Canberra, 22 August 1968
306/1968. Top Secret
The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy—19681
[ matter omitted ]
12. Australia’s strategic interests
167. The foregoing discussion has identified the following strategic interests as a basis for the consideration of policy:
(a) The development of the USA/USSR détente and of their efforts to stabilise international relations, including measures for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the containment of Chinese nuclear activity.
(b) Continued assurance of the security of Australia’s lines of communication and strategic approaches, particularly to the north.
(c) Continuing security and friendly influence in the Pacific territories now under British and French rule.
(d) The continued deterrence of China from overt military aggression, particularly against the states of South-East Asia, and the development by China of a stable relationship with other states.
(e) Continued encouragement of UK interests and participation in the area.
(f) Continued encouragement and support of the United States’ position in the Pacific and South-East Asia and its interest in the Indian Ocean and its efforts to maintain and develop arrangements for the security of the mainland South-East Asian states, particularly Thailand.
(g) Support of United States efforts to protect and consolidate a viable Government in South Vietnam and to discourage any North Vietnamese ambitions for control by force of neighbouring countries.
(h) Support of efforts and arrangements to maintain confidence in the states of South-East Asia against external aggression and the encouragement of them to develop the capacity to defend themselves.
(i) Encouragement of South-East Asian states to take themselves, and by cooperation between them, in all fields necessary, effective measures to alleviate conditions favourable to insurgency and to resist insurgency, contributing as needs be political support, technical, administrative and economic aid, and in the last resort, where circumstances warrant it, military support.
(j) The maintenance of Japan’s present orientation within the United States’ strategic position in Asia and the cultivation of a constructive and cooperative approach by Japan consonant with our interests, to the security, political and developmental problems of the region.
(k) Avoidance of instability and a power struggle in the Malaysian/Indonesian area, the promotion of political stability and moderation in external policy in Indonesia and of mutual cooperation in defence between Malaysia and Singapore and confidence in their external security and internal security, and support for the efforts of these countries in these respects.
(l) Avoidance of instability in the Philippines and avoidance of withdrawal of the US from its bases there.
(m) Continued economic progress in Indonesia, the maintenance of moderate, constructive and effective central Government there and the development of stable relations of confidence between Indonesia and its neighbours to the north and west and with Australia.
(n) The protection of TPNG and of Australia’s interest there.
(o) The continued development of close relations with the United States in SEATO and particularly in the ANZUS context and the encouragement of their interest in and support for Australian strategic and defence policies.
(p) The closest cooperation in defence matters with New Zealand.
PART III. Future Defence Policy
1. Introduction
168. Australian strategy cannot be considered in isolation from the global situation and the strategies of the major world powers. While the nuclear stalemate between the USSR and USA has reduced the likelihood of general war, and the détente between the two countries has in Europe relaxed tensions between the NATO powers and the Soviet Bloc, Africa and the Middle East remain regions of instability for a variety of reasons. Yet, at present, the situation in these regions does not suggest military intervention by, or military conflict between, the major world powers.
169. It is in Asia that the greatest threat to stability exists and it is centred on Communist China. True Australia does not currently face the threat of the direct advance of communist power through a weak and fragmented region that earlier existed. Yet despite the fact that the might of the USA has been directed to the containment of China, pressures exerted by China and its influence are felt in North Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and India, and Vietnam continues to be the active focal point of the struggle to defeat communist aggression. And, despite their differences, the USSR and Communist China are both actively supporting Communist North Vietnam with equipment, supplies, technicians, etc. Given that the several interests of the USA and USSR are directed to preventing Communist China from overt military aggression, the most likely method by which Communist China will extend her influence, and communism, in South-East Asia will be by a variety of means short of overt identifiable armed aggression, including subversion, terrorism, insurgency, and psychological warfare. However, the possibility of escalation to limited war cannot be ignored. This might occur through miscalculation on either side or some unpredictable incident. It is considered that China will seek to avoid limited war except where her own safety or the survival of a bordering country as a communist nation is threatened.
170. The overthrow of Sukarno and the establishment of a regime preoccupied with grave internal problems of economic and administrative reconstruction and growth, have stabilised the Indonesian situation and removed to the later medium or long term, uncertainties about Indonesia’s external conduct. In the Malaysian region the internal communist challenge has been defeated and the new states of Malaysia and Singapore established with hopeful prospects of consolidation and stable government. Nevertheless communist insurgents still operate on the Thai/Malaysian border and in Sarawak, communal tensions still exist in Malaysia, and there is friction with the Philippines over Sabah.
171. That Communist Chinese aggression has been kept within the limits it has been and that the other favourable developments noted have occurred may be ascribed largely to the USA and to a lesser extent the UK.
