Note by Gilfedder

18 Note by Gilfedder1

Canberra, 23 June 1955

Disarmament—Soviet Proposals2

[matter omitted]

Australian Viewpoint

It will be recalled that because of inherent uncertainties connected with a proposal by the United Kingdom to try to establish the level of armed forces on a population criterion, the Prime Minister telegraphed London in October, 1954,3 stating that in view of the growing significance of Chinese manpower in the strategic balance of forces there should be Commonwealth consultation before any important steps were taken by the United Kingdom on this matter.

The United Kingdom approach4 based on a formula was a real problem for Australia since certain countries with high density populations would actually be able to build up their forces after disarmament had begun. While Australia adhered strongly to the principle of disarmament it was felt that the United Kingdom formula based on population alone was artificial in principle and would be most difficult for the following reasons:

1. An Asian neighbour, Indonesia, with a population of over 80m. could build up a force of close to one million, while Australia would be held to a comparatively low ceiling on the basis of our population. What would happen if Indonesia became a satellite of the Communists?
2. We would worry about the effect of any such formula on the U.S. Strategic forces’ position in reference to South East Asia.

The United Kingdom has now turned away from its proposal for the use of the population criterion as a sole factor. The new proposal now includes demographic, geographic, economic and political factors.

If we look at the revised United Kingdom thinking in conjunction with the compromise Anglo-French proposals5, there are still some difficulties facing Australia:

1. Would the ‘freeze’ of overall military expenditure as at 31st December, 1953, unless followed by some positive measures for disarmament leave Australia in a low state of preparedness.
2. Would the ‘agreed reductions’ in the Anglo-French compromise proposals be acceptable if they take account of all essential strategic conditions in addition to ‘economic’, ‘political’, ‘demographic’, and ‘geographic’ factors.

Obviously Australia is and has a special case, not only because of her Treaty commitments, but also because of her actual position on the map in relation to the densely populated areas in Asia. We would therefore expect some system of ‘weighting’ to be used in relation to any maximum allowable figure. This could be based on the factors already referred to. Furthermore, we would seek for a distinction to be made by any proposals between our permanent forces and citizen and reserve forces. In other words, we would consider, for ceiling purposes only, our permanent forces, the ceiling for which would be adjusted in accordance with the geographic, political, economic and demographic factors previously mentioned.

We welcome any ‘real’ changes which have developed as a result of the Soviet proposals of 10th May, but we should insist in dealing with the United Kingdom that we have a ‘special’ case in relation to the compromise Anglo-French proposals to which we broadly subscribe.

When the Defence Department’s views on the Russian proposals are received, it should be possible to clarify the Australian attitude very considerably.

[NAA: A1209, 1957/5685 part 3]

• 1 D. Gilfedder, Prime Minister’s Department.
• 2 The Soviet representative to the United Nations, Andrei Vyshinsky, introduced disarmament proposals at the opening of the General Assembly on 30 September 1954, details of which were sent in cablegram 520 from the Australian delegation to the United Nations, New York, and received in Canberra on 6 October 1954. The proposals represented a marked change from the USSR’s previous insistence that disarmament should be taken in one step. Vyshinsky accepted a position similar to that advocated by Selwyn Lloyd of the United Kingdom and Jules Moch of France; namely, that there be a phased process of disarmament (see notes 7 and 8 to Document 15). On 10 May 1955, in a plan that brought them even closer to the Western position, the Soviet delegation introduced new proposals that called for the removal of armies of occupation and foreign bases from Germany; the acceptance of ceilings for armed forces after disarmament; and acceptance that a prohibition on the manufacture and use of atomic weapons should be delayed until agreed reductions in conventional weapons had been 75 per cent completed. See Bernard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control , Greenwood Press, Westport, 1961, Chapter 8.
• 3 See Document 15.
• 4 This was initially based on papers submitted on 28 May and 12 August 1952. The United Kingdom, in conjunction with France and the United States, called for fixed numerical ceilings on the military forces of the major powers (see note 2 to Document 16). China, the United States and the USSR were to have between one and one and a half million people under arms. The United Kingdom also added that nuclear disarmament had to be tied to conventional reductions. See ‘Disarmament’, undated file note, NAA: A1838, 80/5/2 part 1. See also Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control , p. 189.
• 5 See note 8 to Document 15.