Brief for Australian Delegation to IAEA Safeguards Committee

163 Brief for Australian Delegation to IAEA Safeguards Committee1

Canberra, 11 June 1970

Confidential

Summary of Principles

The brief for the delegation to the Safeguards Committee meeting on 12th June, 1970, is the approved Working Paper submitted by the Australian Government to the Director-General on 1st May.2 However, the following consists of a ‘Summary of Principles’ which the delegation may keep at hand for reference and discussion purposes in the course of the meetings. In the main the principles stated are already incorporated in the approved brief. Tactically, care is to be taken in the use of these principles and in the reference to them as reflecting the Australian Government position on the issues involved.

1. Safeguards shall be for the sole purpose of verifying within non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty, that nuclear material is not diverted from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
2. The safeguards procedures to be applied by the Agency under the Treaty must be effective and generally acceptable.
3. The safeguards agreements should not be discriminatory either as between individual States or between groups of States on the one hand and individual States on the other.
4. Safeguards shall be applied, and safeguards inspectors shall have access to, only those nuclear materials and facilities which are being used by the non-nuclear weapon State party to the Treaty for peaceful purposes under the jurisdiction of the State and have been so designated by the State to the Agency.
5. Non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty shall have the right to reject particular inspectors at any time and without giving reasons for such rejections.
6. Safeguards shall not be applied to ores containing nuclear materials, minerals, mines and activities related to the extraction or concentration of nuclear materials.
7. Safeguards shall not be applied to uranium enriched to less than X percent in uranium-235 or to less than Y percent uranium-233, nor to plutonium containing more than Z percent of plutonium-240, nor to plant, equipment or facilities which contain, process, produce or use such material. Note: Percentages above to be determined by technical experts.
8. Special provisions shall be included in the Agency’s safeguards system to provide a strong deterrent to industrial or commercial espionage. Design information or access to facilities shall not be provided where a non-nuclear weapon State party to the Treaty considers such information or access would injure its commercial interests; in these circumstances, safeguards shall be applied as necessary to the input and output of nuclear material in the facilities concerned.
9. The costs of applying safeguards to non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty shall be borne by the regular budget of the Agency. Non-nuclear weapon States shall not be required to meet any costs additional to those deemed necessary by them for their own national purposes.
10. There should be continuing research into safeguards with a view to simplifying the safeguards process to the greatest degree possible, and achieving economy.
11. Safeguards shall be applied to nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty under arrangements to be negotiated separately from safeguards for non-nuclear weapon States. The costs of applying safeguards in nuclear weapon States shall not be borne by the regular budget nor by non-nuclear weapon States. Note: In making these points there should be no suggestion that Australia does not support the application of safeguards to nuclear weapon States.

[NAA: A1838, 719/10/6 part 10]

• 1 The brief was sent to the Embassy in Vienna by bag and to the AAEC in Sydney by teleprinter message.
• 2 See Document 162.