Memorandum [CANBERRA], 7 January 1944
MOST SECRET
FUTURE OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC REGION-CONFERENCE BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN
AND NEW ZEALAND MINISTERS, JANUARY 1944
With further reference to my letter of 20th December [1] I am
forwarding herewith a copy of a report by the Defence Committee on
the subjects on which information has been sought by you.
2. In view of the urgency with which this information is required
and owing to the absence of the Minister for Defence in Western
Australia, it has not been possible to submit the report to him.
As I have already discussed the subjects with the Minister I am
aware that the report meets with his general approval, subject to
the following special observations on certain passages:-
Fundamental Assumptions
Paragraph 5(a). In regard to the assumption in paragraph 5(a) of
the Defence Committee’s report that total reliance should not be
placed on any system of collective security, it is observed that
the establishment of an effective regional collective system in
the Pacific is considered by the Minister to be of vital
importance to Australia. He made this clear in his speech of 14th
December, 1943. [2]
As stated in paragraph 6 of the Defence Committee’s report, it is
impracticable for Australia and New Zealand to defend the
Southwest Pacific Area unaided and this has been the experience of
the present war. Australia is in a sphere of American strategic
responsibility and its security has been largely dependent on
American seapower and assistance from United States Land and Air
Forces and supplies which could not have reached this theatre but
for the exercise of such command of the sea.
Bases in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas which must be
controlled by a friendly Power
Paragraph 21. The Minister considers that the establishment of a
base in the Solomon Islands - New Hebrides Area as a joint United
Kingdom - Australian - New Zealand commitment is a matter for
later consideration in the light of subsequent discussions with
the New Zealand and United Kingdom Governments. This principle
also has a bearing on the reciprocal aspect of Australian
participation in the garrisoning of bases such as Singapore which
might later be raised by the United Kingdom Government.
The extent to which Australia will be able to maintain or to
contribute to the maintenance of the base in the Solomon Islands
New Hebrides Area depends upon the future strength of the
Australian Forces. This is related to the effectiveness of the
collective system that may be established and a review of the
principles of Defence which emerge as the result of the experience
of this war. The former cannot yet be determined and the Defence
Committee has an instruction to report upon the latter as soon as
it feels that it is in a position to do so.
Also related to the question of garrisoning bases outside
Australian territory in the post-war period are the limitations
imposed by the Defence Act.
There is also the definitive extent of the responsibility of the
Commonwealth Government for the Local Defence of Australia. In the
light of the experience of this war and the views outlined by the
Defence Committee, the security of Australia can most effectively
be ensured by a defence system founded on an outer screen of bases
in the adjacent islands. The question of the scope of Australian
Local Defence is also linked with the further development of co-
operation in Empire Defence.
3. In connection with your further letter of 31st December [3],
the aspects relating to defence policy are covered by the report
of the Defence Committee. It is added that the Defence Committee
considers that the subject matter of its report should not be
included in the confidential Handbook.
4. Enquiries have been made of this Department by Service
Departments as to the scope of the advice which your Department
desires from them in pursuance of a similar request made to them.
As the Minister for Defence is responsible for Defence Policy and
as matters relating to the activities of the Services included in
the draft agenda may have implications from the aspect of Defence
Policy, it has been arranged that Service Departments will
transmit any information that they may wish to furnish through
this Department. The attendance of any representative of a Service
Department will be at the discretion of the Service Minister
concerned for advice to him on Service aspects not involving
questions of Defence Policy.
F. G. SHEDDEN
Enclosure
FUTURE OF SOUTHWEST PACIFIC REGION-CONFERENCE BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN
AND NEW ZEALAND MINISTERS, JANUARY 1944 [4]
TERMS OF REFERENCE
The Defence Committee noted the wish of the Minister for De fence
that the Defence Committee should consider what could be done
towards meeting the request of the Department of External Affairs
for information on the following subjects for use in connexion
with the forthcoming conference between Australian and New Zealand
Ministers on the future of the Southwest Pacific Area:-
(1) Bases in the Southwest Pacific Area which must be controlled
by Australia;
(2) Bases in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas which must be
controlled by a friendly power;
(3) Extent to which Australia could maintain bases mentioned under
(1), including consideration of cost, manpower, industrial
potential, etc.;
(4) Mutual defence problems and interests of Australia and New
Zealand;
(5) Desirable forms of mutual assistance as contribution by
Australia and New Zealand towards maintenance of peace and
security (e.g. munitions, aircraft, staff co-operation, supply);
(6) Defence problems connected with civil air transport in South
west and South Pacific Areas;
(7) General view of a desirable international security system in
the Western Pacific.
