150

Department of External Affairs to Hodgson

Cablegram UNY7 CANBERRA, 28 March 1946

MOST IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET PERSONAL

Only first three parts of your 359 (United Nations 13 [1]) have been received. They have been discussed with Minister, together with radio reports indicating that Soviet Delegation left Council Chamber and that Council would meet in camera. [2]

Minister’s directions are as follows:-

It is assumed that you have already opposed any hearings in camera but in any event at next sittings you must oppose this procedure so that hearings will take place in presence of public.

2. You should take the opportunity of indicating to press that Australia is opposed to hearings in camera.

3. You should endeavour to ensure fullest investigation in order to elucidate all the facts. This should include right of questioning of persons making statements in relation to dispute.

This applies not only to particular case under consideration-in addition, Council should lay down procedure along these lines for the future.

4. Copies should be obtained of all communications which have passed between Persian Ambassador [3] and his Government on Soviet-Iranian issue since 1st March.

5. While Australian views as indicated in instructions should be expressed, in order to avoid danger of Australia being isolated your aim should be to avoid moving positive amendments or carrying amendments to a vote unless there is likely to be some reasonable degree of support.

_

1 Also numbered Security 8 and dispatched 27 March, it reported that Gromyko had opposed the inclusion of the Iranian ‘situation’ on the Security Council agenda on the grounds that an ‘understanding’ had been reached between the Soviet Union and Iran.

2 Cablegram 370 (Security II) of 28 March subsequently reported that Gromyko had walked out of the Security Council that day after the Council had rejected a U.S.S.R. proposal for postponement of the Iranian item. The Chairman announced chat a private meeting of the principal representatives would take place the following day to discuss the situation caused by the U.S.S.R. withdrawal.

3 i.e., the Iranian Ambassador to the United States, Hussein Ala.

_

[AA:A1838 T189, 854/10/2]