Cablegram 234 LONDON, 2 July 1940, 5 a.m.
IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET
War Cabinet this morning considered the Far Eastern situation and
had before it your telegram 27th June No. 330 [1] for which we are
much obliged.
After full consideration the War Cabinet came to the conclusion
that it would be desirable to reply as follows to the Japanese
demands.
(a) To agree to the withdrawal of the Shanghai garrison provided
that Italy also withdraws and on the assumption that British lives
and property will be protected and that Japanese Government will
not seek to alter the status of the concession except in
consultation with the parties concerned.
(b) To make enquiry as to the precise grounds for the complaint at
Hong Kong, and,
(c) With regard to the Burmese Road he [2] is to point out that
the passage of arms and ammunition does not offer any very
material contribution to the armed strength of China; that war
material from the United Kingdom has been insignificant in recent
months and that owing to their own war effort His Majesty’s
Government in the United Kingdom are in fact unable to supply
China with munitions of war. As to the stoppage of fuel, fuel oil
and petrol, trucks and railway material, His Majesty’s Government
in the United Kingdom would state that in making this request the
Japanese Government was asking them to take action inconsistent
with their obligation to India and Burma, for whom the Burmese
Road constitutes a legitimate trade route. [Relations] [3] with
the United States would also be affected in as much as the route
is largely used for United States products. It is proposed to [add
that] in strict neutrality a request to cut off these materials
from China should involve a similar stoppage of supplies to Japan
though of course this is in no way the intention.
Finally, it is proposed to say that far from prolonging
hostilities, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have
deplored them and have on various occasions expressed their
readiness, should both parties so desire, to use their endeavours
to bring the conflict to a dose.
In arriving at the above conclusion, His Majesty’s Government in
the United Kingdom have been influenced by the fact that, while it
is obviously desirable to avoid trouble with Japan at this moment,
it is doubtful whether the concessions from [weakness] on points
of principle, apart from other considerations, would bring any
lasting improvement in the Anglo-Japanese relations. Furthermore,
in any attempt to find a way of accommodation with Japan, care
must be taken not to destroy confidence in the United States and
China in the British policy.
As the Commonwealth Government are aware, the United States have
indicated that they are prepared neither to increase pressure
which might involve them in war nor to take the initiative in a
policy of conciliation. On our part we are quite prepared to adopt
the latter policy if it is capable of producing any results. But
the United States Government appear to hold the view, which we are
inclined to share, that the Japanese nation is in no mood to be
weaned from a policy of aggression, and in these circumstances it
seems more than likely that any concessions which we may show
ourselves ready to make will fail to deter Japan from her
objectives.
We are inclined to agree with Sir Robert Craigie that a refusal to
close the Burmese Road will not directly lead to war, and that the
Japanese will in the first place have recourse to less violent
measures. Unless Great Britain were to be defeated in the European
conflict it seems to us doubtful whether Japan would have recourse
to total war. Japan’s resources are not inexhaustible and should
she ultimately resort to hostilities it seems much more probable
that they would be limited and local and that, provided we
ourselves did not declare a state of war, she would terminate them
whenever it became apparent that a further advance would tax her
resources beyond their capacity. If Japan is bent on a policy of
this kind, it is unlikely that anything can be done at this stage
to deflect her. Nevertheless, Sir Robert Craigie has been
authorized to explore the possibilities and if these exist, His
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom will naturally do what
they can in consultation with the Dominion Governments to exploit
them.
In the light of the above and in view of the very bad effect which
the closing of the Burmese Road would have upon India, Burma and
Malaya, which would be directly affected, we feel that we should
not close the Burmese Road.
We fully appreciate the considerations advanced by the
Commonwealth Government from the point of view of Australia. It
will be understood that it is necessary for us to take into
account all the relevant factors, and we hope that in the light of
the wider considerations mentioned above, the Commonwealth
Government will feel able to concur in the terms of the reply
which it is proposed to [send] to Japan. We should be grateful for
a very early reply. [4]
We are repeating your telegram and this reply to His Majesty’s
Governments in Canada, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa,
with a request for any observations so far as they are concerned.
_
1 Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. III,
Document 452.
2 Sir Robert Craigie, U.K. Ambassador to Japan.
3 Words in square brackets have been inserted from the Dominions
Office copy in PRO: DO 114/113.
4 The Commonwealth Govt advised of its concurrence in the terms of
the proposed reply to Japan on 2 July. See cablegram 344 on file
AA: A981, Far East 31, ii.
_
_
[AA: A981, FAR EAST 31, ii]
_