Canberra, 4 June 1960
1463. Secret Priority
Nuclear Test Talks—Problem of Communist China
We discussed with Baker1 (Disarmament Affairs) on 3rd June the problem of Communist China and a nuclear test agreement. We asked whether it was realistic to contemplate the early conclusion of a Nuclear Test Treaty (assuming the Russians were still genuinely willing to seek such a treaty) in view of Communist China’s ability to frustrate any treaty unless her price (presumably involving recognition at the very least)2 were met.
- Baker said he saw the matter as falling into two stages, the conclusion of a treaty among the United States, United Kingdom and USSR and the continuation of such a treaty. The first step was for the three principal parties to sign a treaty and begin to implement it by the establishment of control posts and other inspection measures in their own territory. This would get the treaty under way. The second stage would be the adherence of other countries and the progressive implementation in their territories of the necessary control inspection measures. These two stages were of course closely related; if, in the second stage, a country such as Communist China refused to co-operate, the treaty would cease to be binding on the three principal parties. Baker said this would be clearly spelled out in the ‘phasing’ article of the treaty, which laid down the schedule for the installation of control measures.
[matter omitted]
[NAA: A1838, 919/3 part 4]
- 1 Vincent Baker, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Atomic Energy Affairs, US Department of State.
- 2 At this time, the mainland People’s Republic of China was still not officially recognised by a number of Western and Western-aligned governments, most notably the United States but also Australia, both of which continued to regard the Nationalist-led Republic of China, based in Taiwan, as the only legitimate Chinese government in the international sphere. This was reflected in the fact that the Republic of China was a member of the UN Security Council; the People’s Republic of China, on the other hand, was denied a seat in the UN altogether until October 1971, when Peking assumed its place on the UN Security Council. For Australia’s long road to recognition, see Doran and Lee (eds), Australia and Recognition of the People’s Republic of China, 1949-72 and E.M. Andrews, Australia and China: The Ambiguous Relationship, Melbourne University Press, 1985, pp. 133-47. For US recognition, see in particular US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976. Volume XVII: China, 1969-1972 , US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 2006.