see the game played. Only time will tell if Mr. Gorton will decide to play it this way, and if he will still win.
9. I am sending copies of this despatch to the High Commission in Canberra, Wellington, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur and to the Political Adviser to the C-in-C. Far East.
1 Sir P. Dean, British Ambassador to Washington, 1965–69.
2 In this despatch, Johnston commented that Gorton was looking at the US alliance ‘with a more sceptical eye’ than his predecessor, and that for all practical purposes the Australian commitment in Vietnam had reached its limits. ‘If the close and intimate personal relationship’ between Holt and President Johnson had tended to exaggerate in Australian eyes the weight given to Australian views in US councils, ‘the effective exclusion’ of the Australian Government from the US decisions to halt the bombing of North Vietnam and to open negotiations with the North had ‘brought about a more realistic appraisal of the nature of an alliance between two powers of such disparate strengths’. The UK withdrawal, according to Johnston, posed questions for the Australian Government which it could not answer itself until it knew ‘whether the Americans are going home too’, and whether the US would agree to underwrite an Australian presence in Malaysia and Sil)gapore. Gorton was depicted by the High Commissioner as a man of ‘strong convictions’ who believed Australia’s interests were best served by working to ‘promote inherent stability in the countries which are her northern neighbours’. It seemed likely that stability would require the retention of Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore but it was uncertain whether these should include land forces. As for the effect on Anglo-Australian relations of the UK’s decision to withdraw, Johnston argued ‘we seem to have escaped with surprisingly little damage’. The Australian press had prepared the Australian public for the UK’s decision. ‘Sorrow, regret, and some waspishness were shown, but not the outrage, even hysteria, which might have been expected. Australia was hurt and is regretful over the decisions we were compelled to take but shows no disposition to seek to take it out of us in other ways. The Australian Government’s international policies since the war have of course been characterised by a determined self-interest. It is reasonable that Australia in fact should have shown no disposition to cut off her nose to spite her face; Asia is a cold unfriendly world for a small white nation and Britain remains an important ally and a vital source of immigrants and capital’ (UKNA: FCO 24/103, despatch, Johnston to Thomson, 21 May 1968).
Johnston offered a further profile of Gorton’s personality and policies in a despatch written in November 1968. ‘First and foremost the Prime Minister is an Australian nationalist. His two predecessors seem to him to have overdone their respective postures. Sir Robert Menzies in being “British to the bootstraps”, and Mr. Holt in going “all the way with LBJ”. Mr. Gorton sees the first as an out-of-date, unrealistic bit of mumbo-jumbo; and the second as an undignified piece of boot-licking. In either case the implied element of dependence on others offends his profound sense of personal and national dignity.’ Johnston dismissed suggestions that Gorton had dissipated the goodwill built up in Washington by Menzies and Holt. ‘Mr. Gorton is hard-headed enough to know that, however much he may dislike it, Australia continues to depend on the United States for its survival.’ Johnston also dismissed Australian press speculation that because he put Australia first, Gorton believed in ‘Fortress Australia’ and that he would withdraw Australian forces from Southeast Asia. ‘On the contrary it could be argued that an intelligent Australian nationalist would wish to defend his own country as far forward as possible and to keep the risk of war at the maximum distance from its shores.’ In the debate going on within the Australian Government about the role of Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore, the High Commissioner argued that Gorton had yet to show his hand. When he did, his policy would be guided by a pragmatic assessment, ‘having regard to the policies of the new United States President, and the probable outcome in Viet–Nam’ (UKNA: FCO 24/381/1, despatch, Johnston to Stewart, 29 November 1968).
3 President Johnson met other allied leaders at Manila in October 1966 and pledged to withdraw troops from Vietnam within six months if North Vietnam withdrew its forces to the north and ceased infiltration of South Vietnam. A communique signed by the seven participants (Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand and the US) included a four-point ‘Declaration of Peace’ stressing the need for a ‘peaceful settlement of the war in Vietnam and for future peace and progress’ in the rest of Asia and the Pacific.
4 A reference to the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy in Los Angeles on 5 June 1968.
5 Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, US Under Secretary of State, 1966–69.
6 McGeorge Bundy was US National Security Adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, 1961–66, and President of the Ford Foundation, 1966–79.
7 Attachments with this despatch are not published.
8 General William C. Westmoreland, Commander of US forces in Vietnam, 1964–68, and US Army Chief of Staff, 1968–72.
[UKNA: FCO 24/103]