2. The Defence Committee was informed that the Department of
External Affairs had on enquiry advised that for the purposes of
the foregoing Terms of Reference it was intended:-
(a) that the phrase ‘friendly power’ in paragraph 2 should be
taken to include the United Kingdom and New Zealand; and
(b) that the phrase ‘Western Pacific’ in paragraph 7 should be
taken to include the Far East.
The Defence Committee also proceeded on the basis that Australia
should be taken to include Australian Territories and the
Australian Mandated Territories.
3. With reference to the use of phrase ‘friendly power’ to cover
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, the Defence Committee re
corded its view that it was inappropriate to refer to other
members of the British Commonwealth of Nations as ‘friendly
powers’ and that such usage would be likely to cause confusion
particularly in connexion with matters of Imperial defence.
4. It was noted that in requesting the Defence Committee to
provide information upon the foregoing matters, the Minister for
De fence has stated that he realized that some of the questions
are dependent upon the effectiveness of any system of collective
security that may be established and on the strength of the forces
to be maintained after the war, and on both of these questions
some guidance from the Government is really necessary in the first
place. The task of preparing this report in connexion with
problems affecting the Pacific Area has demonstrated to the
Defence Committee the force of these observations and it has been
felt that, in the absence of that guidance from the Government and
in the present state of uncertainty, the most that can be done is
to make certain fundamental assumptions and deal with the
questions broadly upon such a basis.
FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
5. The Defence Committee considered that, for the purposes of this
report, it was reasonable to assume:-
(a) that total reliance should not be placed on any system of
collective security;
(b) that no country should accept the risk of relying primarily
for its defence upon the assistance of a foreign power;
(c) that the attack upon the Southwest Pacific Region against
which precautions should be taken is that of some first-class
Asiatic Power;
(d) that the present Japanese Mandated Territories will, after the
war, be under the control of a friendly power.
6. The Defence Committee also concluded that, because the security
of sea communications is vital to the defence of the Southwest
Pacific Region and this can only be secured by powerful naval and
air forces, it is impracticable for Australia and New Zealand to
defend the Area unaided and the best assurance of its security
would be a scheme of Imperial defence formulated and carried out
by the members of the British Commonwealth in co-operation. This,
however, would not be to the exclusion of a wider system of
collective security.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
7. Before considering the particular subjects referred to it, the
Defence Committee have thought it necessary to state what they
consider are Australia’s primary defence requirements, keeping in
mind the fact that the best defence is a strong and continuous
offensive against the enemy’s bases and sea communications. The
selection and position of our bases should, therefore, be such as
to assist offensive action. These primary requirements are:-
(a) Security of sea communications;
(b) Security from invasion; and
(c) Security from long range bombing from adjacent islands and
sporadic raids.
Security of Sea Communications
8. It is obvious that, unless we are able to protect the sea
routes linking Australia with the outside world and so ensure the
arrival of reinforcements and supplies, our local resources would
eventually be exhausted. The operation of our armed forces and
essential industries would be hampered and restricted through lack
of essential requirements such as fuel and we should be in danger
of falling a victim to the enemy.
9. The main ocean supply routes are open to attack by the enemy at
great distances from Australia, e.g. in the middle of the Pacific
or Indian Oceans, or alternatively at focal points near Australia.
Such attacks may be carried out by powerful naval units, raiders,
submarines, and long range bombers, and protection must be
provided against all these dangers. In order to operate the
necessary forces to give this protection, bases are required
strategically placed between the enemy and the shipping routes
where strong naval and air forces can be stationed to give cover
to the lighter forces such as cruisers, aircraft carriers, and
anti-submarine vessels which are required for the protection of
our convoys. Without this cover, our escorts would be driven from
the sea by powerful enemy units and our shipping would be left to
the mercy of the enemy.
