6

Cablegram from Hodgson to Department of External Affairs

6 Cablegram from Hodgson1 to Department of External Affairs

New York, 2 June 1947

UN 552. Secret Immediate

  1. The Australian position on relationship between International Atomic Control Agency and the Security Council has been clearly and vigorously maintained throughout the Debate.
  2. At the outset of the Debate on 21st May, I stressed that the International Control Agency should not, in fact could not, be administered by the Security Council. I quoted extensively from the Minister’s analysis of 8th July 1946,2 and said that Australia still stood firmly for these principles. I pointed out that the Soviet Amendment3 was not in conformity with the General Assembly Resolution of 14th December, 1946, which provided that an International system of control should be established within the framework of the Security Council. It was radically different to say that the System should be administered within the Security Council. Australia could not accept control authority or jurisdiction by the Security Council over the exercise of powers and functions of the International Agency.

[matter omitted]

[NAA: A1838, 720/1 part 2]

  • 1 W.R. Hodgson, acting Australian representative on the UN Security Council.
  • 2 The analysis was based on the principles in Document 5.
  • 3 The Soviet Amendment, following soon after Baruch’s proposal, envisaged an alternative plan calling for two treaties. The first would prohibit the production and use of atomic weapons and, in an attempt to eliminate the US nuclear monopoly, require the prior destruction of all existing stocks of atomic weapons. A second treaty, to be negotiated within six months from the effective date of the first, would authorise the Security Council to administer penalties for violations. Unlike the Baruch Plan, which explicitly dictated that punitive action against offenders would be solely determined by a majority vote in the General Assembly, the Soviet proposal recommended that sanctions should be subject to the veto rights of the permanent members of the Security Council. See Barton and Weiler (eds), International Arms Control , pp. 71-2.