Cablegram 90A LONDON, 26 June 1942
IMMEDIATE FOR PRIME MINISTER PERSONAE HIMSELF ONLY
My telegram No. 88A. [1] There is some further background that I feel I should give you personally. While what Evatt [2] obtained while he was here was most valuable we have to recognise there is a certain undercurrent of resentment against the special consideration shown to Australia and a feeling in some quarters that Australia is entirely selfish and out to get what she can for herself irrespective of the common interest and the wide strategical necessities of the war.
However unfounded these views may be we have to take them into account as our needs will be continuous and in the wide prosecution of the war to victory it is essential that the sound possibilities of offensive action based on Australia in the future should not be prejudiced by resentments felt against us and suspicions of our motives.
For example the munitions assignments obtained by Evatt from Lyttelton [3] have been the subject of violent protests by South Africa and New Zealand and when the arrangement came before the London Munitions Assignments Board for endorsement the American representatives asked that it should be recorded that they had not been consulted about the matter.
Further I have recently most confidentially and privately learnt that Smuts [4] has several times expressed the view that Australia is over-playing her hand in her special demands for consideration and since the Prime Minister [5] has been in Washington has sent a telegram to him and the President [6] expressing this view. This is of importance because undoubtedly Smuts carries greater weight with the Prime Minister and the President than anyone else. Our case, however, is basically so strong that I am not unduly alarmed by any of the above but it was because of my knowledge of the atmosphere that exists that I suggested at the end of my telegram No. 86A [7] that probably we had better acquiesce in the request with regard to the postponement of the delivery of the Spitfires.
It is also because of it that I have in my official cablegram to you so strongly emphasised the necessity of Australia’s representative in the War Cabinet not coming to be regarded as a mere advocate for Australia’s demands. I am also particularly anxious that our Representative should not be so regarded because even during the short time I have been in the War Cabinet I have felt that Australia’s representative can play a most useful part in the higher direction of the war.
BRUCE
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1 Document 531.
2 Minister for External Affairs.
3 U.K. Minister of Production.
4 South African Prime Minister.
5 Winston Churchill.
6 Franklin D. Roosevelt.
7 Document 529.
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[AA:M100, JUNE 1942]