Cablegram 122[A] LONDON, 2 August 1942, 11 p.m.
IMMEDIATE FOR THE PRIME MINISTER MOST SECRET AND PERSONAL HIMSELF ONLY
Following is note referred to in my immediately preceding telegram
121[A] [1]:-
‘In the course of a short conversation with the Prime Minister
this evening, after dealing with matters upon which I was seeing
him, some reference was made to the question of our representation
in the War Cabinet. As the Prime Minister stated with some
emphasis that, “His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland” must have the right to sit alone, and referred
to the impending arrival of an Indian representative and Nash’s
presence, it is fairly clear how his mind is working. He
visualizes the presence at meetings of War Cabinet of permanent
representatives of India and Australia, plus representatives of
other Dominions from time to time and possibly all together. This
is an impossible picture and illustrates the point on which I
differed from Page [2] when the question of our representation in
War Cabinet was in the melting pot. Page was endeavouring to
create a system under which a representative of each Dominion
would sit in the United Kingdom War Cabinet. This to my mind was a
quite unworkable proposition. I felt, however, that an immediate
crisis with Australia consequent upon demand for a voice in the
higher direction of the war following on Japan’s initial successes
might be overcome if an offer was made to the Dominions of a
representative in War Cabinet but only Australia accepted. Knowing
the attitude of Mackenzie King and Smuts this seemed a reasonably
safe bet. Fraser was the only doubtful quantity, not because he
wanted a representative in the War Cabinet, but because he might
feel impelled to insist on one if an Australian representative was
appointed.
In the result all went well as no Dominion other than Australia
asked for a representative in War Cabinet. On this basis it seemed
to me possible that the arrangement might work.
An examination of what Australia was asking, and what the Prime
Minister here promised, makes it clear that there were great
difficulties to be overcome if what was visualized in the exchange
of telegrams between the Prime Ministers here and in Australia was
to be realized in practice. [3] When Evatt arrived at the
beginning of May, it was clear that the arrangement had not
achieved what was hoped from it. This view Evatt held strongly and
he told me that in conversation he had with the Prime Minister at
Chequers on the Friday before he left, he had explained to the
Prime Minister the whole position and enlisted his co-operation in
putting it right. [4]
On this understanding I agreed to become Australia’s accredited
representative and set out my understanding of my task in my cable
to the Prime Minister No. S.34 of 4th June (copy attached
herewith). [5]
(Note:-From copy of this telegram (S.34) I withheld the sentence
with regard to the position of United Kingdom members of War
Cabinet.)
Since I undertook the responsibilities of Australia’s accredited
representative I have been trying quietly to improve the position
and was not without hope of eventual success. The visit of the
American representatives last week to discuss the broad strategy
of the war placed me in a considerable difficulty. I heard of this
visit when the Prime Minister announced it to the Cabinet on
Monday 20th July. As by Thursday I had not been summoned to any
meeting of War Cabinet either with regard to instructions to be
given to the Chiefs of Staff or to consider the results of their
discussions with Marshall and King, I felt that I should advise
the Government of the position and drafted the cable of 23rd July
[6] (copy attached herewith). This telegram I decided to think
over during the night and as I was summoned to a War Cabinet
meeting on Friday I decided to postpone sending it until after the
meeting. As a result of discussion at the meeting I decided not to
send the telegram. For it I substituted my telegram 111[A] of 25th
July (copy of which is attached herewith) [7] together with other telegrams I have sent on the subject of Hopkins, Marshall and
King’s Visit. [8]
Although the immediate problem created by the visit of American
representatives has passed the major question of implementation of
the arrangement with regard to our representation in War Cabinet
remains unsettled. The only hope of satisfactorily dealing with
this problem is by personal discussion between the Prime Minister
and myself
I am convinced that the Prime Minister is anxious to find an
effective means of honouring the obligation which he has
undertaken. The only solution which I can see is for the
Australian representative to take part in formulation of all major
questions of policy. If this, or some other arrangement that will
be reasonably satisfactory both to the United Kingdom Government
and Australian Government, cannot be acceded to, there appears to
be no alternative but to declare frankly that the contemplated
basis of Australian representation in the War Cabinet is
unworkable. The latter course would have most unfortunate results
and every effort of good sense and good will must be made to avoid
it.’
Note:-The draft telegram not sent which I refer to above I am
forwarding in my immediately following telegram 123[A]. [9]
BRUCE
- 1 Document 14.
- 2 Page had been in London as Special Representative of the Commonwealth Govt from October 1941 to March 1942. After a long illness he left London on 25 June and returned to Australia via the United States. He was co-opted as a member of the Advisory War Council on 26 August.
- 3 See Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-49, vol. V, Documents 259, 262, 289, 304 and 319.
- 4 See ibid., Document 508.
- 5 On file AA:M100, June 1942.
- 6 On file AA:M100, July 1942.
- 7 Document 9.
- 8 See cablegrams 112A and 114A of 25 and 27 July on the file cited in note 6.
- 9 Document 16.
[FA:A3195, 1942, 1.30572]