10. In this war, the main bases used for this purpose in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans include the following:-
Pacific: Pearl Harbour, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, Solomon
Islands.
Indian: Kilindini, Ceylon.
These bases not only provide a cover for our defensive escorts but
also enable striking forces to attack the enemy’s bases and his
lines of communication.
11. The establishment of any operational base would involve the
provision of major defence works, including seaward and fixed
defences, aerodromes, installations for the repair and maintenance
of equipment and reserves of equipment and stores as well as
substantial Navy, Army and Air Forces as a garrison.
Security from Invasion
12. The best means of securing Australia from invasion is by
taking strong offensive action from established and well defended
forward bases. If, however, an enemy were sufficiently powerful to
seize, hold and develop island bases adjacent to Australia from
which an invasion supported by a strong force of land based and
carrier borne aircraft could be launched against the mainland, it
would be beyond our power to prevent a landing in strength at all
points along the 12,000 mile coastline. It would, however, be
possible, by a suitable disposition of our air and land forces and
by well organized air and land transport, to provide a substantial
degree of protection at vital points which would naturally be the
most attractive to the enemy as affording him the opportunity to
gain the quick decision that would be necessary for him before
overseas reinforcements could be brought up. Accordingly, to
provide advanced positions for offensive operations by our naval
and air forces, to prevent the enemy establishing bases in a
suitable position for an invasion force to assemble, and at the
same time to provide our forces with bases to cut across the
enemy’s lines of communication, it is considered advisable that
well defended bases should be available from the north-west to the
north-east of Australia. Further, the possession of such bases,
constituting as they would a threat to the enemy’s lines of
communication in the event of an attempted invasion, would operate
as a real deterrent to his making such an attempt.
Security from Long Range Bombing and Sporadic Raids
13. It is considered necessary to provide protection against long
range bombing from bases within one thousand miles of Australia’s
industrial centres. This can be most effectively done by the
holding of ,strategically placed bases at a considerable distance
from such centres in the neighbourhood of the areas from which
bombing might be possible.
14. Sporadic raids, i.e. bombardment by surface vessels or bombing
by carrier home aircraft and raids of a commando type having as
their main object destruction of installations followed by a quick
withdrawal, could also be countered from such forward bases.
Selection of Bases
15. In the light of these primary defence requirements, it is
considered that it is necessary to choose bases which will, so far
as possible, serve at the one time the several purposes of.-
(a) affording opportunity for offensive action;
(b) facilitating the rapid transfer of the armed forces of the
nations concerned with the defence of the South and Southwest
Pacific regions to permit of concentrations for operational
purposes;
(c) protecting sea communications;
(d) safeguarding against invasion; and
(e) safeguarding against bombing and sporadic raids.
The bases chosen should provide harbour facilities for naval
forces, a large number of air strips for the operation of strong
air forces, and should be so situated and adapted that they lend
themselves to effective land defence.
PARTICULAR SUBJECTS
16. With the foregoing general considerations in mind, and subject
to more detailed examination by the interested powers of the bases
to be selected, the Defence Committee submits the following views
upon the particular subjects upon which information is sought.
Bases in Southwest Pacific Area which must be controlled by
Australia
17. In the north-west, it is considered that although Darwin
should constitute the main base for the defence of Australia and
for offensive operations against enemy bases and lines of
communication, its effectiveness would be greatly enhanced by the
control of an advanced base in an area such as Timor for the
operation of air squadrons in particular. The possession of such a
base would add greatly to the range of offensive naval and air
operations and its denial to the enemy would remove a threat
which, as experience shows, prevents the full use of
Darwin as a naval base and ties down considerable land and air
forces.
18. In the north-east, it is considered that, in addition to other
bases in Australian Mandated Territories, a strong naval and air
base protected by an adequate garrison should be established in an
area such as the Admiralty islands. Such a location would be
preferable to Rabaul for a number of reasons, including the
following-
(a) it is the most northerly situation available and, if bypassed,
would constitute a continuous threat to enemy lines of
communication;
(b) it has a better harbour available;
(c) there would be no danger to installations from volcanic
disturbances;
(d) it is more easily protected in that it could not be approached
by successive steps along the coast but would have to be directly
assaulted from the sea.