2. Our Defence policy
172. None the less our recognition of these changes with their credits and debits, should not be allowed to obscure the abiding nature of basic features of our strategic situation:
- the pressure of China on the balance of power with its particular manifestation in pressures on South-East Asia,
- the fundamental importance of the United States in the containment of pressure,
- the relative weakness and instability of the States of South-East Asia and their susceptibility to insurgency,
- the uncertainty in the long term, particularly in the light Of the United Kingdom withdrawal, about internal Malaysian and Singapore stability and Indonesian conduct,
- the continuing USSR policy of exploiting situations wherever it safely can and its ambitions in the Indian Ocean area,
- the uncertainties in the long term as to the direction the Japanese policy may take, and the geo-strategic situation of Australia which itself confers a certain measure of security upon us.
173. To date, within the framework of our global interests, the key purpose of our defence policy has been to prevent a potential enemy from establishing himself in areas from which a direct threat to Australia could be posed and fundamentally we have seen that enemy to be associated with the spread of communism. This policy has been called the concept of forward defence. We have recognised that this policy calls not merely for military activities but for coordinated action in the political, economic and military fields.
174. Yet we could hardly assert that this forward defence concept represents an independent strategy of our own. Rather it has been a case that we have deliberately, doubtless in our own interests and perhaps inescapably, tied Australia to the strategy of others. We have had such a tradition, first to fit comfortably into British strategy and more recently in that of the US. In this latter case we have placed our trust in ANZUS, we played a major part in establishing SEATO, of which the USA is the dominant partner. Like all small countries we can best ensure our security by participating in regional security arrangements; as a result we find ourselves involved in situations not of our choosing and in the formation of which we have negligible, if any, influence.
175. The harsh reality that confronts us is that the forward defence policy to which we have subscribed and which we argue has been successful to date, cannot continue to be successful unless the USA maintains its present policies in relation to Communist China and Asia and, as well, its forward military posture in the Pacific and in Asia, and that Australia cannot have any long term successful defence policy without ANZUS and, to a lesser extent, the SEATO alliance with the USA.
176. If our assessment is correct that the US cannot but maintain a military position in the Pacific and Asia then if we continue our active participation in these alliances conceivably the residual US military position after the conclusion of the Vietnam War may, as a consequence, not merely be reduced to lesser degree but remain more committed in South-East Asia than might otherwise be the case. But the consequence we have to continue to face is that we may be called upon actively to participate in US initiatives, especially those stemming from SEATO.
177. Despite the fact that there is at least before the later medium term no threat of direct aggression to Australia and its Territories, it is, taking the long term view, quite unrealistic to take the line that we could rely on the ANZUS Treaty for US protection of Australia and its Territories and at the same time adopt the policy of complete military withdrawal from South-East Asia as our current commitments there expire and of rejecting for the future any further military involvement in Asia. And this even if we made clear our preparedness to contribute to Asia’s needs by aid and assistance of a non-military character.
178. If Australia’s best interests are to be served, they do not lie in our taking up any extreme position. The choices surely are not between a continuing military presence in Asia (parenthetically to be noted is that, in fact, this has been the case virtually since the end of World War II) and no such presence under any circumstances. Rather does it seem we should be aiming, subject to the limits that SEATO imposes, to achieve a situation which will allow us the maximum of strategic flexibility, a situation in which we would be able to make our judgements from time to time, against all relevant circumstances, as to the directions, political, economic or military, in which we would be involved.
179. Such a course would carry not the connotation that Australia would necessarily have forces overseas continuously but instead that Australia was prepared to have available forces that could, if needs be, be deployed to South-East Asia when required. It would, however, mean that our forces would have to be organized, equipped and trained so that they would have to the maximum possible extent a dual capability i.e. for effective employment in South-East Asia as well as for the direct defence of Australia and that we would progressively build up the infrastructure in Australia and its Territories necessary to support the operations of our forces wherever they were needed. Such a course should preserve our status and influence in the region in respect of the factors shaping its long term environment and our own future security, should sustain the confidence of our friends in South–East Asia in Australia’s concern and support, and not merely sustain our capacity to influence United States policy in the region but preserve its confidence in us as a reliable ally. The credibility of such a course could be amply demonstrated by participation in exercises in South–East Asia such as are already contemplated as a result of the recent Five Power Talks.
180. What is proposed would have the advantage, if contrary to our assessment, the US withdrawal from Asia should be more dramatic, that we would have placed ourselves in a position to devote even greater emphasis to the improvement of the capability of our forces within Australia for the protection of it and its Territories.
The short term concept
181. In the short term as defined by this paper, Australia has little option but to continue the present forward defence posture because we are heavily committed in Vietnam, and also committed to the stationing of forces in Malaysia and Singapore. In addition Australia is committed to the support of the SEATO alliance involving the declaration of forces to SEATO contingency plans for the defence ofThailand against externally inspired insurgency and overt aggression and regular participation in SEATO exercises.
182. While the war in Vietnam continues it is important that the situation there is not undermined in other countries in South-East Asia. SEATO and other allied support restrains further deterioration in Laos and is directed to the security and confidence of Thailand. Support for Malaysia and Singapore is designed to ensure that the situation south of the SEATO countries does not deteriorate. Therefore Australian and allied support for Vietnam and these other countries of South-East Asia are interdependent and mutually supporting.
183. With the end of the war in Vietnam there may be a residual commitment during the withdrawal period and in the readjustment period following a settlement, the support that the other South-East Asian countries receive from their allies will be important.
