Cablegram E146 WASHINGTON, 7 June 1943, 4.02 p.m.
MOST SECRET PERSONAL
1. Eggleston’s wire No.21 [1] synchronises similar Chinese argument presented here at highest level. There is no occasion for further action by us because he can take it that reasonable reinforcement of United States air force has been decided upon.
Churchill views with suspicion Chinese propaganda to accelerate or dictate the nature of Burma attack which cannot commence until the end of monsoons and details of which are, in any case, a military secret.
2. Eggleston can be told that Australia has invariably given general support to China for it is an integral part of the war against Japan. But I have grave suspicions of the nature of communiques and sometimes think that Eggleston should always take this into account.
3. Specifically I would like his views on the following- (a) Was the recent Japanese attack an all out offensive on Chungking.
(b) Were Chinese communiques accurate or not-if not, for what purpose was position played up.
(c) Having regard to the universal assumption that the Japanese could seize Chungking at any time, is there any reason to suspect link up or understanding between Chungking and Japan as to the extent of operations.
(d) Have not Japanese forces in China been decreased by many divisions in the last six months.
As to (d) please tell me latest from Australian Intelligence Reports.
4. In any event, there is no need for Eggleston to send these messages to London. [2]
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1 Document 209.
2 Hodgson forwarded Evatt’s message to Eggleston on 8 June. See cablegram 112 on file AA:A989, 43/970/5/2/1.
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[AA:A4764, 3]