97 Memorandum from Douglas-Scott1 to Department of External Affairs
Brussels, 17 November 1967
585. Confidential
Non-Proliferation
The following is the text (to our knowledge still classified) of the five principles acceptable to the Euratom Five2 which the United States has been discussing with the Russians in Geneva:
- Safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty must be applied to source and fissionable material and not to facilities.
- There should be no misunderstanding that as far as Euratom member states are concerned, safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be applied on the basis of an agreement to be concluded between Euratom and IAEA.
- This agreement should be based on the principle of verification of Euratom safeguards by IAEA; the implementation of this principle shall be negotiated between the two organisations.
- Pending the conclusion of the agreement between Euratom and IAEA, Euratom member states concerned wish to stress that there should be no misunderstanding that the obligations with regard to Euratom (or to its member states) entered into by any party to a Non-Proliferation Treaty shall not be affected by provisions of Article III dealing with supply.
- Euratom member states concerned, determined to act in common, have to be sure that the position of Euratom when negotiating to arrive at a satisfactory agreement with IAEA will not be prejudiced by any eventual provision of Article III, as for example on a time period.
[matter omitted]
[NAA: A1838, 719/10/6 part 2]
- 1 Keith Douglas-Scott, Counsellor, Brussels.
- 2 The Euratom Commission had first been officially informed of the draft non-proliferation treaty at the beginning of February 1967 under the terms of the nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Euratom.