Canberra, 14 January 1957
25. Secret Guard
Disarmament
Main difference between United Kingdom and United States arises [from] United Kingdom desire for further opportunity to test and build up stocks of nuclear weapons before United Nations restrictions prevent it doing so.
- Australia has supported principles for disarmament as conceived by United States and has preferred them to United Kingdom approach. We have given weight to United States fear that little time may be left before a fourth power is in position to manufacture and test nuclear weapons. It would naturally concern Australia very greatly if Japan for example were in this position.
- However (and foregoing is subject to this) we want United Kingdom to have every reasonable opportunity to test and accumulate stocks of nuclear weapons before controls come into effect, as this would help to preserve United Kingdom’s position as a great power, being one of only three nations with nuclear weapons.1 We do not know how much longer time United Kingdom estimates it will need, and we would welcome any indication of this United Kingdom can give us.2 In any case it seems unlikely that rapid progress would be made in United Nations because 1. U.S.S.R. has given no indication it will accept effective international inspection system within its borders, which is essential to any system of control and 2. even if all powers were in agreement it would take some time to work out system of control and let it enter into force.
- Foregoing seems to be in line with your own thinking in your telegram No. 43.3 Best tactics in General Assembly seems to be to avoid any firm expression of opinion on these points by Assembly tying United Kingdom hands prematurely and to take next steps in Disarmament Commission and Sub-Committee.
[matter omitted]
[NAA: A1838, 80/5/2 part 1]
- 1 The Australian Government had received a number of cablegrams during 1956, a time of extensive nuclear testing at Maralinga, that indicated the United Kingdom’s determination to complete testing and deployment of both fission and hydrogen weapons before the final conclusion of a disarmament agreement. See NAA: A1838, TS681/10 part 6.
- 2 The UK Government had advised that ‘such measures will never be implemented in the grey world of today’. See Despatch 9/56 from Australian Mission to the United Nations, New York, 26 July 1956, NAA: A1838, TS681/10 part 6.
- 3 Not published.