184. At the initial Five Power Talks Australia accepted that our agreement to contribute to the proposed integrated air defence system for Malaysia and Singapore would carry implications in regard to the post-1971 period. Our options for a continuing naval and army presence were left open. The continued presence of appropriate Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore until the end of the Vietnam war and during the period of readjustment following a settlement in Vietnam would be consistent with the foregoing argument.
The concept post-Vietnam
185. What lies beyond the conclusion of the Vietnam war depends on the settlement that emerges and its aftermath. We have assessed a continuing insurgency threat to Laos, Cambodia and Thailand and that the continued existence of an independent Thailand is crucial to the future stability of Malaysia and Singapore. Regardless of the type of Vietnam settlement, unless it is unexpectedly favourable, the other countries in South-East Asia will be anxious about what North Vietnam and China might do next. This uncertainty will probably take time to subside. The US and allied attitudes, US support for Thailand, and Australian support for Malaysia and Singapore could be critical during this period to consolidate the settlement, sustain confidence, and discourage aggressive attitudes by North Vietnam and China. It should be possible during this readjustment period to confine Australia’s military deployments to some form of continuing presence in Malaysia and Singapore and perhaps in Vietnam as part of the terms of settlement. Given the most favourable circumstances, this readjustment period could be short, and thereafter Australian military deployments in South-East Asia would become unnecessary. At that stage, apart from engaging in military exercises, our activity could be confined to political and economic aid directed to preserving and consolidating the position established during the period of our forward defence posture and to strengthening the internal position of the South-East Asian states in the area of our immediate interest. There would remain only the continuing military commitment under SEATO, unless meantime Australia became party to some other regional arrangement involving military obligations.
186. The handling of this change in our present policy would require delicate judgement and care if the confidence we have helped to establish and the continued credibility of our will and capacity to intervene, if necessary, is not to be jeopardised.
187. To handle deftly the transition involved we must even now begin to lay the ground for it. Because of its bearing on our security, we should leave no doubt with our friends in Asia and the USA that we continue to be no less concerned with what develops in South-East Asia. We should establish that the course we intend to follow is in the best interests, both of South-East Asia and Australia, being designed to achieve the maximum results and at the same time avoiding over stretching our own limited resources. We should have it understood that we perceive our support for the Region to embrace political, economic and administrative objectives and assistance. We should seek to have ourselves recognised as free and willing to take independent initiatives. One of our main objectives should be to encourage the emergence of regional security arrangements embracing at least those of countries within our area of our immediate interest, and enjoying, at least, the support of the USA.
188. The course outlined will contain uncertainties and risks but that would be true of any other. The nature of the problems, together with our comparative inexperience in some of them, and our limited resources will oblige us to proceed with discretion but at the same time what we do should be and be seen to be commensurate with our interests in the Region and should be designed to have the maximum impact. With any success in this direction, not merely will the worth of our role be enlarged, it will be provided with a more secure and stable basis.
189. It is in respect of Malaysia and Singapore that Australia has the immediate opportunity to begin to apply these broader concepts. But this does not mean that there will not be opportunities for similar initiatives elsewhere, particularly in Indonesia and Thailand. Such a process should enlist the sympathetic interest and support of the USA and we should go out of our way to ensure this. The fact that we had established a lively and particular interest in the security and stability of the countries within the area of our immediate interest and were making a positive contribution in support of them and Thailand, would justify Australia’s making a more independent and flexible response to any US request for involvement, military or otherwise, elsewhere in the South-East Asian area.
190. As things stand, in the late medium or longer terms covered by this paper there is the possibility that there could be a change in the attitude of Indonesia and unfavourable developments in the Philippines. Such possibilities might be frustrated if the course advocated above is pursued. Putting this aside, in the case of Indonesia a change in attitude and the consequential threat to Australia could develop more quickly and Australian policy must take this possibility into account. This is one more reason why the capability of the forces we develop from now on should be versatile enough to meet a possible future threat from Indonesia.
3. Continuing and potential commitments
192. It follows from the foregoing argument that Australia needs to make provision for forces to meet the following purposes, along with the direct defence of Australia and its Territories:
- the Vietnam commitment;
- existing and possible future commitments to the defence of Malaysia and Singapore under Five Power arrangements;
- the support of SEATO under contingency plans and ANZUS or of other similar collective security arrangements that may emerge ranging from counter insurgency up to limited war;
- in the medium and longer terms, the support of indigenous forces in Papua/New Guinea to meet Indonesian activities there; and
- the possible need to counter insurgency in other areas where USA or UK support may be expected;
- contributions to United Nations supervisory or peace keeping forces;
- other defence tasks.
Some notes on these follow.
[ matter omitted ]
1 This is the revised version of the 1968 strategic assessment (see Document 94) which was amended in the light of the Defence Committee’s comments (see Document 95). Published here are, from Part II of the report, paragraph 167, a summary of Australia’s strategic interests; and, from Part III, paragraphs 168–92, on future defence policy.
[NAA: A5619, C470 PART 2]