19. It is considered necessary that arrangements should be made
for the establishment and maintenance of such bases and that
action should not be deferred until an emergency arises.
Bases in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas which must be
controlled by a friendly power
20. The Defence Committee considers that in view of the geo
graphical position of the Netherlands East Indies, it is necessary
for the safety of Australia that these Islands should be in the
possession of a friendly power and that strong bases (including a
base at Sourabaya) should be established for their protection to
prevent them being used as stepping stones for an attack upon
Australia.
21. A base in the Solomon Islands - New Hebrides Area is
considered important to the security of Australia, but in view of
her limited resources, Australia may not be fully able to maintain
this base, having regard to other essential commitments. It is
considered, however, that Australia should contribute to the
maintenance of the base to the fullest possible extent and that
the New Zealand and the United Kingdom Governments should also
contribute. It is also considered that New Zealand should maintain
a base in Fiji.
22. The question of a base in New Caledonia requires special
consideration. A base on the Island would be useful for the
purpose of naval and air operations, but its main importance would
be to deny the use of the Island to an enemy. In the hands of an
enemy, it would constitute a direct threat to Australia’s vital
centres. The Defence Committee considers that arrangements should
be made for Australia to have access to facilities in New
Caledonia to ensure that it does not fall into the hands of an
enemy.
Extent to which Australia could maintain Bases
23. Apart from the naval commitments involved, it is thought that
it should not be beyond the capacity of Australia to maintain the
bases which it is considered must be controlled by Australia. The
naval commitment should be regarded as an Imperial obligation in
which Australia should participate so far as her resources permit,
having regard to the necessity for the maintenance of a balanced
Defence Force. The Defence Committee felt that any consideration
of the detailed questions of what would be involved in cost and
manpower in providing for such bases cannot be undertaken at
present.
Mutual Defence Problems and Interests of Australia and New Zealand
24. The maintenance of the integrity of each country is of vital
concern to the other. In particular, Australia and New Zealand are
mutually concerned with the establishment and maintenance of the
bases previously referred to to the north-east and east of
Australia and to the maintenance by naval and air forces of sea
communications in the Tasman Sea.
Desirable Forms of Mutual Assistance
25. It is considered that in addition to what has been mentioned
previously co-operation between Australia and New Zealand for
defence should be developed along the following lines:-
(a) the organization, equipping, training and exercising the armed
forces under a common doctrine;
(b) joint planning;
(c) interchange of staff,
(d) the co-ordination of policy for the production of munitions,
aircraft, shipping and supply items to ensure the greatest
possible degree of mutual aid consistent with the maintenance of
the policy of self-sufficiency in local production.
Defence Problems connected with Civil Air Transport
26. It is considered that the main problem from the point of view
of defence in the development of air transport in the Southwest
and South Pacific Areas is to ensure that air transport routes are
strategically disposed for defence and can be defended. Even where
such routes are not the most economical, it is considered that
they should be developed at any rate as alternatives. Only
friendly powers should be permitted to conduct air transport
services within these areas.
International Security System in Western Pacific
27. It is considered that in an area stretching from Singapore to
Fiji it is imperative that there should be an effective system of
international security which would involve joint responsibility by
the nations concerned for a coordinated defence plan. Under such a
plan, each participant should undertake definite obligations and
accept responsibility for the defence of a defined area, but such
a division of responsibility should be accompanied by arrangements
for active co-operation including the common use of bases within
the defined areas. So far as Australia and New Zealand are
concerned, the meeting of the naval commitments involved in
defending the areas allotted to them would require to be the
subject of a common Imperial defence policy. It is appreciated
that the foregoing are matters for inter-Governmental discussion
of the Pacific settlement.
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1 On file AA:A5954, box 294.
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2 At the Federal Conference of the Australian Labor Party.
3 On the file cited in note 1.
4 This was discussed at Defence Committee meetings of 28 and 31 December 1943 and 5 January 1944.
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[AA:A5954, BOX 294]